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This	  thesis	  explores	  the	  obstacles	  in	  establishing	  a	  consistent	  and	  effective	  
response	  framework	  for	  humanitarian	  catastrophe,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  
maintaining	  a	  sustained	  dialogue	  to	  this	  end.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  recognizing	  the	  
underlying	  conflict	  between	  two	  positions:	  the	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  of	  states	  
into	  the	  affairs	  of	  others,	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  individuals	  caught	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  
violent	  conflict.	  The	  importance	  of	  working	  towards	  a	  resolution	  of	  this	  conflict	  is	  
illustrated	  through	  the	  case	  study	  of	  Darfur,	  where	  a	  divided	  international	  
community	  led	  an	  insufficient	  response	  to	  the	  crisis	  that	  can	  ultimately	  be	  judged	  
as	  a	  failure.	  Lastly,	  a	  recent	  attempt	  at	  reconciling	  the	  non-­‐
intervention/protection	  conflict	  is	  examined	  through	  the	  report	  of	  the	  
Responsibility	  to	  Protect,	  which	  takes	  important	  steps	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  
consensus,	  but	  ultimately	  suffers	  from	  inflated	  expectations	  regarding	  its	  scope	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Overview	  of	  Conflict	  
	  
To	  go	  to	  war	  for	  an	  idea,	  if	  the	  war	  is	  aggressive,	  not	  defensive,	  is	  as	  
criminal	  as	  to	  go	  to	  war	  for	  territory	  or	  revenue;	  for	  it	  is	  as	  little	  justifiable	  
to	  force	  our	  ideas	  on	  other	  people,	  as	  to	  compel	  them	  to	  submit	  to	  our	  will	  
in	  any	  other	  respect.	  But	  there	  assuredly	  are	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  is	  allowable	  
to	  go	  to	  war,	  without	  having	  been	  ourselves	  attacked,	  or	  threatened	  with	  
attack;	  and	  it	  is	  very	  important	  that	  nations	  should	  make	  up	  their	  minds	  in	  
time,	  as	  to	  what	  these	  cases	  are	  (Mill,	  1859).	  
	  
There	  exists	  a	  dilemma,	  conceptually	  and	  in	  practice,	  among	  the	  methods	  
of	  responding	  to	  humanitarian	  crises	  around	  the	  world.	  Too	  often,	  this	  conflict	  
has	  resulted	  in	  paralysis	  when	  swift	  action	  is	  most	  needed.	  When	  the	  conflicting	  
positions	  are	  the	  most	  contentious,	  and	  solutions	  least	  forthcoming,	  such	  inaction	  
has	  often	  been	  the	  difference	  between	  life	  and	  death.	  The	  remedy	  will	  not	  be	  
found	  in	  a	  push	  for	  action	  without	  a	  careful	  consideration	  of	  the	  conflict	  itself,	  nor	  
will	  a	  careful	  consideration	  of	  the	  conflict	  itself	  summon	  the	  necessary	  will	  to	  
take	  the	  first	  steps	  towards	  resolution.	  	  
If	  the	  focus	  in	  resolving	  this	  conflict	  were	  to	  remain	  on	  the	  task	  of	  saving	  
lives,	  we	  would	  already	  be	  well	  on	  our	  way	  to	  resolving	  this	  debate.	  




ignored	  as	  key	  players	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  humanitarian	  conflict	  resolution.	  Still,	  
they	  are	  not	  the	  only	  ones,	  and	  perhaps	  not	  even	  the	  primary	  ones.	  As	  the	  Seville	  
Statement	  on	  Violence,	  a	  proclamation	  by	  leading	  researchers	  in	  psychology	  and	  
neuroscience	  tells	  us,	  we	  are	  not	  doomed	  to	  violence	  by	  our	  nature;	  it	  is	  not	  in	  
our	  genes,	  or	  latent	  in	  our	  subconscious	  (The	  Seville	  Statement	  on	  Violence,	  
1986).	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  can	  work	  towards	  solutions	  to	  human	  catastrophe;	  
from	  improving	  systems	  that	  prevent	  large-­‐scale	  violent	  outbreaks	  to	  developing	  
consensus	  on	  how	  to	  stop	  them	  when	  they	  do,	  much	  can	  be	  done.	  
This	  thesis	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  find	  such	  systems	  or	  solutions.	  Instead,	  it	  
attempts	  to	  examine	  the	  state	  of	  the	  conflict	  at	  present	  in	  three	  stages.	  First,	  
through	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  opposing	  positions	  of	  the	  conflict,	  second	  by	  
examining	  the	  recent	  outbreak	  of	  violence	  in	  Darfur	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  
conflict,	  and	  third	  by	  summarizing	  the	  work	  of	  The	  International	  Committee	  on	  
Intervention	  and	  State	  Sovereignty	  which	  has	  attempted	  to	  address	  the	  conflict.	  	  
The	  conflict	  exists	  between	  the	  following	  positions:	  one,	  that	  the	  overall	  
peace	  and	  stability	  of	  the	  world	  will	  be	  best	  served	  through	  abiding	  by	  the	  
established	  norms	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  and	  non-­‐interference	  into	  the	  affairs	  of	  
one	  state	  by	  another;	  and	  two,	  that	  overall	  peace	  and	  stability	  can	  be	  improved	  
through	  more	  proactive,	  and	  even	  forceful,	  protection	  measures	  for	  individuals	  
caught	  in	  cycles	  of	  violence	  when	  they	  break	  out.	  This	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  




Framing	  the	  debate	  in	  a	  dichotomy	  such	  as	  the	  conflict	  between	  non-­‐
intervention	  and	  protection	  requires	  some	  clarification.	  Non-­‐intervention	  does	  
not	  imply	  the	  absence	  of	  protection,	  nor	  does	  protection	  imply	  the	  use	  of	  
intervention,	  and	  unless	  carefully	  described,	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  condensed	  into	  
sound	  bites	  arguing	  for	  the	  use	  or	  non-­‐use	  of	  force.	  Despite	  their	  deficiencies,	  
these	  terms	  will	  be	  used	  under	  admittedly	  broad	  strokes,	  as	  the	  best	  general	  
description	  of	  the	  many	  complex	  issues	  underlying	  the	  debate.	  	  
The	  tension	  between	  the	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  and	  protection	  is	  not	  
easily	  navigated.	  On	  both	  sides,	  there	  exist	  compelling	  arguments,	  and	  important	  
points	  to	  consider.	  In	  modifying	  slightly	  the	  words	  of	  Paul	  Ramsey	  (1983),	  that	  
“anyone	  who	  is	  impressed	  only	  by	  the	  immorality	  and	  probable	  ineffectiveness	  of	  
interventionary	  action	  should	  sensitize	  his	  conscience	  to	  the	  immorality	  and	  
probable	  ineffectiveness	  of	  non-­‐intervention”	  (p.23),	  I	  would	  add	  that	  those	  
impressed	  only	  with	  the	  immorality,	  and	  ineffectiveness	  of	  non-­‐intervention,	  
should	  sensitize	  their	  conscience	  also	  to	  the	  immorality,	  and	  probable	  
ineffectiveness	  of	  intervention	  as	  well.	  
Not	  to	  imply	  that	  nothing	  can	  be	  done,	  but	  simply	  that	  understanding	  and	  
affirming	  the	  valid	  concerns	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  non-­‐intervention/protection	  
conflict	  is	  absolutely	  necessary	  before	  any	  resolution	  can	  take	  place.	  Too	  often	  
the	  conflict	  has	  led	  to	  paralysis	  in	  humanitarian	  crises	  where	  clear	  actions	  are	  




criteria	  have	  not	  been	  developed.	  It	  is	  through	  an	  understanding	  of	  this	  conflict	  
that	  real	  consensus	  can	  be	  fostered.	  	  
Each	  side	  of	  the	  conflict	  will	  thus	  be	  examined	  through	  the	  arguments	  and	  
positions	  that	  inform	  them.	  The	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  will	  be	  viewed	  through	  
the	  perspective	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  law,	  sovereign	  inviolability,	  and	  empire,	  and	  
protection	  through	  that	  of	  human	  rights	  law,	  peacekeeping,	  intra-­‐state	  conflict,	  
and	  sovereignty	  as	  responsibility.	  
The	  Legal	  Debate	  
Resulting	  from	  two	  of	  the	  greatest	  conflicts	  of	  the	  21st	  century,	  the	  United	  
Nations	  was	  created.	  The	  largest	  body	  in	  history	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  international	  
conflict	  resolution	  is	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  international	  law,	  order,	  and	  peace	  in	  
the	  world	  today.	  It	  is	  also	  a	  source	  of	  the	  conflict	  in	  question.	  The	  values	  it	  aims	  to	  
uphold	  are,	  at	  first	  glance,	  competing.	  	  
One	  the	  one	  hand,	  enshrined	  in	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  interpreted	  through	  the	  
courts	  and	  largely	  through	  practice,	  the	  legal	  norm	  of	  non-­‐interference	  from	  one	  
state	  into	  the	  affairs	  of	  another	  is	  firmly	  established.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  
project	  of	  human	  rights	  informed	  by	  the	  universal	  declaration,	  and	  supported	  by	  
eight	  human	  rights	  treaties	  and	  numerous	  other	  conventions,	  one	  of	  which	  
requires	  action	  in	  the	  case	  of	  genocide	  to	  provide	  protections	  for	  individuals	  over	  
states.	  Thus,	  when	  states	  become	  egregious	  violators	  of	  human	  rights,	  the	  conflict	  




Human	  rights	  treaties	  are	  meant	  to	  encourage	  compliance	  with	  basic	  
human	  standards	  without	  directly	  becoming	  involved	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  a	  state.	  
Being	  essentially	  voluntary,	  states	  must	  sign	  and	  ratify	  the	  treaties,	  but	  are	  also	  
able	  to	  withdraw	  from	  them.	  Legal	  pressure	  to	  join	  and	  comply	  with	  such	  legal	  
treaties	  however	  can	  be	  very	  strong.	  NGOs	  (non-­‐governmental	  organizations),	  
civil	  society,	  and	  the	  international	  community	  can	  be	  effective	  in	  applying	  
political	  pressure	  and	  coaxing	  states	  into	  compliance.	  Additionally,	  the	  UN	  can	  
receive	  petitions	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  for	  a	  number	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  treaties,	  
and	  state	  parties	  may	  be	  called	  upon	  to	  present	  when	  such	  petitions	  are	  verified	  
and	  deemed	  to	  be	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  treaty.	  While	  it	  may	  not	  dramatically	  alter	  
the	  behaviors	  of	  a	  state,	  it	  does	  serve	  to	  expose	  them	  to	  the	  international	  
community.	  Most	  states	  are,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  sensitive	  about	  the	  reputation	  that	  
they	  are	  earning	  in	  their	  human	  rights	  records.	  
The	  Sovereignty	  Debate	  
The	  role	  of	  sovereignty	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  central	  issue	  in	  the	  non-­‐
intervention/protection	  debate.	  Sovereignty	  is	  the	  right	  of	  states	  to	  fully	  control	  
their	  own	  affairs,	  without	  the	  interference	  of	  other	  states,	  and	  is	  the	  principle	  
that	  allows	  for	  international	  relations	  to	  take	  place.	  Undermining	  the	  norm	  of	  
sovereign	  inviolability	  risks	  opening	  the	  floodgates	  of	  interstate	  behavior.	  
Unfortunately,	  sovereign	  inviolability	  has	  also	  allowed	  states	  that	  have	  turned	  
violent	  to	  continue	  campaigns	  of	  war	  crimes,	  crimes	  against	  humanity,	  genocide,	  




relative	  impunity.	  This	  challenge	  becomes	  magnified,	  considering	  that	  the	  
overwhelming	  majority	  of	  large-­‐scale	  violent	  conflicts	  since	  WW2	  have	  occurred	  
entirely	  within	  a	  sovereign	  territory,	  rather	  than	  between	  sovereign	  states.	  	  
The	  UN	  has	  tried,	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  peacekeeping,	  to	  reconcile	  the	  
two	  ideals.	  While	  not	  defined	  in	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  peacekeeping	  has	  been	  
historically	  a	  consensual	  activity	  that	  does	  not	  violate	  a	  states’	  sovereignty,	  and	  
which	  is	  generally	  not	  deployed	  without	  an	  existing	  peace	  process	  or	  functioning	  
cease-­‐fire	  agreement.	  Peacekeepers	  generally	  have	  the	  permission	  or	  invitation	  
of	  the	  government	  in	  question	  and	  do	  not	  violate	  the	  legal	  prohibitions	  on	  non-­‐
interference.	  
Peacekeeping	  does	  not	  impose	  peace	  from	  above.	  However	  after	  a	  chain	  of	  
failures	  to	  deploy	  peacekeepers	  or	  halt	  ongoing	  killing	  in	  Rwanda,	  Somalia,	  
Srebrenica,	  and	  Darfur,	  calls	  in	  the	  international	  community	  for	  more	  robust	  
military	  actions	  in	  the	  face	  of	  atrocious	  conflict,	  particularly	  when	  the	  UN	  is	  
unable	  to	  act,	  have	  surfaced.	  Generally	  such	  military	  actions	  have	  been	  given	  the	  
name	  “humanitarian	  intervention.”	  	  
Humanitarian	  Intervention	  
While	  this	  thesis	  is	  not	  about	  humanitarian	  intervention,	  it	  should	  be	  
pointed	  out	  that	  the	  term	  itself	  suffers	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  clarity	  and	  a	  conceptual	  
paradox.	  The	  term	  is	  generally	  used	  in	  the	  context	  of	  forceful	  military	  action	  for	  
humanitarian	  goals.	  Clearly,	  forceful	  military	  action	  is	  one	  thing,	  and	  




circumstances	  where	  no	  better	  alternatives	  exist,	  the	  dangers	  of	  its	  abuse	  and	  
appropriation	  are	  significant.	  Calls	  for	  a	  “right	  to	  humanitarian	  intervention,”	  
even	  when	  it	  is	  not	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  UN,	  surfaced	  in	  the	  80’s	  largely	  out	  of	  the	  
formation	  of	  Doctors	  without	  Borders	  and	  popularized	  by	  its	  co-­‐founder,	  Bernard	  
Kouchner(Chandler,	  2001).	  
Arguing	  for	  a	  right	  to	  humanitarian	  intervention	  will	  not	  assist	  working	  
towards	  a	  resolution	  to	  the	  non-­‐intervention/protection	  debate.	  It	  goes	  too	  far	  
towards	  disregarding	  law	  that	  has	  been	  conceived	  in	  the	  direct	  aftermath	  of	  
human	  tragedy,	  runs	  too	  high	  a	  risk	  of	  producing	  more	  of	  that	  which	  it	  sets	  out	  to	  
end,	  and	  is	  a	  very	  difficult	  concept	  to	  control	  and	  contain	  once	  released	  from	  its	  
legal	  chains.	  One	  example	  of	  this	  is	  when	  Kouchner,	  in	  his	  role	  as	  foreign	  minister	  
of	  France,	  suggested	  to	  the	  Security	  Council	  the	  use	  of	  forceful	  humanitarian	  
intervention	  to	  enter	  the	  restrictive	  Burmese	  government	  following	  a	  devastating	  
cyclone	  in	  2008	  after	  it	  had	  been	  slow	  in	  allowing	  international	  assistance.	  The	  
chief	  UN	  humanitarian	  coordinator	  at	  the	  time	  responded,	  “I'm	  not	  sure	  that	  
invading	  Myanmar	  would	  be	  a	  very	  sensible	  option	  at	  this	  particular	  
moment…[or	  that]	  it	  would	  be	  helpful	  to	  the	  people	  we're	  actually	  trying	  to	  help”	  
(Kazmin	  &	  Lynch,	  2008).	  
Still,	  the	  moral	  conviction	  from	  which	  it	  was	  conceived	  must	  be	  salvaged.	  
It	  is	  the	  same	  foundation	  that	  supports	  the	  idea	  that	  genocide,	  war	  crimes,	  crimes	  
against	  humanity,	  and	  ethnic	  cleansing	  are	  unacceptable,	  and	  should	  be	  stopped	  





The	  case	  of	  Darfur	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  depth	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  response	  
to	  the	  humanitarian	  crisis	  there	  is	  the	  latest	  example	  that	  an	  inconsistency	  in	  
actions,	  directly	  resulting	  from	  the	  unresolved	  conflict	  between	  protection	  and	  
non-­‐intervention,	  has	  resulted	  in	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  deaths,	  and	  millions	  
more	  war-­‐affected.	  Security	  council	  resolutions	  against	  the	  government	  of	  Sudan	  
were	  belated	  and	  insufficient	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  atrocities	  committed.	  Sudan	  
also	  continually	  reminded	  the	  UN	  that	  its	  territorial	  sovereignty	  must	  not	  be	  
violated	  by	  peacekeeping	  or	  intervention	  operations.	  It	  was	  supported	  by	  China	  
in	  the	  Security	  Council,	  which	  initially	  pushed	  for	  resolutions	  that	  requested	  the	  
consent	  of	  Sudan	  for	  greater	  UN	  involvement.	  Sudan	  declined	  the	  UN	  request	  for	  
consent	  and	  did	  so	  with	  hardly	  any	  punitive	  measures	  applied	  against	  it.	  It	  did	  
not	  acquiesce	  until	  international	  pressure	  on	  China	  led	  it	  to	  vote	  in	  favor	  on	  the	  
resolution	  establishing	  a	  peacekeeping	  mission.	  
Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  
Finally,	  the	  report	  of	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  (R2P)	  will	  be	  examined	  
as	  a	  recent	  attempt	  to	  establish	  common	  ground	  and	  reframe	  the	  arguments	  over	  
the	  non-­‐intervention/protection	  debate.	  Noam	  Chomsky	  has	  described	  
humanitarian	  intervention	  and	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  as	  being	  
“cousins”(Chomsky,	  2009).	  As	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  would	  contend	  
however,	  their	  relation	  is	  significantly	  more	  distant.	  The	  R2P	  was	  developed	  with	  




intervention	  and	  aimed	  to	  develop	  an	  alternative.	  As	  Kofi	  Annan	  has	  said,	  it’s	  
time	  to	  “get	  right	  away	  from	  using	  the	  term	  ‘humanitarian’	  to	  describe	  military	  
operations”	  (Annan,	  2000).	  
The	  R2P	  has	  achieved	  a	  moderate	  recognition	  following	  its	  inception,	  and	  
has	  even	  been	  described	  as	  an	  emerging	  legal	  norm.	  It	  is	  not,	  however,	  a	  panacea	  
for	  addressing	  outbreaks	  of	  violent	  intrastate	  conflict.	  There	  remain	  significant	  
obstacles	  to	  finding	  a	  balance	  between	  coercion	  and	  non-­‐interference	  in	  
addressing	  violent	  outbreaks	  of	  conflict.	  Among	  these	  include	  developing	  
agreement	  between	  the	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  to	  either	  
restrict	  their	  usage	  of	  the	  veto,	  or	  work	  towards	  a	  more	  representative	  balance	  of	  
power	  in	  the	  Security	  Council.	  	  
Still,	  it	  appears	  at	  present	  that	  the	  R2P	  will	  continue	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  
impetus	  for	  discussion	  in	  UN.	  Whether	  or	  not	  this	  discussion	  will	  lead	  to	  
improvements	  in	  the	  conflict	  resolution	  strategy	  for	  preventing	  outbreaks	  of	  
violence,	  and	  halting	  them	  when	  they	  do	  occur,	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  The	  
discussion	  itself,	  and	  continuing	  to	  foster	  conditions	  that	  allow	  it	  to	  take	  place,	  is	  
a	  necessary	  one.	  By	  reframing	  the	  debate	  over	  humanitarian	  intervention	  and	  
focusing	  on	  interests	  (the	  protection	  of	  individuals),	  the	  R2P	  has	  set	  out	  on	  the	  





Norm	  of	  non-­‐Intervention	  
The	  UN	  Charter	  and	  international	  law	  
After	  a	  preamble	  acknowledging	  the	  universality	  of	  fundamental	  human	  
rights,	  the	  preference	  of	  the	  UN	  charter	  for	  non-­‐intervention	  is	  well	  established.	  
The	  prohibition	  of	  force	  is	  clearly	  illustrated	  throughout	  the	  document.	  Article	  
2(4)	  states	  that:	  “All	  Members	  shall	  refrain	  in	  their	  international	  relations	  from	  
the	  threat	  or	  use	  of	  force	  against	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  or	  political	  
independence	  of	  any	  state,	  or	  in	  any	  other	  manner	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  
Purposes	  of	  the	  United	  Nations”	  (Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  2006).	  In	  one	  of	  
the	  most	  cited	  passages	  of	  the	  UN	  charter,	  article	  2	  paragraph	  7,	  it	  states	  that,	  
“Nothing	  contained	  in	  the	  present	  Charter	  shall	  authorize	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  
intervene	  in	  matters	  which	  are	  essentially	  within	  the	  domestic	  jurisdiction	  of	  any	  
state;	  but	  this	  principle	  shall	  not	  prejudice	  the	  application	  of	  enforcement	  
measures	  under	  Chapter	  VII”	  (Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  2006).	  The	  
members	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  UN	  Charter	  consist	  of	  nearly	  every	  state	  in	  the	  world,	  
excluding	  only	  the	  Vatican	  and	  Palestine,	  meaning	  that	  its	  provisions	  are	  nearly	  
universal.	  	  
Any	  exceptions	  to	  the	  legal	  prohibition	  on	  the	  use	  of	  force	  may	  be	  
determined	  by	  the	  Security	  Council.	  The	  Security	  Council	  is	  the	  primary	  body	  that	  
can	  legally	  apply	  force	  “as	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  or	  restore	  international	  
peace	  and	  security”	  (Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  2006).	  The	  15-­‐member	  world	  




permanent	  members—China,	  France,	  Russia,	  U.K.	  and	  the	  U.S.—may	  veto	  a	  
resolution,	  causing	  it	  to	  fail.	  
For	  most	  legal	  theorists	  who	  adhere	  to	  a	  strict	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
Charter,	  arguments	  for	  the	  unauthorized	  use	  of	  force	  that	  are	  not	  approved	  by	  
the	  Security	  Council,	  and	  are	  not	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  self-­‐defense,	  end	  here.	  Such	  
an	  interpretation	  means	  that	  a	  number	  of	  military	  interventions	  unauthorized	  by	  
the	  Security	  Council	  throughout	  the	  90’s,	  most	  obviously	  the	  NATO	  bombing	  
campaign	  against	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Yugoslavia	  and	  the	  2003	  Iraq	  war,	  were	  
manifestly	  illegal	  under	  international	  law.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  the	  General	  Assembly	  has	  twice	  
reinforced	  the	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  when	  political	  tensions	  during	  the	  Cold	  
War	  hung	  precariously	  low	  over	  Charter	  law.	  These	  resolutions	  both	  reading	  
verbatim	  that,	  “[no]	  State	  has	  the	  right	  to	  intervene,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  for	  any	  
reason	  whatever,	  in	  the	  internal	  or	  external	  affairs	  of	  any	  other	  State”	  (U.N.	  
General	  Assembly	  Res/20/2131,	  1965;	  U.N.	  General	  Assembly	  Res/25/2625,	  
1970).	  	  
	  
International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  case	  of	  Nicaragua	  
The	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  contained	  in	  the	  UN	  Charter	  has	  also	  been	  
upheld	  through	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (ICJ),	  which	  acts	  
as	  the	  jurisdictional	  arm	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.	  ICJ	  rulings	  are	  highly	  influential,	  




source	  of	  international	  law,	  according	  to	  article	  38	  of	  its	  statute,	  first	  through	  
“international	  conventions,”	  which	  includes	  the	  UN	  charter,	  and	  second	  through	  
“international	  custom,	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  general	  practice	  accepted	  as	  law”	  (Statute	  
of	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  2006).	  
By	  recognizing	  the	  importance	  of	  “international	  custom”	  in	  the	  latter	  
provision,	  the	  ICJ	  also	  recognizes	  that	  legal	  norms	  can	  change	  over	  time.	  Legal	  
norms	  are	  the	  foundation	  and	  basis	  for	  the	  laws	  that	  are	  built	  on	  them.	  When	  
legal	  norms	  change,	  laws	  are	  often	  amended	  or	  revised	  to	  reflect	  the	  dominant	  
norm.	  For	  such	  a	  change	  to	  occur,	  however,	  particularly	  in	  the	  international	  
arena,	  the	  practice	  must	  be	  widespread,	  and	  generally	  agreed	  upon.	  At	  present,	  
rulings	  of	  the	  ICJ	  have	  continually	  recognized	  prohibitions	  on	  the	  use	  of	  force	  as	  
per	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  underscoring	  that	  in	  the	  current	  state	  of	  legal	  norms,	  non-­‐
intervention	  still	  prevails.	  	  
The	  very	  first	  ruling	  of	  the	  court	  upheld	  the	  legal	  prohibition	  on	  force.	  
After	  a	  number	  of	  British	  navy	  vessels	  were	  damaged	  by	  mines	  in	  the	  Corfu	  
Channel	  of	  the	  coast	  of	  Albania,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  set	  up	  a	  minesweeping	  
operation	  against	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  Albanian	  government,	  arguing	  that	  it	  had	  a	  
right	  to	  intervention	  as	  an	  aggrieved	  state	  (Chesterman,	  2001).	  The	  court	  ruled	  
that:	  
Whatever	  be	  the	  present	  defects	  in	  international	  organization…[it]	  can	  
only	  regard	  the	  alleged	  right	  of	  intervention	  as	  a	  policy	  of	  force,	  such	  as	  




cannot…find	  a	  place	  [for	  it]	  in	  international	  law.	  (Corfu	  Channel	  Case	  
as	  cited	  in	  Chesterman,	  2001)	  
A	  later	  ruling,	  that	  set	  precedence	  and	  continues	  to	  be	  cited	  today,	  
regarded	  the	  U.S.	  intervention	  in	  Nicaragua	  during	  the	  Reagan	  years.	  In	  1984,	  the	  
CIA	  began	  operations	  to	  destabilize	  the	  communist	  government	  of	  Nicaragua	  by	  
laying	  mines	  in	  their	  ports,	  attacking	  oil	  installations	  and	  naval	  bases,	  and	  arming	  
and	  training	  a	  group	  of	  rebels	  known	  as	  the	  Contra	  (Stein,	  2004).	  In	  1986,	  
Nicaragua	  brought	  the	  matter	  before	  the	  ICJ.	  The	  court	  found	  the	  U.S	  to	  be	  in	  
violation	  of	  the	  law	  through	  its	  use	  of	  force	  and	  attempt	  to	  destabilize	  the	  
government	  through	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Contra	  rebel	  group,	  and	  decided	  that	  
the	  U.S.	  must	  pay	  reparations	  to	  the	  Nicaraguan	  government.	  
The	  ruling	  contained	  important	  passages	  for	  the	  future	  consideration	  of	  
intervention	  behavior:	  “The	  court	  cannot	  contemplate	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  rule	  
opening	  up	  a	  right	  of	  intervention	  by	  one	  State	  against	  another	  on	  the	  ground	  
that	  the	  latter	  has	  opted	  for	  some	  particular	  ideology	  or	  political	  system…”	  it	  
went	  on,	  “the	  protection	  of	  human	  rights…cannot	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	  mining	  
of	  ports,	  the	  destruction	  of	  oil	  installations,	  or	  again	  with	  the	  training,	  arming,	  
and	  equipping	  of	  the	  contras”(International	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  1986).	  	  ICJ	  rulings,	  
since	  the	  Nicaragua	  case,	  have	  upheld	  the	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention,	  and	  the	  
prohibition	  of	  force	  contained	  in	  article	  2(4)	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter	  (Stein,	  2004).	  	  
The	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  also	  forms	  the	  nucleus	  of	  other	  




article	  19	  of	  its	  charter,	  that	  “No	  State	  or	  group	  of	  States	  has	  the	  right	  to	  
intervene,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  for	  any	  reason	  whatever,	  in	  the	  internal	  or	  
external	  affairs	  of	  any	  other	  State”	  (Organization	  of	  American	  States,	  1967)	  while	  
in	  article	  4	  of	  the	  constitutive	  act	  of	  the	  African	  Union,	  members	  agree	  to	  the	  
“prohibition	  of	  the	  use	  of	  force	  or	  threat	  to	  use	  force	  among	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  
Union”	  and	  the	  “non-­‐interference	  by	  any	  Member	  State	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  
another”	  (African	  Union,	  2002).	  
Some	  arguments	  have	  challenged	  the	  prohibition	  of	  force	  in	  the	  UN	  
Charter	  by	  claiming	  that	  under	  a	  correct	  interpretation,	  there	  exists	  a	  legal	  
ground	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  humanitarian	  intervention,	  even	  if	  the	  Security	  Council	  
does	  not	  approve	  it.	  Two	  main	  versions	  of	  these	  arguments	  exist.	  	  
The	  first	  claims	  that	  honest	  humanitarian	  intervention	  does	  not	  violate	  
2(4)	  of	  the	  charter	  because	  it	  does	  not	  	  “result	  in	  territorial	  conquest	  or	  political	  
subjugation”	  (Tesón,	  1988,	  p.	  151).	  In	  other	  words,	  because	  the	  prohibition	  of	  
force	  in	  article	  2(4)	  is	  against	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  or	  political	  independence	  of	  
any	  state,	  humanitarian	  intervention	  either	  does	  not	  threaten,	  or	  can	  somehow	  
be	  conducted	  in	  a	  way	  that	  conforms	  to,	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Charter.	  
Seeking	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  drafters	  of	  the	  Charter,	  one	  can	  gain	  valuable	  
insight	  from	  the	  debate	  on	  this	  specific	  passage.	  As	  Chesterman	  (2001)	  points	  
out,	  this	  particular	  phrasing	  of	  2(4)	  was	  adopted	  during	  the	  San	  Francisco	  
Conference	  responding	  to	  the	  request	  of	  a	  number	  of	  smaller	  states	  to	  clearly	  




international	  relations.	  For	  Schachter	  (1984),	  to	  argue	  that	  any	  sort	  of	  
military	  intervention	  fails	  to	  violate	  territorial	  integrity	  or	  political	  independence	  
seems	  to	  work	  only	  if	  one	  assumes	  an	  “Orwellian	  interpretation”	  of	  such	  terms.	  
The	  second	  argument	  asserts	  that	  certain	  applications	  of	  force	  or	  
intervention	  can	  be	  waged	  in	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  
United	  Nations,	  and	  that	  humanitarian	  intervention	  is	  “in	  conformity	  of	  the	  most	  
fundamental	  peremptory	  norms	  of	  the	  Charter”	  (Tesón,	  1988,	  p.	  151).	  This	  same	  
reasoning	  was	  used	  in	  1983	  by	  the	  U.S.	  representative	  to	  the	  United	  Nations,	  
Jeane	  Kirkpatrick	  speaking	  on	  the	  U.S.	  intervention	  in	  Grenada	  when	  she	  argued	  
that	  there	  was,	  “ample	  justification	  for	  the	  use	  of	  force	  in	  pursuit	  of	  other	  values	  
also	  inscribed	  in	  the	  Charter—freedom,	  democracy,	  peace”	  (Nanda,	  1990,	  p.	  498).	  
The	  response	  to	  this	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  section	  of	  the	  Charter	  reading	  
“or	  any	  other	  manner	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  United	  Nations”	  
means	  that	  this	  prohibition	  on	  force	  should	  be	  taken	  in	  addition	  to	  other	  
prohibitions,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  rule.	  As	  a	  U.S.	  
delegate	  to	  the	  drafting	  committee	  clarified,	  “…the	  intention	  of	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  
original	  text	  was	  to	  state	  in	  the	  broadest	  terms	  an	  absolute	  all-­‐inclusive	  
prohibition;	  the	  phrase	  ‘or	  in	  any	  other	  manner’	  was	  designed	  to	  insure	  that	  
there	  should	  be	  no	  loopholes”	  (UNCIO	  in	  Chesterman,	  2001	  p.49).	  	  Furthermore,	  
the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  has	  already	  twice	  rejected	  arguments	  for	  such	  a	  
method	  of	  interpretation,	  including	  its	  invocation	  by	  Jeane	  Kirkpatrick	  (Holzgrefe	  




Ultimately	  the	  refutations	  of	  these	  arguments	  seem	  to	  reinforce	  
further	  the	  legal	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention,	  rather	  than	  challenge	  it.	  The	  
formation	  of	  the	  UN	  following	  two	  of	  the	  deadliest	  wars	  in	  history	  was	  done	  with	  
the	  firm	  conviction,	  learned	  through	  devastation	  and	  tragedy,	  that	  nations	  must	  
not	  resort	  to	  violent	  force	  against	  one	  another.	  As	  Stein	  (2004)	  writes,	  “as	  long	  as	  
the	  United	  Nations	  lasts,	  international	  law	  will	  never	  again	  permit	  the	  free	  use	  of	  
force	  by	  states”	  (p.29).	  
Of	  course,	  this	  has	  not	  stopped	  states	  from	  doing	  so	  anyway.	  The	  use	  of	  
force	  has	  continued	  and	  international	  law	  has	  been	  broken.	  In	  the	  ICJ	  Nicaragua	  
ruling	  for	  example,	  the	  U.S.	  refused	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  court’s	  order	  of	  
reparations	  by	  exercising	  its	  veto	  power	  on	  Security	  Council	  resolutions	  that	  
attempted	  to	  fulfill	  the	  edict.	  The	  United	  States	  then	  went	  on	  to	  disregard	  a	  near-­‐
unanimous	  General	  Assembly	  resolution	  urging	  U.S.	  compliance.	  	  
The	  U.S.	  reaction	  to	  the	  court’s	  ruling	  illustrates	  the	  reality	  of	  power	  
difference	  in	  international	  law.	  Not	  only	  does	  general	  disregard	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  
law,	  as	  shown	  by	  the	  U.S.,	  threaten	  the	  relevance	  and	  authority	  of	  the	  United	  
Nations	  and	  other	  international	  legal	  institutions,	  but	  also	  the	  international	  
political	  support	  for	  the	  further	  development	  of	  such	  institutions	  (Murphy,	  
1996).	  If	  one	  player	  in	  a	  global	  legal	  order	  is	  able	  to	  capriciously	  choose	  which	  
legal	  rulings	  to	  obey,	  and	  which	  not,	  the	  entire	  process	  risks	  becoming	  a	  farce	  
where	  those	  sincerely	  deserving	  of	  justice	  receive	  none,	  and	  cynicism	  or	  distrust	  




The	  problem	  is	  also	  one	  of	  consistency.	  If	  ICJ	  rulings	  have	  no	  real	  
chance	  of	  being	  applied	  due	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  veto	  in	  the	  Security	  Council,	  should	  
they	  be	  taken	  seriously?	  The	  ability	  for	  legal	  rulings	  to	  administer	  justice,	  
whether	  in	  bringing	  a	  halt	  to	  human	  rights	  abuses,	  or	  recognizing	  the	  unlawful	  
destabilization	  of	  democratically	  elected	  governments	  relies	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  
rulings	  to	  be	  carried	  out.	  Through	  the	  selective	  enforcement	  of	  human	  rights,	  the	  
upholding	  of	  law	  in	  the	  face	  of	  those	  who	  would	  disregard	  it	  veers	  dangerously	  
close	  to	  becoming	  a	  masquerade.	  After	  all,	  as	  George	  W.	  Bush	  stated	  to	  the	  
General	  Assembly	  during	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  invasion	  of	  the	  Iraq	  war,	  “Are	  
Security	  Council	  resolutions	  to	  be	  honored	  and	  enforced	  or	  cast	  aside	  without	  
consequence?”	  (Bush,	  2002).	  
While	  the	  case	  of	  Nicaragua	  may	  be	  a	  relatively	  clear	  one,	  the	  relationship	  
of	  international	  law	  to	  larger	  questions	  of	  morality	  and	  the	  application	  of	  justice	  
must	  be	  balanced	  through	  a	  host	  of	  different	  variables.	  Repeated	  violations	  of	  the	  
legal	  prohibition	  on	  force	  may	  be	  the	  symptom	  of	  a	  much	  larger	  cause,	  while	  it’s	  
possible	  that	  the	  current	  laws	  are	  insufficient	  in	  addressing	  or	  enforcing	  
nefarious	  behavior,	  and	  perhaps	  ought	  not	  be	  obeyed.	  	  
	   Glennon	  (2001)	  for	  example	  argues	  that	  law	  does	  not	  always	  lead	  to	  
justice,	  and	  that	  there	  may	  arise	  situations	  where	  breaking	  it	  is	  preferable	  to	  
arguing	  for	  a	  different	  interpretation	  or	  pushing	  for	  its	  repeal.	  Using	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  NATO	  intervention	  in	  Kosovo,	  he	  argues	  that	  while	  the	  operation	  did	  violate	  




law	  is	  not	  represented	  by	  the	  Charter	  alone,”	  and	  that	  particularly	  in	  the	  area	  
of	  military	  force,	  international	  law	  is	  inadequate	  (Glennon,	  2001,	  p.	  190).	  
The	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  however	  is	  established	  in	  more	  than	  the	  UN	  
Charter.	  Perhaps	  the	  strongest	  legal	  precedence	  for	  the	  non-­‐intervention	  of	  a	  
state	  into	  the	  affairs	  of	  another	  is	  that	  of	  sovereignty,	  specifically	  the	  norm	  of	  
sovereign	  inviolability.	  	  
Sovereign	  Inviolability	  	  
“It	  is	  better	  to	  recognize	  that	  we	  are	  in	  darkness,	  than	  to	  pretend	  that	  we	  
can	  see	  the	  light”	  (Bull,	  1977,	  p.	  320).	  
Any	  discussion	  on	  the	  interference	  of	  one	  state	  into	  the	  affairs	  of	  another	  
will	  require	  an	  examination	  of	  sovereignty.	  In	  this	  section,	  sovereignty	  is	  
examined	  through	  its	  role	  as	  the	  guarantor	  against	  interference	  and	  aggression	  
between	  states	  of	  different	  levels	  of	  power	  and	  influence,	  and	  as	  the	  foundation	  
for,	  and	  operational	  principle	  of,	  international	  relations.	  	  
Using	  the	  definition	  of	  Hedley	  Bull,	  a	  sovereign	  state	  emerges	  from	  a	  
government	  that	  is	  able	  to	  exercise	  autonomous	  control	  over	  a	  defined	  territory	  
and	  group	  of	  people	  not	  just	  by	  right,	  but	  also	  in	  practice	  (Bull,	  1977).	  It	  is	  
through	  this	  formation	  of	  statehood,	  and	  the	  capacity	  for	  internal	  control	  that	  a	  
state	  develops	  the	  right	  and	  practice	  for	  non-­‐interference	  by	  external	  actors	  in	  its	  
domestic	  affairs.	  
Sovereignty	  is	  thus	  divided	  into	  different	  elements,	  two	  of	  which	  are	  




and	  the	  assurance	  of	  the	  non-­‐intervention	  from	  other	  sovereign	  states	  
(external).	  Both	  parts	  are	  necessary	  to	  make	  up	  the	  whole.	  If	  a	  government	  lacks	  
internal	  sovereign	  authority	  over	  the	  entire	  domestic	  society,	  or	  competing	  
claims	  to	  the	  title	  exist,	  the	  international	  community	  cannot	  know	  whose	  
legitimacy	  to	  recognize.	  Likewise,	  a	  state	  under	  the	  control	  of	  external	  
interference	  to	  the	  point	  that	  it	  longer	  possesses	  autonomy	  over	  its	  territory,	  is	  in	  
the	  most	  basic	  sense,	  no	  longer	  a	  sovereign	  entity	  (Zaum,	  2007).	  
Sovereignty	  also	  enables	  the	  practices	  of	  diplomacy,	  international	  
relations	  and	  international	  organization.	  For	  agreements,	  understandings,	  or	  
relationships	  to	  take	  place	  at	  the	  international	  level,	  state	  representatives	  
interact	  with	  other	  state	  representatives	  with	  the	  knowledge	  that	  they	  speak	  for	  
the	  sovereign	  entity.	  Such	  representatives	  must	  also	  be	  present	  for	  participation	  
and	  membership	  in	  the	  international	  community.	  General	  assembly	  meetings	  or	  
other	  international	  forums	  only	  have	  one	  seat	  for	  each	  country,	  and	  decisions	  are	  
not	  easily	  made	  lacking	  an	  agreement	  over	  who	  holds	  the	  sovereignty,	  and	  who	  
represents	  the	  territory	  and	  population	  of	  a	  region.	  
From	  being	  recognized	  in	  the	  international	  community	  and	  international	  
organizations,	  to	  being	  included	  in	  international	  agreements	  and	  participate	  in	  
the	  worlds’	  international	  organizations,	  sovereignty	  underwrites	  the	  foundation	  
of	  the	  global	  political	  world	  order.	  It	  is	  inseparable	  from	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  
modern	  state,	  is	  protected,	  defined,	  and	  interwoven	  in	  domestic	  and	  




empire	  (De	  Jouvenel,	  1957;	  Hinsley,	  1966).	  To	  eliminate	  or	  modify	  beyond	  
recognition	  state	  sovereignty	  would	  “grind	  to	  a	  halt…the	  internal	  mechanism	  of	  
the	  separate	  modern	  community…	  so	  much	  so	  that…its	  abandonment	  remains	  
impossible”	  (Hinsley,	  1966,	  p.	  215).	  
While	  sovereignty	  hasn’t	  always	  successfully	  prevented	  conflict	  or	  wars	  
from	  breaking	  out,	  it	  has	  persisted	  and	  survived	  through	  them,	  and	  has	  been	  a	  
feature	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  world	  orders	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  aftermath.	  As	  Stephen	  
Krasner	  points	  out,	  if	  certain	  features	  do	  evolve	  regarding	  the	  nature	  or	  scope	  of	  
state	  authority,	  the	  organization	  of	  political	  life	  is	  not	  about	  to	  be	  conducted	  
around	  anything	  else;	  sovereignty	  remains	  the	  sole	  viable	  concept	  (Krasner,	  
1999).	  
The	  emergence	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  Sovereignty	  happened	  in	  the	  16th	  and	  
17th	  centuries,	  first	  through	  Jean	  Bodin’s	  16th	  century	  definition,	  the	  unmitigated	  
and	  unending	  power	  of	  a	  republic,	  where	  the	  ruler	  is	  held	  accountable	  only	  to	  
God	  and	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  (Bodin,	  1992),	  and	  later	  by	  the	  work	  done	  by	  Thomas	  
Hobbes	  in	  his	  1651	  treatise	  Leviathan.	  The	  emergence	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  its	  
application	  in	  the	  treaty	  of	  Westphalia	  has	  been	  largely	  informed	  by	  evolving	  
views	  on	  human	  nature.	  
Writing	  mostly	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  domestic,	  or	  internal	  sovereign	  authority,	  
the	  Hobbesian	  concept	  was	  born	  out	  of	  a	  perceived	  chaos,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  order	  
to	  be	  imposed	  upon	  it.	  For	  Hobbes	  the	  essence	  of	  human	  nature	  is	  derived	  from	  




our	  appetites	  that	  will	  lead	  to	  our	  well-­‐being.	  Because	  each	  person	  is	  
motivated	  largely	  by	  self-­‐interests,	  they	  become	  in	  competition	  with,	  and	  the	  
potential	  enemy	  of,	  everyone	  else,	  especially	  when	  resources	  are	  scarce	  (Newey,	  
2008).	  The	  result	  is	  a	  “war	  of	  all,	  against	  all,”	  or,	  what	  Hobbes	  identifies	  as	  a	  
“state	  of	  nature”	  (Strauss,	  1952).	  	  
The	  unmitigated	  anarchy	  present	  in	  Hobbes’	  state	  of	  nature	  leads	  to	  fear,	  
out	  of	  which	  arises	  the	  desire	  for	  order	  and	  security.	  It	  is	  this	  order	  that	  the	  
sovereign	  state	  can	  provide,	  when	  individuals	  “recognize	  as	  their	  real	  enemy	  is	  
not	  the	  rival,	  but	  that	  terrible	  enemy	  of	  nature,	  death,	  who,	  as	  their	  common	  
enemy,	  forces	  them	  to	  mutual	  understanding,	  trust	  and	  union…”	  (Strauss,	  1952,	  
p.	  22).	  Out	  of	  this	  realization	  the	  internal	  sovereign	  authority	  is	  created,	  both	  to	  
provide	  for	  domestic	  order,	  protect	  against	  outside	  influence,	  and	  to	  prevent	  
human	  nature	  from	  acting	  out	  its	  basic	  nature	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  perpetual	  
insecurity	  and	  war.	  In	  the	  international	  arena,	  human	  nature	  is	  simply	  magnified,	  
and	  states	  peruse	  their	  interests	  much	  like	  individuals	  would,	  both	  in	  order	  to	  
surpass	  every	  other,	  and	  to	  secure	  their	  own	  well	  being	  in	  a	  world	  of	  like	  states.	  	  
This	  concept	  has	  served	  as	  the	  impetus	  for	  the	  line	  of	  political	  thought	  that	  
sovereignty	  must	  not	  submit	  to	  outside	  influence	  that	  would	  seek	  to	  weaken	  it,	  
and	  also	  raises	  the	  important	  dynamic	  of	  power	  difference.	  Power	  dynamics	  in	  
international	  relations,	  as	  realists	  E.	  H.	  Carr	  and	  Hans	  Morgenthau	  argue,	  will	  
always	  influence	  political	  outcomes	  and	  international	  policy	  (Scheuerman,	  2007).	  




of	  criteria	  through	  treaties,	  laws,	  or	  organizations	  is,	  as	  Morgenthau	  writes,	  
“contrary	  to	  logic,	  and	  politically	  unfeasible”	  (in	  Scheuerman,	  2007,	  p.	  259).	  
Carl	  Schmitt	  shared	  in	  Morgenthau’s	  disdain	  for	  the	  weakening	  of	  
sovereignty.	  Schmitt	  argued,	  like	  Hobbes,	  that	  a	  strong	  sovereign	  state	  is	  
necessary	  to	  provide	  order,	  security,	  and	  stability,	  and	  that	  a	  state	  cannot	  exist	  
legitimately	  without	  absolute	  authority	  over	  and	  above	  all	  other	  parts	  of	  society	  
(Zuckert	  &	  Zuckert,	  2006).	  Schmitt	  argues	  that	  any	  rhetoric	  calling	  for	  the	  
violation	  of	  sovereignty	  through	  the	  invocation	  of	  “humanity”	  simply	  wishes	  to	  
cheat	  (Schmitt,	  1996).	  For	  Schmitt	  those	  wishing	  to	  qualify	  sovereignty	  through	  
laws	  or	  practice,	  even	  when	  claimed	  to	  be	  humanitarian,	  amount	  to	  
“irresponsible	  utopianism,	  and/or	  a	  set	  of	  moralistic	  platitudes	  cynically	  invoked	  
to	  cover	  the	  power	  bids	  of	  a	  superpower	  or	  of	  a	  few	  great	  powers	  against	  the	  
weaker	  ones”(Cohen	  J.	  L.,	  2004,	  p.	  4).	  	  
Most	  conceptions	  of	  sovereignty,	  however,	  recognize	  that	  state	  authority	  
must	  be	  tempered,	  if	  for	  nothing	  but	  fulfilling	  the	  states	  own	  best	  interest.	  
Machiavellian	  statesmanship,	  and	  totalitarian	  strategy	  are	  often	  
counterproductive,	  and	  damaging	  to	  the	  overall	  goals	  of	  the	  state.	  Furthermore,	  
the	  sovereign	  authority	  clearly	  may	  recognize	  self-­‐imposed	  limitations	  on	  its	  
power	  without	  sacrificing	  the	  larger	  sovereignty	  as	  a	  whole,	  or	  the	  right	  it	  has	  for	  
non-­‐intervention.	  As	  Hinsley	  (1966)	  points	  out,	  sovereignty	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  




maintains	  no	  more	  than	  that	  there	  must	  be	  a	  supreme	  authority	  within	  the	  
political	  community	  if	  the	  community	  is	  to	  exist	  at	  all…”	  (P.217).	  
Limitations	  of	  power	  on	  a	  sovereign	  authority	  go	  further	  still,	  in	  that	  if	  the	  
subjects	  of	  the	  sovereign	  no	  longer	  accept	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  government,	  the	  
authority	  can	  change,	  either	  by	  the	  force	  of	  a	  revolution,	  or	  by	  the	  decision	  of	  a	  
vote.	  Instead	  of	  absolute,	  or	  divine	  authority,	  Stankiewicz	  (1969)	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  
the	  function	  of	  sovereignty	  that	  ensures	  security	  and	  order	  within	  a	  society.	  This	  
function	  “creates	  the	  obedience	  that	  makes	  sovereign	  power	  and	  its	  exercise	  
possible.	  Only	  in	  one	  sense	  is	  the	  sovereign	  separate	  and	  above	  the	  people	  
(absolute	  and	  unlimited):	  no	  one	  else	  has	  more	  power	  unless	  he	  replaces	  him	  as	  
sovereign”	  (Stankiewicz,	  1969,	  p.	  10).	  	  
The	  so-­‐called	  English	  school	  of	  realism	  breaks	  with	  the	  strictures	  that	  
Morgenthau	  and	  Schmitt	  placed	  on	  the	  weakening	  of	  state	  sovereignty.	  It	  still	  
recognizes	  that	  anarchy	  exists,	  largely	  as	  a	  product	  of	  human	  nature,	  and	  that	  
power	  remains	  the	  largest	  consideration	  for	  international	  relations,	  but	  it	  
contends	  that	  there	  are	  other	  factors	  for	  maintaining	  order	  in	  world	  politics,	  and	  
that	  international	  law	  and	  international	  organizations,	  even	  if	  they	  weaken	  state	  
sovereignty,	  have	  played	  a	  role	  in	  providing	  such	  rules.	  Many	  of	  the	  ideas	  of	  the	  
English	  school	  have	  been	  drawn	  from	  Hedley	  Bull	  (1977),	  who	  argues	  that	  an	  
international	  society	  can	  arise	  from	  anarchy,	  and	  that	  order	  is	  a	  valuable	  and	  





The	  English	  school	  does	  not	  question	  the	  norm	  of	  sovereign	  
inviolability	  as	  the	  structure	  of	  international	  relations,	  but	  it	  recognizes	  that	  
achieving	  the	  common	  goals	  of	  all	  social	  life	  should	  be	  inter	  alia,	  “[the]	  limitation	  
of	  violence	  resulting	  in	  death	  or	  bodily	  harm”	  (Bull,	  1977,	  p.	  18).	  Through	  
recognizing	  the	  existence	  of	  order	  among	  nations,	  more	  effective	  political	  
structures	  can	  be	  developed.	  Just	  because	  anarchy	  arises	  from	  human	  nature	  
does	  not	  mean	  we	  must	  abandon	  working	  towards	  of	  normative	  moral	  
frameworks.	  	  
Recognizing	  the	  interconnectedness	  among	  sovereign	  nations	  enables	  us	  
to	  “behave—at	  least	  in	  some	  measure—as	  parts	  of	  a	  whole”	  (Bull,	  1977,	  p.	  7).	  The	  
basic	  argument	  is	  that	  state	  actions	  are	  not	  performed	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  and	  that	  even	  
actions	  believed	  to	  be	  made	  in	  a	  state’s	  self	  interest	  can	  return	  to	  haunt	  them.	  
One	  example	  of	  this	  could	  be	  a	  tragedy	  of	  the	  commons	  scenario	  where	  the	  
unrestricted	  individual	  pursuit	  of	  a	  limited	  resource	  by	  all	  could	  result	  in	  the	  
exhaustion	  of	  the	  resource	  and	  its	  availability	  for	  none(Hardin,	  1968).	  To	  avoid	  
such	  a	  disaster,	  and	  to	  minimize	  the	  unrest	  and	  violence	  that	  would	  likely	  follow,	  
political	  entities	  should	  subject	  themselves	  to	  the	  “observance	  of	  certain	  rules	  of	  
coexistence”	  in	  maintaining	  their	  independent	  sovereignty	  (Bull,	  1977,	  p.	  283).	  	  
Still,	  even	  though	  international	  society	  may	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play	  in	  limiting	  
violence	  and	  bodily	  harm,	  Bull	  concludes	  that	  it	  could	  not	  exist	  without	  the	  norm	  




foundation	  of	  world	  order,	  and	  the	  only	  potential	  starting	  place	  for	  achieving	  
international	  consensus	  (Bull,	  1977,	  p.	  296).	  
The	  role	  and	  scope	  of	  these	  “rules	  of	  coexistence,”	  have	  resulted	  in	  a	  split	  
within	  the	  English	  school.	  The	  solidarists	  argue	  that	  such	  rules	  should	  be	  devised	  
with	  a	  focus	  on	  achieving	  justice	  and	  upholding	  human	  rights	  in	  international	  
society,	  “by	  leaving	  a	  margin	  for	  the	  use	  of	  reason	  and	  morality	  in	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  existing	  rules	  of	  law”	  (Knudsen,	  2002).	  Some	  solidarists	  even	  
allow	  for	  limited	  use	  of	  force	  in	  the	  upholding	  and	  maintaining	  of	  international	  
justice.	  English	  school	  pluralists	  disagree,	  and	  maintain	  that	  respect	  for	  
established	  norms	  of	  nonintervention	  are	  essential.	  The	  pluralists	  argue	  that	  
states	  will	  not	  agree	  to	  justice	  from	  above,	  particularly	  where	  it	  infringes	  upon	  
sovereignty,	  beyond	  the	  fewest	  number	  of	  conditions	  necessary	  in	  maintaining	  
international	  order	  (Sterling-­‐Folker,	  2006).	  	  
These	  two	  sides	  do	  not	  differ	  in	  the	  conviction	  that	  mass	  human	  rights	  
violations	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  are	  intolerable	  and	  deplorable,	  only	  in	  
their	  beliefs	  of	  how	  to	  best	  prevent	  them.	  The	  concern	  in	  weakening	  sovereignty	  
is	  that	  once	  it	  becomes	  subordinate	  to	  the	  claims	  of	  humanitarianism,	  the	  existing	  
international	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  the	  system	  of	  international	  organization	  will	  
collapse,	  or	  be	  rendered	  obsolete	  (Byers	  &	  Chesterman,	  2003).	  Once	  sovereignty	  
must	  be	  justified	  through	  a	  set	  of	  criteria,	  the	  focus	  shifts	  away	  from	  the	  




action	  for	  whatever	  reason,	  are	  given	  another	  tool	  with	  which	  to	  do	  it:	  the	  
invocation	  of	  humanity.	  	  
Byers	  &	  Chesterman	  (2003)	  are	  concerned	  that	  by	  allowing	  exceptions	  to	  
the	  norm	  of	  sovereign	  inviolability,	  the	  world	  will	  evidence	  more	  human	  rights	  
violations	  rather	  than	  less.	  Diluting	  the	  strength	  of	  sovereignty	  will	  weaken	  a	  
deterrent	  to	  hegemonic	  influence	  and	  interstate	  abuse.	  The	  danger	  is	  that	  we	  
should	  drift	  back	  to	  a	  global	  state	  of	  affairs	  dominated	  by	  the	  use	  of	  military	  
power	  as	  a	  diplomatic	  tool,	  rather	  than	  international	  law	  and	  organizations.	  The	  
concern	  for	  undermining	  the	  norm	  of	  sovereign	  inviolability	  is	  summed	  up	  nicely	  
by	  Glennon	  (2001)	  when	  he	  writes:	  
It	  is	  tempting	  to	  think	  that	  a	  power	  so	  benevolent	  as	  turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐century	  
America	  will	  remain	  benevolent	  forever.	  Perhaps	  it	  will,	  but	  history	  
provides	  room	  for	  concern	  that,	  if	  it	  is	  not	  the	  United	  States	  that	  
malevolently	  takes	  advantage	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  rules,	  another	  emerging	  power	  
will	  do	  so	  (p.194).	  
It	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  then	  that	  countries	  most	  vulnerable	  to	  
coercion	  from	  powerful	  states	  are	  the	  most	  adamant	  in	  their	  defense	  of	  
sovereignty.	  The	  developing	  world	  has	  repeatedly	  expressed	  concern	  over	  the	  
importance	  of	  sovereign	  inviolability.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  114	  member	  Non-­‐
Aligned	  Movement	  statement	  which	  unanimously	  condemned	  humanitarian	  
intervention	  in	  2000,	  the	  president	  of	  Algeria	  and	  chairperson	  for	  the	  




undermining	  of	  our	  sovereignty,	  not	  only	  because	  sovereignty	  is	  our	  last	  
defense	  against	  the	  rules	  of	  an	  unequal	  world,	  but	  because	  we	  are	  not	  taking	  part	  
in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  of	  the	  Security	  Council”	  (in	  Glennon,	  2001,	  p.	  
158).	  Nelson	  Mandela,	  speaking	  on	  the	  rise	  of	  humanitarian	  intervention,	  also	  
criticized	  the	  unauthorized	  use	  of	  force	  when	  he	  stated,	  “The	  message	  they’re	  
sending	  is	  that	  any	  country	  that	  fears	  a	  veto	  can	  take	  unilateral	  action.	  [By	  doing	  
this]	  they’re	  introducing	  chaos	  into	  international	  affairs:	  that	  any	  country	  can	  
take	  a	  decision	  which	  it	  wants”	  (in	  Glennon,	  2001,	  p.158).	  
In	  summary,	  for	  realists	  and	  advocates	  of	  sovereign	  inviolability,	  the	  
dynamics	  of	  the	  international	  power	  imbalance	  combined	  with	  each	  state’s	  
pursuit	  of	  their	  own	  national	  interest,	  especially	  when	  the	  result	  is	  zero-­‐sum,	  
requires	  the	  law	  and	  norm	  be	  firmly	  established	  on	  non-­‐intervention	  in	  order	  to	  
maintain	  international	  peace	  and	  stability.	  The	  norm	  of	  sovereign	  inviolability	  
ultimately	  protects	  all	  states,	  even	  when	  positions	  of	  relative	  power	  change.	  	  
As	  we	  will	  examine	  in	  the	  section	  on	  intrastate	  conflict,	  however,	  the	  
emerging	  patterns	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  past	  decades	  have	  most	  often	  been	  
committed	  within	  a	  sovereign	  territory,	  flowing	  from	  the	  central	  authority	  to	  its	  
subjects.	  Such	  outbreaks	  of	  violence	  required	  no	  outward	  breaches	  of	  
sovereignty	  to	  wage	  brutal	  intrastate	  campaigns	  of	  war	  against	  ethnic,	  religious,	  
and	  tribal	  groups.	  These	  have	  led	  to	  both	  legal	  and	  illegal	  responses,	  some	  of	  
which	  involved	  a	  violation	  of	  sovereignty,	  others	  that	  worked	  through	  a	  peace	  




new	  voices	  emerged	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  debate,	  calling	  both	  for	  the	  
reconsideration	  and	  strengthening	  of	  sovereignty.	  
Some,	  including	  Finnemore	  (2003)	  have	  argued	  that	  not	  every	  invocation	  
of	  humanity	  combined	  with	  the	  application	  of	  force	  and	  violation	  of	  sovereignty	  
is	  simply	  “wishing	  to	  cheat.”	  Using	  the	  case	  of	  the	  1992	  U.S.	  intervention	  in	  
Somalia,	  Finnemore	  argues	  that	  as	  there	  was	  no	  established	  government	  to	  
influence,	  and	  no	  economic	  benefit	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  military	  intervention	  
was	  not	  conducted	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  have	  “furthered	  strategic	  interests”	  
(Finnemore,	  2003,	  p.	  55).	  The	  U.S.	  even	  opposed	  a	  UN	  proposal	  at	  the	  time	  to	  
increase	  troop	  deployments	  and	  pacify	  the	  rogue	  state,	  citing	  its	  desire	  to	  
withdraw	  troops	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  	  
When	  sovereign	  authority	  is	  achieved	  and	  wielded	  perniciously,	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  minority	  rule	  or	  dictatorships,	  the	  political	  representation	  may	  flow	  
backwards,	  while	  sweeping	  authority	  placed	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  leaders	  with	  violent	  
or	  abusive	  proclivities	  often	  has	  tragic	  consequences.	  Thus,	  one	  of	  the	  pressing	  
dilemmas	  for	  the	  norm	  of	  sovereign	  inviolability	  comes	  when	  oppressed	  and	  
under	  represented	  groups	  within	  a	  sovereign	  authority	  both	  do	  not	  consent	  to	  
the	  authority,	  and	  simultaneously	  have	  no	  recourse	  to	  challenge	  it,	  or	  become	  
fatally	  stifled	  in	  the	  attempt.	  It	  is	  when	  sovereignty	  becomes	  a	  protectorate	  of	  
abusive	  leaders	  or	  governments,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  guarantor	  of	  stability	  and	  






The	  consideration	  of	  empire	  in	  the	  context	  of	  intervention	  goes	  beyond	  
the	  potential	  for	  military	  abuse	  and	  the	  usage	  of	  brute	  force.	  Modern	  theories	  of	  
empire	  recognize	  the	  complex	  interwoven	  nature	  of	  global	  power	  and	  the	  
channels	  it	  flows	  through.	  In	  defining	  the	  nature	  of	  Empire,	  Hardt	  &	  Negri	  (2000)	  
suggest	  that	  “the	  fundamental	  principle…is	  that	  its	  power	  has	  no	  actual	  and	  
localizable	  terrain	  or	  center	  [but	  is]	  distributed	  in	  networks	  throughout	  mobile	  
and	  articulated	  mechanisms	  of	  control”	  (p.384).	  	  
This	  power	  need	  not	  originate	  from	  a	  state	  actor	  directly,	  but	  can	  be	  found	  
in	  organizations	  that	  support	  and	  legitimize	  the	  underlying	  values	  and	  beliefs	  of	  a	  
particular	  system.	  Organizations	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank,	  or	  the	  International	  
Monetary	  Fund,	  along	  with	  multinational	  corporations,	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  
depositories	  of	  such	  power.	  Today,	  the	  physical	  dominance	  of	  territory	  is	  no	  
longer	  necessary	  to	  siphon	  the	  benefits	  of	  cheap	  labor	  from	  the	  fringes	  of	  an	  
empire,	  particularly	  if	  the	  empire	  is	  everywhere,	  and	  new	  sources	  of	  such	  labor	  
are	  continually	  becoming	  less	  expensive	  or	  less	  regulated	  elsewhere.	  With	  
structural,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  legal	  economic	  means	  of	  control,	  military	  
coercion	  becomes	  required	  only	  when	  the	  basic	  underlying	  systems	  for	  
maintaining	  this	  control	  are	  threatened.	  
Even	  through	  a	  structural	  conception	  of	  empire,	  Hardt	  &	  Negri	  (2000)	  
recognize	  that	  the	  United	  States	  occupies	  “a	  privileged	  position	  in	  the	  global	  




not	  to	  recognize	  the	  position	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  with	  a	  military	  presence	  in	  130	  
countries	  through	  a	  network	  of	  over	  760	  bases	  and	  naval	  fleets	  positioned	  in	  
every	  major	  ocean	  in	  the	  world	  as	  being	  “privileged”	  (Department	  of	  Defense,	  
2008).	  	  
Madeleine	  Albright	  clarified	  the	  motivation	  behind	  the	  American	  need	  for	  
pre-­‐eminence	  in	  no	  uncertain	  terms	  when	  she	  explained	  the	  perpetual	  expansion	  
to	  new	  markets	  stating	  that,	  “our	  own	  prosperity	  depends	  on	  having	  partners	  
that	  are	  open	  to	  our	  exports,	  investments,	  and	  ideas”	  (Bacevich,	  2002,	  p.	  176).	  	  
During	  the	  cold	  war,	  the	  rhetoric	  which	  placed	  the	  U.S.	  as	  the	  champion	  of	  
freedom,	  democracy,	  and	  capitalism	  as	  the	  bastion	  against	  the	  Soviet	  “evil	  
empire”	  was	  matched	  only	  by	  its	  attempts	  at	  undermining,	  overthrowing,	  or	  
weakening	  powers	  contrary	  to	  its	  values.	  During	  the	  cold	  war,	  the	  enterprise	  of	  
protecting	  countries	  around	  the	  world	  from	  the	  communist	  threat	  soon	  became	  
indistinguishable	  from	  the	  old	  imperial	  throwbacks	  of	  subjugation	  and	  
exploitation,	  with	  Vietnam	  being	  a	  particularly	  vicious	  such	  example(Hardt	  &	  
Negri,	  2000).	  	  
After	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  justifications	  for	  maintaining	  such	  a	  
widely	  distributed	  network	  of	  military	  power	  around	  the	  world	  could	  no	  longer	  
be	  couched	  in	  dualistic,	  anti-­‐communist	  rhetoric.	  Still,	  after	  growing	  into	  its	  role,	  
both	  economically	  and	  politically,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  soon	  about	  to	  voluntarily	  
loosen	  its	  grip	  (Johnson,	  2004).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  task	  of	  expanding	  the	  




goods,	  capital,	  ideas,	  and	  people”	  has	  been	  the	  overriding	  purpose	  of	  U.S.	  
foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  last	  few	  decades	  (Bacevich,	  2002,	  p.	  3).	  	  
The	  spread	  of	  democratic	  capitalism	  has	  been	  joined	  at	  the	  hip	  with	  the	  
opening	  of	  markets	  and	  free	  trade,	  all	  of	  which	  have	  been	  more	  than	  welcoming	  
to	  the	  expansion	  of	  American	  hegemony,	  also	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  
“leadership”	  (Bacevich,	  2002).	  It	  appears	  also	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Iraq,	  the	  
business	  of	  going	  to	  war	  has	  been	  folded	  into	  the	  PR	  and	  marketing	  machine	  that	  
manages	  the	  folk	  perceptions	  of	  products	  and	  leaders.	  As	  the	  George	  W.	  Bush’s	  
chief	  of	  staff	  in	  2003	  told	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  when	  asked	  why	  they	  waited	  until	  
September	  to	  build	  the	  case	  for	  war	  he	  replied,	  “From	  a	  marketing	  point	  of	  view,	  
you	  don’t	  introduce	  new	  products	  in	  August”	  (Bumiller,	  2002).	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  structural	  features	  of	  empire,	  the	  use	  of	  direct	  power,	  or	  
at	  least	  the	  threat	  of	  it,	  still	  has	  its	  place	  in	  maintaining	  the	  “leadership”	  status	  
quo.	  As	  evidenced	  by	  the	  enormous	  U.S.	  military	  dispersion,	  force	  remains	  an	  
important	  tool	  of	  empire.	  One	  particularly	  pernicious	  document,	  the	  2002	  
National	  Security	  Strategy	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  unreservedly	  advocates	  
a	  practice	  of	  preventative	  &	  pre-­‐emptive	  warfare.	  Its	  wording	  belies	  utter	  
disregard	  for	  international	  law,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  strategy	  for	  maintaining	  global	  
preeminence	  by	  deterring	  other	  countries	  from	  amassing	  forces	  large	  enough	  to	  
match	  or	  challenge	  American	  dominance	  (Dallmayr,	  2005).	  For	  Dallmayr	  (2005)	  
the	  brazen	  imperial	  nature	  of	  such	  a	  policy	  even	  “dwarfs	  the	  ambitions	  of	  all	  




The	  blatant	  transparency	  of	  such	  policies	  of	  hegemony	  and	  their	  
application,	  through	  the	  invasion	  of	  Iraq,	  illustrates	  the	  dangers	  of	  undermining	  
the	  norm	  of	  sovereign	  inviolability.	  When	  a	  nation	  must	  continually	  open	  new	  
markets	  and	  minds	  to	  its	  products	  and	  ideas	  in	  the	  process	  of	  securing	  its	  own	  
prosperity,	  the	  prospect	  of	  humanitarian	  military	  intervention	  is	  clearly	  an	  
attractive	  model	  for	  doing	  so.	  In	  this	  light,	  the	  warnings	  of	  undermining	  the	  norm	  
of	  sovereign	  inviolability	  become	  instantly	  clarified.	  
In	  the	  imperial	  world	  order,	  even	  NGOs	  can	  be	  appropriated	  for	  the	  cause.	  
During	  a	  speech	  given	  at	  Yale,	  Colin	  Powell	  stated	  that	  NGOs	  and	  humanitarian	  
organizations	  would	  serve	  as	  “force	  multipliers”	  during	  the	  Iraq	  war	  (Powell,	  
2001).	  The	  idea	  that	  aid	  workers	  are	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  supplementary	  units	  of	  
force	  undermines	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  work	  and	  destroys	  the	  trust	  they	  aim	  to	  
develop	  with	  local	  populations.	  	  
The	  blurring	  of	  lines	  between	  neutral	  humanitarian	  aid	  worker	  and	  “unit	  
of	  force,”	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  targeting	  of	  aid	  workers	  by	  violent	  groups,	  and	  the	  
undermining	  of	  the	  very	  environment	  that	  allows	  them	  to	  administer	  assistance.	  
Regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  working	  for	  a	  political	  agenda,	  managing	  
perceptions	  can	  be	  crucial	  in	  preventing	  violent	  backlashes.	  The	  attack	  on	  the	  UN	  
compound	  in	  Baghdad	  in	  2003	  for	  example,	  which	  killed	  17,	  including	  the	  former	  
High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  Sérgio	  Vieira	  de	  Mello,	  did	  so	  with	  the	  




The	  fusion	  of	  nation	  building	  with	  military	  operations	  further	  shows	  
how	  the	  two	  are	  being	  used	  in	  tandem	  for	  imperial	  objectives.	  Provincial	  
reconstruction	  teams	  that	  mix	  military	  and	  development	  objectives	  into	  one	  
hybrid	  unit	  have	  seen	  wide	  usage	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan.	  Their	  purpose	  is	  to	  
rebuild	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  immediately	  following	  attacks.	  As	  one	  leading	  general	  
in	  the	  field	  boasted	  during	  his	  preparation	  for	  U.S.	  military	  offensive	  in	  the	  Marja	  
region	  of	  Afghanistan	  in	  early	  2010,	  “We’ve	  got	  a	  government	  in	  a	  box,	  ready	  to	  
roll	  in”	  (Filkins,	  2010).	  While	  the	  development	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  economic	  
opportunity	  is	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  reducing	  tensions	  and	  resolving	  conflicts	  for	  
unstable	  regions,	  nation	  building	  done	  by	  an	  occupying	  power	  can	  hardly	  be	  
described	  as	  anything	  other	  than	  imperial.	  	  
Any	  qualifying	  of	  sovereignty,	  or	  weakening	  of	  law	  on	  the	  prohibitions	  of	  
force,	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  appropriated	  for	  imperial	  pursuits.	  Today,	  the	  
violation	  of	  one	  countries’	  sovereignty	  by	  another,	  without	  Security	  Council	  
approval,	  is	  illegal,	  and	  will	  certainly	  result	  in	  international	  uproar,	  even	  if	  its	  
claimed	  objectives	  do	  indeed	  have	  elements	  of	  humanitarian	  merit.	  But	  
establishing	  an	  exception	  over	  time,	  as	  has	  been	  attempted	  by	  the	  appeal	  to	  
humanitarian	  intervention,	  is	  in	  danger	  of	  developing	  “not	  just	  a	  permanent	  state	  
of	  emergency	  and	  exception,	  but	  a	  permanent	  state	  of	  emergency	  and	  exception	  
justified	  by	  the	  appeal	  to	  essential	  values	  of	  justice.”	  (Hardt	  &	  Negri,	  2000,	  p.	  18).	  
The	  development	  of	  such	  a	  state	  would	  certainly	  benefit	  a	  neo-­‐imperial	  power,	  




justice.	  The	  steps	  between	  this,	  and	  the	  mission	  of	  spreading	  of	  civilization	  
into	  the	  heart	  of	  darkness,	  fueled	  by	  moral	  conviction,	  are	  few	  indeed.	  	  	  
Still,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  to	  imply	  that	  nothing	  can,	  or	  should	  be,	  done	  in	  
the	  midst	  of	  violent	  outbreaks—even	  when	  such	  methods	  may	  require	  an	  
application	  of	  force.	  The	  creep	  of	  imperial	  values	  must	  be	  separated	  as	  much	  as	  
possible	  from	  the	  tasks	  of	  stopping	  the	  killing	  and	  halting	  the	  violence	  in	  areas	  of	  
mass	  human	  rights	  violence.	  There	  are	  ways	  to	  regulate	  or	  direct	  force	  under	  
international	  guidance	  and	  with	  legal	  oversight	  that	  can	  minimize	  the	  threat	  of	  
neo-­‐imperialism.	  It	  is	  unclear	  whether	  a	  truly	  empire-­neutral	  framework	  for	  
addressing	  human	  rights	  violations	  is	  conceivable	  particularly	  if	  empire	  is	  a	  
structural	  product	  of	  globalization	  which	  is	  continually	  “rearticulating	  an	  open	  
space	  and	  reinventing	  incessantly	  diverse	  and	  singular	  relations	  in	  networks	  
across	  and	  unbounded	  terrain”	  (Hardt	  &	  Negri,	  2000,	  p.	  182).	  	  
If,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  dynamic	  of	  imperial	  power	  is	  more	  centralized,	  it	  
would	  be	  expected	  to	  conform	  largely	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  national	  interest	  for	  its	  
expansion	  and	  conduct.	  Clearly,	  national	  interest	  rarely	  coincides	  with	  
humanitarian	  interest.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Somalia,	  the	  United	  States	  decided	  that	  the	  
humanitarian	  merit	  of	  maintaining	  a	  (UN	  approved)	  military	  presence	  was	  
outweighed	  by	  insufficient	  national	  interest.	  It	  also	  declined	  another	  opportunity,	  
replete	  with	  moral	  high	  ground	  and	  humanitarian	  justification,	  to	  deploy	  troops	  




U.S.	  led	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  as	  a	  case	  where	  extraordinary	  national	  interest	  






The	  protection	  aspect	  of	  the	  underlying	  tension	  recognizes	  that	  any	  
solution	  attempting	  to	  separate	  legal	  questions	  from	  moral	  ones	  in	  establishing	  a	  
framework	  for	  addressing	  humanitarian	  issues	  is	  “doomed	  to	  failure”	  (Holzgrefe	  
&	  Keohane,	  2003).	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  non-­‐intervention	  language	  contained	  in	  the	  
UN	  Charter	  has	  been	  supplemented	  with	  a	  number	  of	  human	  rights	  treaties	  
established	  soon	  after	  the	  Charter’s	  inception.	  These	  treaties	  have	  brought	  legal	  
and	  normative	  recognition	  to	  the	  project	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  
individuals,	  and	  provided	  limited	  methods	  for	  their	  enforcement.	  	  
The	  1948	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (UD)	  seeks	  to	  protect	  
individuals	  from	  tyrannical	  states,	  declaring	  that	  people	  shall	  be	  guaranteed	  of	  
their	  “right	  to	  life,	  liberty	  and	  security	  of	  person”	  (Article	  3)	  and	  that	  “no	  one	  
shall	  be	  subjected	  to	  torture	  or	  to	  cruel,	  inhuman	  or	  degrading	  treatment	  or	  
punishment”	  (Article	  5).	  	  	  
While	  the	  UD	  is	  not	  legally	  binding	  and	  generally	  lacks	  enforcement	  
measures,	  Murphy	  (1996)	  points	  out	  that	  it	  has	  “exercised	  considerable	  moral	  
and	  political	  authority	  and	  is	  today	  considered	  by	  some	  scholars	  as	  having	  passed	  
into	  customary	  international	  law,	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part”	  (p.121).	  It	  has	  also	  led	  to	  a	  
number	  of	  further	  human	  rights	  treaties	  designed	  to	  provide	  further	  oversight	  




The	  Genocide	  Convention,	  created	  the	  same	  year	  as	  the	  UD	  requires	  
any	  of	  the	  140	  contracting	  parties	  to	  call	  upon	  the	  UN	  and	  International	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  to	  intervene	  for	  the	  prevention	  and	  suppression	  of	  genocide.	  The	  
convention	  defines	  genocide	  as	  the:	  	  
Killing	  members	  of	  the	  group;	  Causing	  serious	  bodily	  or	  mental	  harm	  to	  
members	  of	  the	  group;	  Deliberately	  inflicting	  on	  the	  group	  conditions	  of	  
life	  calculated	  to	  bring	  about	  its	  physical	  destruction	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part;	  
Imposing	  measures	  intended	  to	  prevent	  births	  within	  the	  group	  
(Convention	  on	  the	  Prevention	  and	  Punishment	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  Genocide,	  
1948).	  
	  It	  also	  calls	  upon	  state	  parties	  to	  “undertake	  to	  prevent	  and	  punish”	  the	  
crime	  of	  genocide,	  and	  that	  they	  may	  “call	  upon	  the	  competent	  organs	  of	  the	  
United	  Nations	  to	  take	  such	  action	  under	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  as	  
they	  consider	  appropriate	  for	  the	  prevention	  and	  suppression	  of	  the	  act	  of	  
genocide”	  (Convention	  on	  the	  Prevention	  and	  Punishment	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  
Genocide,	  1948).	  
While	  the	  Genocide	  Convention	  has	  been	  cited	  by	  the	  ICJ	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
Srebrenica	  and	  by	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  Rwanda,	  it	  ultimately	  
relies	  upon	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  UN,	  and	  the	  resolutions	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  for	  
enforcement	  (Stein,	  2004).	  Murphy	  (1996)	  also	  suggests	  that	  while	  the	  Genocide	  
Convention	  does	  not	  explicitly	  condone	  the	  use	  of	  force	  to	  stop	  such	  crimes,	  there	  




highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  correctly	  applying	  the	  terminology	  of	  “genocide”	  
when	  making	  accusations	  in	  the	  international	  community,	  if	  for	  no	  other	  reason	  
than	  to	  assure	  that	  such	  cases	  are	  met	  with	  the	  utmost	  severity	  and	  urgency.	  	  
The	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  (ICC)	  is	  a	  court	  that	  was	  established	  in	  
2002	  with	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Rome	  statute	  and	  has	  been	  ratified	  by	  111	  states,	  
with	  28	  signatories	  not	  yet	  party	  to	  the	  convention	  (United	  Nations	  Treaty	  
Collection,	  2010).	  Although	  the	  court	  is	  technically	  independent	  from	  the	  UN,	  the	  
Security	  Council	  may	  refer	  cases	  to	  it,	  and	  it	  is	  given	  the	  jurisdiction	  to	  issue	  
arrest	  warrants	  and	  prosecute	  individuals	  suspected	  of	  committing	  the	  crimes	  of	  
genocide,	  war	  crimes,	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity.	  The	  crime	  of	  aggression	  is	  
also	  to	  be	  included	  in	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  court,	  however	  because	  a	  definition	  of	  
aggression	  has	  not	  agreed	  upon,	  it	  is	  currently	  unable	  to	  prosecute	  individuals	  for	  
this	  crime	  (Stein,	  2004).	  
The	  ICC	  has	  opened	  investigations	  in	  four	  cases:	  Northern	  Uganda,	  the	  
Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo,	  the	  Central	  African	  Republic,	  and	  Darfur,	  and	  
has	  indicted	  14	  individuals	  under	  charges	  of	  war	  crimes	  and	  crimes	  against	  
humanity.	  Four	  of	  these	  are	  in	  custody	  and	  presently	  undergoing	  trial	  
(International	  Criminal	  Court,	  2010).	  By	  holding	  the	  responsible	  parties	  
accountable	  when	  such	  acts	  are	  committed,	  the	  ICC	  represents	  new	  steps	  
forward	  in	  the	  norm	  of	  protection.	  Although	  a	  number	  of	  key	  actors	  have	  failed	  to	  
ratify	  the	  Rome	  Statute	  and	  become	  parties	  to	  the	  ICC,	  including	  China,	  Russia,	  




warrant	  for	  the	  president	  of	  Sudan	  in	  connection	  to	  crimes	  in	  Darfur,	  is	  
another	  legal	  recourse	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  individuals.	  
Other	  measures	  for	  the	  enforcement	  of	  human	  rights	  have	  also	  emerged	  
through	  eight	  human	  rights	  conventions,	  including	  the	  1966	  International	  
Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social,	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  and	  most	  recently	  with	  The	  
Convention	  for	  the	  Rights	  of	  Persons	  with	  Disabilities	  in	  2006.	  These	  treaties	  must	  
be	  signed,	  ratified	  and	  actively	  implemented	  by	  State	  legislation	  in	  order	  to	  take	  
effect.	  The	  treaties	  are	  overseen	  by	  accompanying	  committees	  who	  may	  receive	  
complaint	  petitions	  and	  assign	  “special	  rapporteurs”	  to	  perform	  fact-­‐finding	  
missions	  at	  the	  invitation	  of	  a	  country	  to	  investigate	  alleged	  human	  rights	  
violations	  and	  make	  recommendations.	  Treaties	  are	  thus	  imposed	  consensually	  
upon	  states,	  which	  further	  retain	  the	  option	  of	  withdrawing	  at	  any	  point	  as	  
parties	  to	  the	  convention,	  or	  prohibiting	  visits	  of	  a	  special	  rapporteur.	  	  
Taken	  together,	  these	  legal	  mechanisms	  provide	  a	  range	  of	  protections	  for	  
individuals	  against	  violations	  of	  human	  rights,	  including	  racial	  discrimination,	  
economic	  inequality,	  crimes	  against	  humanity,	  or	  war	  crimes.	  However,	  even	  for	  
the	  ICC,	  when	  legal	  obligations	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  conflicts	  with	  
sovereign	  inviolability	  or	  the	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention,	  the	  former	  will	  submit	  to	  
the	  latter.	  None	  of	  the	  above	  legal	  devices,	  with	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  the	  
genocide	  convention,	  have	  the	  legal	  right	  to	  halt	  situations	  of	  open	  violence.	  As	  





Peacekeeping	  and	  the	  Security	  Council	  
The	  legal	  focus	  on	  protection	  has	  increased	  exponentially	  in	  the	  post	  cold-­‐
war	  era.	  	  This	  has	  been	  most	  clearly	  evident	  in	  the	  Security	  Council,	  and	  the	  
increase	  in	  the	  usage	  of	  peacekeeping	  operations.	  For	  the	  40	  years	  between	  1946	  
and	  1986,	  the	  Security	  Council	  passed	  593	  resolutions	  on	  perceived	  threats	  
international	  peace.	  In	  the	  following	  22	  years,	  from	  1987	  to	  2005,	  no	  longer	  faced	  
with	  the	  cold	  war	  veto	  mentality,	  the	  Security	  Council	  passed	  1,010	  resolutions	  
and	  maintained	  a	  deployment	  of	  troops	  in	  over	  15	  countries	  around	  the	  world	  by	  
2006	  (Weiss,	  2007).	  
This	  frenzy	  of	  resolutions	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  more	  cooperative	  
atmosphere	  in	  the	  Security	  Council	  following	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev’s	  rise	  to	  power	  
in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  conflict	  from	  inter	  state	  to	  
intra	  state.	  With	  such	  a	  rapid	  and	  massive	  growth	  in	  peacekeeping,	  the	  
adjustment	  process	  for	  the	  UN	  was	  slow.	  The	  organization	  has	  had	  to	  find	  new	  
methods	  for	  upholding	  its	  core	  principles,	  especially	  when	  they	  are	  
contradictory.	  As	  Sutterlin	  (2003)	  points	  out,	  “[t]he	  nature	  of	  the	  threats	  to	  peace	  
and	  of	  conflict	  assumed	  characteristics	  for	  which	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  UN	  had	  not	  
planned	  and	  with	  which	  the	  UN	  was	  not	  well	  prepared	  to	  deal”	  (p.7).	  As	  a	  result,	  
the	  success	  of	  operations,	  when	  they	  have	  been	  launched	  at	  all,	  has	  varied.	  
The	  deployment	  of	  peacekeeping	  troops	  continues	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  
method	  of	  addressing	  direct	  violence	  by	  the	  Security	  Council,	  however	  the	  




Traditional,	  pre-­‐cold	  war	  peacekeeping	  was	  partially	  created	  as	  a	  
compromise	  between	  the	  principles	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  and	  protection,	  and	  also	  
between	  the	  disagreements	  between	  the	  dominant	  superpowers	  in	  the	  Security	  
Council	  (Sutterlin,	  2003).	  It	  was	  not	  meant	  to	  impose	  peace	  from	  above,	  abides	  by	  
the	  rules	  of	  impartiality,	  non-­‐engagement,	  is	  lightly	  armed,	  small	  in	  number,	  and	  
perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  requires	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  target	  state	  before	  being	  
deployed,	  so	  as	  not	  to	  violate	  its	  sovereignty	  (Bercovitch	  &	  Jackson,	  2009).	  
Traditional	  peacekeeping	  operates	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  existing	  political	  
peace	  processes	  or	  ceasefire	  agreements	  instead	  of	  creating	  its	  own,	  and	  is	  not	  
generally	  deployed	  directly	  in	  areas	  of	  open	  conflict.	  	  
Post	  cold	  war	  peacekeeping	  however	  has	  become	  significantly	  more	  
robust.	  The	  criteria	  for	  what	  count	  as	  threats	  to	  peace	  and	  security	  are	  changing.	  
Troop	  numbers	  have	  risen	  dramatically	  and	  are	  better	  armed,	  mandates	  
authorizing	  the	  direct	  protection	  of	  civilians	  have	  replaced	  impartiality,	  and	  even	  
the	  necessity	  of	  obtaining	  state	  consent	  before	  the	  deployment	  of	  peacekeepers	  
has,	  in	  a	  few	  cases,	  been	  removed	  (Berdal	  &	  Economides,	  2007).	  Peacekeeping	  
deployments	  in	  Cambodia	  (UNTAC),	  Yugoslavia	  (UNPROFOR),	  and	  Somalia	  
(UNOSOM	  II),	  for	  example,	  contained	  significantly	  larger	  troop	  numbers	  than	  pre	  
Cold	  War	  operations	  with	  around,	  or	  greater	  than,	  20,000	  troops	  each,	  were	  
heavier	  armed,	  and	  were	  placed	  in	  situations	  of	  open	  violence	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  




One	  of	  the	  largest	  shifts	  however	  is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  Security	  Council’s	  
response	  to	  outbreaks	  of	  violence	  in	  Somalia	  in	  1992.	  The	  response	  slowly	  grew	  
in	  severity,	  initially	  following	  a	  more	  traditional	  approach	  through	  impartiality,	  
consent,	  and	  light	  armament,	  but	  was	  extremely	  unsuccessful	  in	  facilitating	  
ceasefire	  negotiations	  between	  warring	  factions	  and	  providing	  aid	  dispersal.	  Due	  
to	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  central	  authority	  in	  Somalia	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  UN	  found	  
itself	  negotiating	  with	  the	  strongest-­‐military-­‐faction-­‐of-­‐the-­‐moment	  in	  
Mogadishu	  to	  obtain	  consent	  for	  troop	  deployments,	  who	  after	  lengthy	  periods	  of	  
delay	  consented	  to	  a	  deployment	  of	  500	  Pakistani	  troops	  confined	  to	  the	  harbor	  
and	  airport	  areas	  (Sutterlin,	  2003).	  	  
This	  deployment	  had	  little	  to	  no	  effect	  in	  achieving	  regional	  stability,	  and	  
lead	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  UNOSOM	  I	  operation	  by	  3,000	  troops,	  and	  the	  
broadening	  of	  their	  mandate	  to	  provide	  aid	  worker	  security,	  disarmament	  
activities,	  and	  ceasefire	  monitoring,	  all	  without	  obtaining—or	  even	  seeking—
approval	  from	  faction	  leaders	  (Sens,	  1997).	  The	  escalation	  of	  force	  in	  Somalia	  
eventually	  resulted	  in	  resolution	  794,	  where	  the	  Security	  Council	  invited	  the	  
United	  States	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  to	  use	  “all	  necessary	  means…to	  establish	  as	  soon	  
as	  possible	  a	  secure	  environment	  for	  humanitarian	  relief	  operations	  in	  Somalia”	  
(U.N.	  Security	  Council,	  1992).	  This	  nonconsensual	  escalation	  of	  force	  by	  the	  UN	  
represented	  an	  important	  shift	  in	  the	  approach	  for	  addressing	  intrastate	  conflict	  




been	  invoked	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  for	  an	  intrastate	  
conflict.	  	  
Ultimately,	  following	  the	  events	  in	  Mogadishu	  where	  several	  American	  
soldiers	  were	  killed	  and	  even	  more	  wounded,	  the	  U.S.	  withdrew	  its	  forces	  
entirely,	  and	  the	  UN	  was	  forced	  to	  reconsider	  its	  objectives	  in	  Somalia.	  The	  
experience	  had	  swung	  the	  pendulum	  back	  to	  the	  side	  of	  caution.	  Unfortunately,	  it	  
did	  so	  immediately	  preceding	  the	  outbreak	  of	  violence	  in	  Rwanda,	  where	  no	  
action	  was	  taken,	  and	  an	  estimated	  800,000	  were	  ultimately	  killed	  in	  the	  
genocide	  (BBC,	  2008).	  Rwanda	  was	  then	  followed	  by	  the	  massacre	  of	  over	  7,000	  
unarmed	  Muslim	  men	  and	  boys	  in	  and	  around	  the	  town	  of	  Srebrenica,	  Bosnia	  in	  
1995,	  which	  took	  place	  despite	  the	  active	  presence	  of	  UN	  peacekeepers	  in	  the	  
region	  (Simons,	  2001).	  	  
When	  it	  became	  apparent	  that	  the	  Security	  Council	  would	  again	  not	  take	  
action	  as	  conflict	  broke	  out	  between	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Kosovo	  in	  1999,	  NATO	  
launched	  a	  forceful	  offensive	  against	  Yugoslavia	  without	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  
resolution.	  Questions	  over	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  bombing	  campaign—an	  obvious	  
violation	  of	  Yugoslav	  sovereignty,	  which	  left	  Belgrade	  in	  flames—and	  whether	  
the	  action	  did	  more	  harm	  than	  good,	  are	  subject	  to	  intense	  debate.	  Even	  so,	  the	  
reluctance	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  or	  Kofi	  Annan	  to	  outwardly	  condemn	  the	  acts	  
has	  left	  some	  wondering	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  could	  perhaps	  become	  a	  “nascent	  




This	  surge	  in	  intervention	  activity	  alone	  is	  enough	  to	  spark	  furious	  
debates	  in	  the	  international	  community	  and	  academia	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  
sovereignty,	  human	  rights,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  military	  intervention.	  When	  combined	  
with	  failures	  such	  as	  Rwanda	  and	  Srebrenica,	  and	  the	  unacceptable	  
accompanying	  loss	  of	  life,	  followed	  by	  the	  usage	  of	  military	  action	  outside	  the	  
Security	  Council,	  the	  debate	  has	  reached	  tremendous	  new	  heights	  (Bellamy,	  
2004;	  Thakur,	  2006).	  
The	  new	  intrastate	  nature	  of	  conflict	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  function	  of	  sovereign	  inviolability	  is	  a	  deterrent	  
against	  interstate	  conflicts	  and	  allows	  for	  the	  established	  framework	  of	  
international	  order.	  Since	  the	  end	  of	  WW2,	  interstate	  conflict	  is	  being	  largely	  
replaced	  by	  the	  emerging	  realities	  of	  intrastate	  conflict.	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  before	  
1945	  80	  percent	  of	  wars	  were	  interstate,	  while	  since	  1945,	  80	  percent	  have	  been	  
intrastate,	  (Sens,	  1997).	  Of	  the	  94	  large-­‐scale	  conflicts	  between	  1989	  and	  2000,	  
two	  were	  interstate	  in	  nature	  (Wallensteen	  &	  Sollenberg,	  2000),	  while	  in	  2005	  it	  
was	  reported	  that	  interstate	  conflict	  made	  up	  less	  that	  5	  percent	  of	  all	  armed	  
conflicts	  around	  the	  world	  (Human	  Security	  Center,	  2005).	  	  
Intrastate	  conflicts,	  which	  are	  often	  fueled	  by	  ethnic,	  religious,	  and	  
political	  tensions,	  have	  very	  different	  dynamics	  than	  interstate.	  The	  outbreak	  of	  
intrastate	  violence	  is	  often	  accompanied	  by	  egregious	  power	  differences	  and	  the	  
slaughter	  of	  unarmed	  civilians,	  while	  many	  intrastate	  conflicts	  or	  secessionist	  




groups,	  such	  as	  bordering	  countries	  or	  militias,	  potentially	  elongating	  cycles	  
of	  violence.	  	  
The	  rise	  of	  intrastate	  conflict	  is	  accompanied	  with	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  number	  of	  
non-­‐combat	  casualties	  during	  wartime.	  From	  1945	  to	  1988,	  civilians	  comprised	  
64	  percent	  of	  wartime	  casualties,	  while	  by	  1997,	  it	  had	  risen	  to	  90	  per	  cent	  (Sens,	  
1997).	  This	  rise	  in	  civilian	  casualties	  is	  accompanied	  by	  a	  rise	  in	  civilians	  fleeing	  
the	  areas	  of	  violence	  and,	  either	  seeking	  refuge	  across	  a	  state	  border,	  or	  being	  
relocated	  within	  the	  state	  as	  an	  internally	  displaced	  person.	  	  
The	  displacement	  of	  persons	  from	  their	  homes	  into	  refugee	  camps	  
contributes	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  intrastate	  conflict.	  In	  these	  camps,	  disease,	  
squalor,	  and	  extreme	  privation	  are	  commonplace,	  while	  physical	  safety	  is	  
anything	  but	  assured.	  Reaching	  42	  million	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2008,	  including	  refugees,	  
asylum	  seekers,	  and	  internally	  displaced	  persons	  (UNHCR,	  2009),	  cross-­‐border	  
refugee	  flows	  also	  contribute	  to	  regional	  instability,	  thus	  posing	  potential	  threats	  
to	  international	  peace	  and	  security.	  
The	  distinction	  between	  internally	  displaced	  persons	  (IDPs)	  and	  cross-­‐
border	  refugees	  is	  also	  an	  important	  one.	  The	  internally	  displaced	  have	  been	  
called	  the	  “orphans	  of	  conflict,”	  as	  they	  lack	  the	  international	  protection	  and	  
support	  afforded	  to	  cross-­‐border	  refugees,	  and	  remain	  within	  the	  domestic	  
sovereign	  authority	  of	  their	  state	  (Steinberg,	  2005).	  The	  mechanisms	  for	  the	  
relocation	  of	  IDPs,	  if	  organized	  at	  all,	  are	  thus	  often	  controlled	  or	  influenced	  by	  




Displacement	  Monitoring	  Centre	  placed	  the	  number	  of	  IDPs	  around	  the	  world	  
at	  26	  million	  in	  52	  countries,	  while	  24	  countries	  were	  found	  responsible	  for	  new	  
or	  ongoing	  outbreaks	  of	  conflict	  that	  actively	  contributed	  to	  internal	  
displacement	  (International	  Displacement	  Monitoring	  Centre,	  2008).	  
Because	  the	  international	  convention	  on	  the	  status	  of	  refugees	  does	  not	  
recognize	  internally	  displaced	  persons,	  they	  also	  lack	  legal	  recourse.	  This	  
combination	  of	  sovereign	  inviolability	  with	  intrastate	  conflict	  and	  internal	  
displacement,	  create	  ideal	  conditions	  for	  intractable	  and	  severe	  human	  rights	  
violations	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity.	  As	  the	  Swedish	  Prime	  Minister	  Ingvar	  
Carlsson	  observed	  as	  co-­‐chair	  of	  the	  1995	  Commission	  on	  Global	  Governance,	  “to	  
confine	  the	  concept	  of	  security	  exclusively	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  states	  is	  to	  ignore	  
the	  interests	  of	  people	  in	  whose	  name	  sovereignty	  is	  exercised”	  (Jackson,	  2000,	  p.	  
211).	  
Rwanda,	  Somalia,	  the	  Balkans,	  Sudan,	  Northern	  Uganda	  and	  Srebrenica	  
are	  just	  a	  few	  examples	  where	  violence	  has	  been	  aimed	  largely	  at	  civilian	  
populations,	  and	  where	  political	  solutions	  have	  remained	  frustratingly	  illusive	  
(Bercovitch	  &	  Jackson,	  2009).	  While	  the	  complexities	  of	  intrastate	  conflict	  have	  
proven	  unmanageable	  by	  traditional	  cold	  war	  peacekeeping	  methods,	  new	  and	  
emerging	  methods	  are	  still	  hotly	  debated	  over	  their	  implications	  for	  sovereignty	  
and	  international	  law.	  	  
Intrastate	  conflict	  is	  nothing	  new.	  What	  is	  new,	  is	  the	  conviction	  that	  the	  




it	  could	  be	  considered	  a	  threat	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  under	  UN	  
law.	  As	  noted	  by	  Franck	  (1992),	  it	  “is	  no	  longer	  arguable	  that	  the	  United	  Nations	  
cannot	  exert	  pressure	  against	  governments	  that	  oppress	  their	  own	  peoples”	  
(p.85).	  Intrastate	  conflict	  has	  had	  a	  large	  impact	  on	  international	  relations	  and	  
the	  formation	  of	  the	  emerging	  norm	  of	  protection.	  Since	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  and	  the	  bipolar	  world	  order,	  the	  Security	  Council,	  largely	  unencumbered	  
from	  its	  former	  veto-­‐induced	  paralysis,	  has	  shown	  new	  initiative	  in	  addressing	  
these	  instances	  of	  violence	  through	  more	  robust	  forms	  of	  peacekeeping,	  while	  the	  
feature	  of	  military	  humanitarian	  intervention,	  for	  better	  or	  worse,	  has	  become	  
permanent	  on	  the	  global	  political	  landscape	  (Murphy,	  1996).	  
Evolving	  views	  of	  sovereignty	  
The	  concept	  of	  sovereignty	  has	  undergone	  many	  transformations	  since	  its	  
integration	  in	  1648	  Westphalia.	  Most	  recently,	  it	  has	  become	  the	  subject	  of	  
increasing	  debate	  over	  the	  extent	  of	  these	  transformations,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  
we	  find	  ourselves	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  (Atack,	  2002).	  
Sovereign	  authority	  can	  hardly	  be	  recognized	  anymore	  (if	  it	  ever	  was)	  as	  
absolute.	  Jean	  Bodin’s	  16th	  century	  definition	  of	  the	  idea	  as	  “the	  absolute	  and	  
perpetual	  power	  of	  a	  commonwealth,”	  where	  the	  sovereign	  ruler	  is	  held	  
accountable	  only	  to	  God	  and	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  (Bodin,	  1992),	  does	  not	  fit	  in	  the	  
modern	  realities	  of	  eroded	  economic	  and	  political	  borders.	  Instead,	  impermeable	  
absolute	  sovereign	  authority	  today	  appears	  unfeasible	  (Goldstein,	  Kahler,	  




Even	  the	  earliest	  applications	  of	  sovereignty	  applied	  only	  to	  European	  
states,	  while	  peoples	  unrecognized	  by	  the	  European	  powers,	  had	  no	  recourse	  
against	  hegemony,	  intervention,	  or	  the	  worst	  of	  imperial	  dominance	  (Hayman	  &	  
Williams,	  2006).	  Further,	  the	  time	  between	  the	  Peace	  of	  Westphalia	  and	  the	  
Congress	  of	  Vienna	  in	  1815	  featured	  the	  frequent	  practice	  of	  intervention	  and	  
violation	  of	  the	  domestic	  order	  of	  states	  (Glennon,	  2001).	  	  
Today,	  it	  is	  rare	  to	  find	  literature	  that	  does	  not	  recognize	  the	  large	  
evolutionary	  steps	  sovereignty	  has	  taken	  in	  the	  past	  few	  decades	  (Weiss,	  2007,	  p.	  
13),	  while	  some	  have	  suggested	  that	  sovereignty	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  continuum,	  
rather	  than	  a	  fixed,	  binary	  system	  (Keohane,	  2003).	  	  
Maintaining	  the	  essential	  functions	  of	  sovereignty	  in	  international	  law	  and	  
order	  will	  be	  a	  central	  project	  for	  any	  future	  framework	  addressing	  humanitarian	  
crises.	  JL	  Cohen	  (2004)	  for	  example,	  calls	  for	  an	  updated	  international	  law	  that	  
“requires	  the	  strengthening	  of	  supranational	  institutions,	  formal	  legal	  reform,	  
and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  global	  rule	  of	  law	  that	  protects	  both	  the	  sovereign	  equality	  
of	  states	  based	  on	  a	  revised	  conception	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  human	  rights”	  (p.3).	  
For	  many	  adherents	  of	  the	  emerging	  protection	  norm,	  the	  salient	  question	  today	  
is	  not	  whether	  state	  sovereignty	  is,	  or	  should	  be,	  absolute,	  but	  rather	  if	  it	  can	  still	  
act	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  international	  order	  without	  also	  providing	  immunity	  for	  
states	  engaged	  in	  genocide,	  ethnic	  cleansing,	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity.	  
The	  emergence	  of	  this	  question	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  rise	  of	  solidarism	  in	  the	  




can	  be	  politically	  neutral,	  and	  that	  in	  certain	  situations,	  indiscriminately	  
distributed	  aid	  can	  prolong	  the	  conflict,	  strengthen	  aggressors,	  and	  even	  lead	  to	  
increasing	  the	  magnitude	  of	  violence.	  As	  the	  UNHCR	  special	  envoy	  to	  the	  former	  
Yugoslavia	  explained,	  “If	  by	  neutrality,	  one	  means	  to	  help	  all	  victims	  without	  
discrimination…that	  is	  correct…but	  if	  neutrality	  means	  not	  to	  take	  sides,	  not	  even	  
in	  favor	  of	  the	  victims,	  that	  would	  be	  a	  wrong	  interpretation:	  we	  chose	  to	  be	  on	  
the	  side	  of	  the	  victims”	  (Cohen	  &	  Deng,	  1998,	  p.	  269).	  The	  solidarist	  position	  is	  
contrasted	  with	  that	  of	  classicism,	  which	  advocates	  political	  neutrality	  in	  conflict,	  
as	  long	  as	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  access	  and	  distribution	  of	  aid	  to	  suffering	  populations.	  	  	  
Some	  NGOs	  have	  taken	  sides	  in	  the	  solidarist/classicist	  divide.	  Médecins	  
Sans	  Frontières/Doctors	  Without	  Borders	  (MSF)	  for	  example	  was	  formed	  as	  a	  
consciously	  solidarist	  organization,	  breaking	  with	  the	  classicist,	  impartial	  
approach	  of	  NGOs,	  such	  as	  the	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  (ICRC).	  
MSF	  was	  established	  by	  former	  ICRC	  members	  who	  believed	  in	  actively	  
denouncing	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  government	  when	  they	  contributed	  to,	  or	  were	  
responsible	  for,	  violent	  conflict.	  Upon	  accepting	  the	  Nobel	  Prize	  on	  behalf	  of	  MSF	  
in	  1999,	  James	  Orbinski	  stated	  that,	  “silence	  has	  long	  been	  confused	  with	  
neutrality,	  and	  has	  been	  presented	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  humanitarian	  
action…we	  are	  not	  sure	  that	  words	  can	  always	  save	  lives,	  but	  we	  know	  that	  
silence	  can	  certainly	  kill”	  (Orbinski,	  1999).	  MSF	  has	  even	  been	  credited	  by	  some	  
with	  popularizing	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  “right	  to	  intervention,”	  even	  before	  




The	  founding	  of	  MSF	  in	  1977,	  anticipated	  the	  direction	  that	  the	  debate	  
over	  humanitarian	  practice	  was	  headed.	  A	  growing	  number	  of	  humanitarian	  
workers	  were	  beginning	  to	  criticize	  the	  classicist	  practices	  of	  aid	  distribution,	  
without	  addressing	  the	  underlying	  causes	  of	  the	  conflict.	  One	  opinion	  writer	  for	  
the	  New	  York	  Times	  criticized	  the	  distribution	  of	  food	  aid	  to	  victims	  of	  
humanitarian	  crises	  without	  also	  providing	  security,	  or	  addressing	  direct	  sources	  
of	  violence,	  as	  producing	  the	  “well-­‐fed	  dead”	  (New	  York	  Times,	  1992).	  The	  norm	  
of	  non-­‐interference	  in	  internal	  state	  affairs	  held	  fast	  as	  internal	  displacement	  
exploded	  throughout	  the	  90’s	  and	  IDP	  camps	  became	  staging	  grounds	  for	  violent	  
attacks	  and	  warlordism	  (Fiona,	  2002).	  As	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  the	  
Organization	  of	  African	  Unity,	  Salim	  Ahmed	  Salim	  noted,	  non-­‐interference	  was	  
quickly	  reaching	  “absurd	  proportions”	  in	  Africa	  (Cohen	  &	  Deng,	  1998,	  p.	  215).	  
The	  search	  for	  solutions	  was	  beginning.	  	  
In	  1993,	  Sudanese	  diplomat	  Francis	  Deng	  was	  appointed	  by	  the	  Secretary	  
General	  as	  the	  UN	  special	  representative	  on	  internally	  displaced	  persons.	  
Throughout	  his	  appointment,	  Deng	  has	  sought	  to	  find	  solutions	  for	  IDPs,	  
informed	  largely	  through	  a	  volume	  of	  case	  studies	  examining	  the	  causes	  and	  
problems	  of	  internal	  displacement.	  Deng	  and	  his	  colleague	  Roberta	  Cohen	  
recognized	  that	  the	  norm	  of	  sovereign	  inviolability	  was	  among	  the	  largest	  factors	  
preventing	  the	  international	  community	  from	  providing	  security	  and	  aid	  to	  




In	  their	  recommendations	  Cohen	  &	  Deng	  call	  for	  host	  of	  measures	  that	  
can	  be	  taken	  for	  the	  internally	  displaced,	  including	  strengthening	  the	  role	  of	  
NGOs	  and	  national	  institutions,	  coordinating	  and	  unifying	  UN	  agencies,	  and	  
altering	  the	  notion	  of	  sovereignty,	  so	  that	  it	  includes	  the	  element	  of	  responsibility	  
for	  the	  protection	  and	  well-­‐being	  for	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  state	  (Cohen	  &	  Deng,	  1998).	  
They	  write:	  
Sovereignty	  cannot	  be	  used	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  the	  mistreatment	  of	  
populations.	  When	  governments	  fail	  to	  meet	  their	  obligations	  to	  
beleaguered	  populations,	  such	  as	  the	  internally	  displaced,	  they	  are	  
expected	  to	  request	  outside	  assistance	  to	  help	  them	  fulfill	  their	  
responsibilities.	  Should	  they	  refuse	  to	  accept	  such	  assistance,	  the	  
international	  community	  can	  and	  should	  assert	  its	  concern,	  and	  step	  in	  
when	  the	  government	  has	  failed	  to	  discharge	  its	  responsibility	  (Cohen	  &	  
Deng,	  1998,	  p.	  276).	  
Their	  work	  has	  accompanied	  the	  call	  for	  an	  opening	  of	  a	  new	  debate	  over	  the	  
function	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  its	  role	  in	  situations	  of	  state-­‐sponsored	  abuse.	  	  
Recognizing	  the	  evolutionary	  steps	  of	  sovereignty,	  Boutros	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  
announced	  in	  the	  1992	  Agenda	  for	  Peace	  report	  that,	  “Respect	  for…fundamental	  
sovereignty	  and	  integrity	  are	  crucial	  to	  any	  common	  international	  progress.	  The	  
time	  of	  absolute	  and	  exclusive	  sovereignty,	  however,	  has	  passed;	  its	  theory	  was	  
never	  matched	  by	  reality”	  (Report	  of	  the	  Secretary	  General,	  1992).	  




Whatever	  perceptions	  may	  have	  prevailed	  when	  the	  Westphalian	  
system	  first	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  State	  sovereignty,	  today	  it	  clearly	  
carries	  with	  it	  the	  obligation	  of	  a	  State	  to	  protect	  the	  welfare	  of	  its	  own	  
peoples	  and	  meet	  its	  obligations	  to	  the	  wider	  international	  community	  
(High-­‐Level	  Panel	  on	  Threats,	  Challenges	  and	  Change,	  2004).	  
Enshrined	  in	  its	  charter	  document,	  the	  African	  Union	  (AU)	  also	  recognizes	  
that	  sovereignty	  should	  not	  trump	  the	  ability	  for	  protection.	  While	  it	  affirms	  in	  its	  
charter	  both	  the	  respect	  for	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  its	  member	  states,	  it	  reserves	  the	  
right	  in	  paragraph	  4(h)	  “to	  intervene	  in	  a	  Member	  State	  pursuant	  to	  a	  decision	  of	  
the	  Assembly	  in	  respect	  of	  grave	  circumstances,	  namely	  war	  crimes,	  genocide	  
and	  crimes	  against	  humanity”	  (African	  Union,	  2002).	  This	  means	  also	  that	  it	  has	  
reserved	  the	  right	  to	  do	  so,	  independent	  of	  the	  Security	  Council.	  
Some	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  protection	  norm	  is	  not	  
unprecedented	  in	  the	  larger	  historical	  context	  of	  intervention	  practice.	  
Finnemore	  (2003)	  argues	  that	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  intervention	  has	  
accompanied	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  western	  concepts	  of	  humanity.	  As	  the	  
understanding	  of	  human	  equality	  has	  changed	  under	  the	  progress	  of	  
emancipation	  and	  the	  liberalization	  of	  values,	  so	  too	  have	  the	  views	  of	  who	  has	  
moral	  standing	  to	  be	  rescued	  in	  a	  state	  of	  crisis.	  Finnemore	  points	  out	  that	  people	  
who	  would	  have	  previously	  disappeared	  under	  the	  radar	  of	  moral	  outrage	  are	  
now	  being	  seen	  as	  equally	  deserving	  of	  protection	  as	  the	  “white	  Christians”	  were	  




In	  illustrating	  the	  relatively	  recent	  recognition	  of	  the	  equality	  of	  races,	  sexes,	  
and	  classes,	  as	  equally	  deserving	  of	  humanitarian	  attention,	  the	  normative	  
emergence	  of	  protection	  is,	  perhaps,	  not	  as	  surprising.	  This	  might	  suggest	  that	  
humanitarian	  intervention	  is	  nothing	  new,	  but	  rather	  the	  judgment	  of	  who	  counts	  
as	  human	  that	  is	  emergent.	  	  	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  features	  of	  sovereignty	  have	  been	  changing,	  and	  that	  the	  
recognition	  of	  this	  change	  is	  widespread,	  but	  where	  are	  the	  lines	  to	  be	  drawn?	  
Some	  have	  argued	  that	  not	  only	  does	  a	  humanitarian	  exception	  to	  sovereignty	  
exist,	  but	  that	  the	  exception	  should	  also	  extend	  to	  preventing	  the	  spread	  of	  
weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction.	  Feinstein	  &	  Slaughter	  (2004)	  claim	  that	  a	  “duty	  to	  
prevent”	  should	  exist	  to	  combat	  the	  threat	  of	  nuclear	  proliferation,	  and	  that	  “like	  
intervention	  for	  humanitarian	  purposes,	  international	  action	  to	  counter	  WMD	  
proliferation	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  diplomatic	  pressure	  or	  incentives,	  economic	  
measures,	  or	  coercive	  action”	  (p.145).	  The	  proponents	  of	  emerging	  views	  of	  
sovereignty	  also	  got	  a	  bit	  more	  than	  they	  asked	  for	  in	  2003,	  when	  the	  U.S.	  led	  
invasion	  of	  Iraq	  began	  using	  humanitarian	  justifications	  to	  justify	  its	  illegal	  
aggression.	  
	  As	  evidenced	  by	  this	  abuse,	  and	  the	  calls	  for	  subjecting	  sovereignty	  to	  a	  
whole	  host	  of	  different	  criteria,	  what	  exactly	  the	  nature	  of	  sovereignty	  is	  
changing	  into	  remains	  unclear.	  Its	  continued	  success	  in	  allowing	  violent	  
governments	  to	  dictate	  the	  terms	  of	  international	  assistance	  to	  suffering	  




their	  actions,	  suggest	  that	  the	  changes	  to	  sovereignty	  have	  further	  to	  go	  
before	  matching	  the	  rhetoric.	  	  
What	  remains	  is	  an	  opportunity	  for	  either	  steps	  towards	  consensus	  within	  
the	  UN	  framework,	  or	  the	  continued	  undermining	  of	  UN	  authority.	  Even	  if	  
developing	  international	  consensus	  for	  legitimate	  uses	  of	  force	  outside	  UN	  
resolutions	  weren’t	  such	  a	  daunting	  task,	  some	  question	  the	  efficacy	  of	  this	  when	  
states	  already	  have	  no	  shortage	  of	  ethical	  rhetorical	  instruments	  for	  justifying	  
their	  determined	  course	  of	  action	  (Bellamy,	  International	  Affairs,	  2008).	  Either	  
way,	  military	  intervention,	  outside	  Security	  Council	  resolutions,	  will	  continue	  to	  
occur.	  Except	  that	  is,	  when	  they	  don’t.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  can’t	  assume	  that	  
future	  military	  actions	  outside	  of	  Security	  Council	  approval	  will	  remain	  “illegal,	  
but	  legitimate,”	  as	  the	  Independent	  International	  Commission	  on	  Kosovo	  
ultimately	  decided	  that	  the	  NATO	  intervention	  was.	  On	  the	  other,	  we	  should	  not	  
expect	  that	  they	  will	  happen	  at	  all	  when	  they	  are	  most	  needed,	  legally	  or	  
otherwise.	  	  	  
Kofi	  Annan	  highlighted	  this	  problem	  in	  an	  address	  to	  the	  General	  
Assembly:	  	  
While	  the	  genocide	  in	  Rwanda	  will	  define	  for	  our	  generation	  the	  
consequences	  of	  inaction	  in	  the	  face	  of	  mass	  murder,	  the	  more	  recent	  
conflict	  in	  Kosovo	  has	  prompted	  important	  questions	  about	  the	  
consequences	  of	  action	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  complete	  unity	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  




A	  year	  later,	  Annan	  stated,	  “In	  essence	  the	  problem	  is	  one	  of	  
responsibility:	  in	  circumstances	  in	  which	  universally	  accepted	  human	  rights	  are	  
being	  violated	  on	  a	  massive	  scale,	  we	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  act”	  (U.N.	  General	  
Assembly,	  55th	  Sess.,	  2000).	  
As	  the	  example	  of	  Darfur	  will	  show,	  no	  clear	  consensus	  has	  been	  reached.	  
Not	  on	  the	  emerging	  definitions	  of	  sovereignty,	  not	  on	  the	  how,	  when,	  and	  why	  of	  
intervention	  behavior,	  not	  even	  on	  the	  present	  landscape	  of	  legal	  norms.	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  task	  of	  working	  towards	  a	  set	  of	  response	  criteria	  should	  not	  be	  
abandoned.	  Many	  diplomatic	  measures	  exist	  in	  the	  toolbox	  of	  international	  
relations	  and	  conflict	  resolution	  that	  most	  parties	  can	  agree	  on,	  and	  it’s	  by	  
building	  on	  this	  common	  ground,	  that	  the	  greatest	  chance	  for	  consensus	  exists.	  	  
Ultimately,	  even	  assuming	  agreement	  can	  be	  reached	  over	  the	  
insufficiencies	  of	  sovereignty	  inviolability	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  individual	  protection,	  
many	  questions	  remain.	  What	  cases	  would	  be	  applicable	  for	  a	  sovereign	  
exception	  and	  who	  would	  decide	  when	  such	  action	  has	  crossed	  the	  threshold?	  
Finally,	  what	  actions	  can	  be	  taken,	  when	  the	  Security	  Council	  does	  not	  act,	  and	  
how	  can	  these	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  creep	  of	  neo	  imperialism?	  
These	  questions	  do	  not	  lend	  themselves	  to	  simple	  answers,	  nor	  will	  any	  
response	  framework	  be	  able	  to	  satisfy	  the	  positions	  of	  all	  parties.	  	  Regardless,	  the	  
importance	  of	  mapping	  out	  the	  conflict,	  so	  that	  it	  can	  be	  navigated,	  is	  clear—as	  






Located	  in	  western	  Sudan,	  Darfur	  is	  a	  sparsely	  populated	  region	  covering	  
an	  area	  roughly	  the	  size	  of	  France	  with	  an	  estimated	  population	  (2006)	  of	  6-­‐6.5	  
Million	  (OCHA,	  2008).	  The	  population	  is	  a	  mix	  of	  nomadic,	  sedentary,	  Arab,	  
African,	  and	  Afro-­‐Arab	  groups,	  nearly	  all	  of	  which	  are	  Muslim	  (O'Fahey,	  2008).	  
“Dar”	  with	  historical	  connotations	  of	  “home”	  or	  “land	  of”	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  an	  
ancient	  tribal	  system	  of	  land	  usage	  and	  ownership	  that	  allows	  the	  right	  to	  
settlement	  and	  passage	  of	  an	  area,	  while	  the	  Fur	  are	  a	  sedentary	  tribal	  group.	  
Darfur	  thus	  can	  be	  translated	  literally	  as	  “home	  of	  the	  Fur.”	  	  During	  the	  
seventeenth	  century,	  the	  Fur	  ruled	  over	  the	  region	  through	  a	  sultanate	  that	  
functioned	  as	  a	  centralized	  authority	  with	  bureaucratic	  and	  military	  systems.	  The	  
Fur	  were	  among	  the	  land	  (Dar)	  holders	  who	  sustained	  themselves	  through	  
farming,	  while	  other	  tribal	  groups	  in	  the	  region	  would	  share	  grazing	  areas	  with	  
the	  farming	  groups.	  
Other	  than	  slowly	  dismantling	  the	  Sultanate	  and	  most	  of	  the	  tribal	  land	  
management,	  British	  rule	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century	  largely	  adopted	  a	  policy	  of	  
“non-­‐interference”	  in	  Darfur	  (De	  Waal,	  2007,	  p.	  73).	  Leaving	  much	  of	  the	  systems	  
of	  eldership	  and	  tribal	  conflict	  resolution	  in	  place,	  they	  neglected	  to	  invest	  in	  
infrastructure	  or	  economic	  development,	  governing	  under	  the	  principle	  of	  
“indirect	  rule,”	  leaving	  the	  region	  largely	  as	  it	  had	  existed	  during	  the	  previous	  
centuries	  (O'Fahey,	  2008,	  p.	  299).	  Following	  independence,	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  




a	  rapid	  growth	  in	  population	  of	  around	  5	  million,	  Khartoum,	  which	  never	  fully	  
established	  its	  governing	  authority	  in	  the	  region	  during	  the	  50’s	  and	  60’s,	  made	  
little	  investment	  in	  Darfur	  other	  that	  what	  O’Fahey	  (2008)	  has	  called	  “brutal	  and	  
rapid	  urbanization”	  (p.301).	  	  
While	  the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  Darfurians	  share	  an	  Islamic	  faith,	  this	  
faith	  underwent	  changes	  through	  the	  50’s	  and	  60’s	  from	  a	  traditionally	  more	  
tolerant,	  Sufi	  form	  of	  Islam,	  to	  a	  more	  political	  practice.	  Cultural	  changes,	  
including	  what	  Paul	  Doornbos	  has	  identified	  as	  the	  “Sudanification”	  of	  tribal	  
groups	  in	  Darfur	  accompanied	  a	  paucity	  of	  government	  services	  and	  neglect	  
(Doornbos,	  1988).	  In	  1995,	  the	  government	  broke	  Darfur	  into	  three	  states	  which	  
was	  largely	  responsible	  for	  weakening	  or	  undermining	  the	  social	  fabric	  of	  the	  
region,	  and	  was	  considered	  by	  many,	  within	  the	  Fur	  tribe,	  as	  being	  done	  to	  divide	  
and	  erode	  their	  chances	  at	  governing	  (Abdul-­‐Jalil,	  Mohammed,	  &	  Yousuf,	  2007).	  
Although	  it	  has	  been	  invoked	  in	  the	  conflict,	  ethnic	  differences	  between	  
Darfurians	  are	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  identify.	  Skin	  color	  and	  religion	  cannot	  account	  
for	  differences,	  while	  cultural	  heritage,	  and	  even	  language	  (Arabic)	  is	  often	  
shared.	  Instead,	  “the	  basis	  for	  the	  cleavage	  is	  the	  claim	  to	  an	  Arab	  identity	  that	  
has	  less	  to	  do	  with	  the	  above	  criteria	  that	  it	  does	  with	  often-­‐fictional	  patrilineal	  
lineages	  that	  lead	  back	  to	  mythical	  Arab	  forbearers.	  There	  may	  be	  little,	  if	  any,	  
historical	  accuracy	  to	  these	  constructs.	  But	  to	  those	  who	  invoke	  them,	  they	  are	  




“African”	  will	  be	  used	  from	  here	  on	  to	  identify	  differences	  between	  group	  
identities	  with	  the	  important	  caveat	  that	  external	  differences	  are	  often	  very	  few.	  	  
Civil	  War	  
The	  events	  leading	  to	  the	  2003	  eruption	  of	  violence	  in	  Darfur	  have	  roots	  in	  
the	  tumultuous	  past	  of	  Sudan.	  The	  north/south	  civil	  war,	  which	  had	  been	  raging	  
since	  1983	  and	  is	  responsible	  for	  over	  1.9	  million	  deaths,	  with	  well	  as	  over	  4	  
million	  forced	  to	  flee	  their	  homes	  (Iyob	  &	  Khadiagala,	  2006)	  had	  deepened	  tribal,	  
political,	  and	  regional	  divisions	  during	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  Darfur	  conflict.	  It	  also	  
intensified	  the	  fears	  the	  ruling	  elite	  in	  Khartoum	  had	  about	  losing	  territory	  to	  
emerging	  insurgent	  movements	  around	  the	  country.	  	  
The	  civil	  war	  is	  relevant	  to	  Darfur	  in	  three	  main	  points.	  First,	  the	  
government’s	  response	  to	  the	  insurgency	  in	  the	  south	  shares	  similarities	  to	  the	  
counterinsurgency	  in	  Darfur.	  	  Second,	  the	  work	  of	  the	  main	  rebel	  group	  in	  the	  
south	  informed,	  assisted,	  and	  nurtured	  rebels	  in	  Darfur	  with	  both	  political	  
ideology	  and	  direction.	  Third,	  while	  the	  international	  community	  was	  focused	  on	  
the	  north/south	  peace	  process	  in	  Sudan,	  it	  was	  often	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  Darfur.	  
Among	  Khartoum’s	  preferred	  methods	  for	  dealing	  with	  civil	  unrest,	  and	  
one	  that	  will	  become	  immediately	  relevant	  in	  looking	  at	  the	  conflict	  in	  Darfur,	  is	  
the	  masterful	  exploitation	  of	  existing	  tribal	  tensions	  by	  distributing	  weapons	  to	  
the	  historic	  rivals	  of	  tribal	  groups	  the	  government	  hopes	  to	  suppress,	  and	  to	  




perfected	  in	  Darfur.	  The	  nature	  of	  such	  a	  strategy	  is	  that	  the	  violence	  quickly	  
develops	  a	  dynamic	  of	  its	  own.	  	  
Northern	  Sudan,	  home	  of	  the	  capital	  Khartoum,	  is	  predominantly	  made	  up	  
of	  self-­‐identifying	  Arab,	  Muslim.	  In	  Khartoum	  state	  power	  is	  consolidated	  by	  a	  
handful	  of	  elites	  struggling	  to	  hold	  onto	  Arab	  minority	  rule	  in	  a	  largely	  African	  
nation.	  The	  post-­‐colonial	  power	  balance	  has	  hardly	  respected	  the	  diversity	  in	  
Sudan,	  with	  some	  arguing	  that	  “since	  independence	  all	  governments	  in	  Khartoum	  
have	  totally	  neglected	  the	  economic,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  interests	  of	  the	  non-­‐
Muslim	  and	  non-­‐Arab	  natives	  of	  southern	  Sudan”	  (Kebbede,	  1999,	  p.	  7)	  
	  In	  the	  south,	  self-­‐identifying	  “African,”	  non-­‐religious,	  animistic,	  or	  
Christian	  groups	  have	  suffered	  from	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  political	  isolation	  and	  
ethnically	  charged	  discrimination	  as	  the	  Darfurians	  in	  the	  west.	  This	  isolation	  has	  
been	  intensified	  by	  statewide	  reforms	  imposing	  a	  requirement	  on	  all	  English	  
speaking	  Universities	  around	  the	  country	  to	  perform	  their	  education	  in	  Arabic,	  
compulsory	  courses	  in	  Qur’an	  studies,	  the	  separation	  of	  the	  sexes,	  and	  the	  
mandatory	  wearing	  of	  a	  veil	  for	  female	  students.	  University	  professors	  who	  did	  
not	  fit	  into	  the	  Islamic	  reforms	  were	  summarily	  dismissed,	  and	  in	  1983	  Shari’a	  
law	  was	  imposed	  on	  the	  whole	  of	  Sudan(Kebbede,	  1999).	  
The	  Sudan	  People’s	  Liberation	  Movement/Army	  (SPLM/A),	  a	  
predominately	  Christian,	  African	  insurgent	  group,	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  John	  
Garang,	  was	  the	  driving	  force	  in	  the	  push	  for	  southern	  autonomy	  and	  equality.	  




on	  the	  government	  until	  they	  agreed	  to	  power	  sharing	  concessions.	  The	  
Comprehensive	  Peace	  Agreement	  (CPA),	  signed	  in	  2005,	  was	  the	  result	  of	  
intermittent	  peace	  efforts	  afforded	  by	  the	  international	  community.	  On	  paper,	  it	  
recognized	  the	  southern	  negotiators	  call	  for	  political	  autonomy	  and	  equal	  
recognition,	  scheduling	  a	  vote	  for	  independence	  at	  a	  later	  date.	  	  
The	  North–South	  peace	  process	  influenced	  the	  response	  to	  Darfur	  in	  that	  
until	  early	  2004,	  the	  international	  community	  was	  so	  focused	  on	  it,	  that	  other	  
matters:	  widespread	  deaths	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	  villages,	  for	  example,	  became	  
secondary.	  There	  had	  been	  a	  long	  and	  drawn	  out	  debate	  within	  the	  international	  
community	  over	  how	  the	  peace	  processes	  should	  be	  sequenced.	  So	  many	  
resources	  had	  already	  been	  devoted	  to	  the	  negotiations	  in	  Naivasha	  that	  there	  
was	  reluctance	  to	  engage	  in	  Darfur,	  out	  of	  fear	  that	  pressuring	  the	  government	  
would	  jeopardize	  the	  progress	  made	  in	  the	  north-­‐south	  negotiations.	  Some	  have	  
cited	  the	  push	  for	  north/south	  peace	  as	  the	  reason	  why	  Darfur	  had	  been	  
neglected	  for	  so	  long	  and	  why	  the	  situation	  there	  was	  allowed	  to	  continue	  
(Feinstein	  International	  Famine	  Center,	  2005).	  
Darfur	  Rebel	  Insurgency	  
Hassan	  Al-­‐Turabi	  was	  a	  religious	  and	  political	  figure	  in	  Sudan	  and	  a	  
founding	  member	  in	  the	  1980s	  of	  the	  political	  party	  the	  National	  Islamic	  Front	  
(NIF).	  The	  NIF	  successfully	  executed	  a	  coup	  d’état	  in	  1989,	  resulting	  in	  a	  
government	  power	  structure	  made	  up	  of	  complicated	  power-­‐sharing	  agreements	  




1999).	  The	  revolution	  brought	  sweeping	  Islamic	  reforms	  throughout	  the	  
country,	  including	  the	  banning	  of	  singing	  and	  dancing,	  and	  severe	  limitations	  on	  
women’s	  freedoms.	  In	  1993,	  Omar	  Al-­‐Bashir’s	  appointed	  himself	  president,	  while	  
Al-­‐Turabi	  continued	  to	  serving	  in	  various	  positions	  for	  the	  next	  years,	  including	  
as	  speaker	  of	  the	  house	  (Flint	  &	  De	  Waal,	  2005).	  	  
	  In	  1999	  a	  lengthy	  power	  struggle	  between	  the	  NIF’s	  leadership	  broke	  out,	  
particularly	  between	  Al-­‐Bashir	  and	  Al-­‐Turabi.	  The	  result	  was	  the	  dissolution	  of	  
parliament	  by	  President	  Al-­‐Bashir,	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  constitution,	  a	  
declaration	  of	  a	  state	  of	  emergency,	  and	  the	  banishing	  of	  Al-­‐Turabi	  from	  the	  
government	  in	  December	  1999	  (Daly,	  2007).	  Al-­‐Bashir	  was	  slowly	  consolidating	  
state	  power	  around	  himself.	  	  
The	  new	  power	  balance	  in	  the	  government	  was	  able	  to	  make	  progress	  in	  
the	  north-­‐south	  peace	  talks,	  but	  as	  these	  slowly	  moved	  forward,	  levels	  of	  violence	  
in	  Darfur	  continued	  to	  rise.	  Under	  the	  NIF	  government,	  Darfur’s	  unsolved	  
problems	  continued	  deteriorating;	  issues	  of	  land,	  water,	  and	  being	  used	  as	  a	  
staging	  ground	  for	  Libyan	  troops	  launching	  attacks	  into	  Chad	  meant	  that	  inter-­‐
tribal	  tensions	  were	  high,	  and	  conflict	  recurrent	  (Flint	  &	  De	  Waal,	  2005).	  When	  
tensions	  did	  give	  way	  to	  violence,	  it	  was	  often	  between	  nomadic	  Arab	  Muslims	  
and	  sedentary	  African	  Muslims	  of	  Darfur.	  As	  Mamdani	  (2009)	  points	  out,	  nobody	  
seemed	  to	  be	  in	  control,	  and	  “no	  conflict	  resolution	  mechanism	  seemed	  to	  be	  in	  




Much	  of	  the	  violence	  had	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  nomadic	  raiders	  on	  
sedentary	  groups.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  many	  of	  the	  sedentary	  tribal	  groups	  had	  already	  
begun	  to	  form	  militias	  for	  protection,	  while	  certain	  ethnic	  tribes,	  including	  the	  
Zaghawa	  and	  the	  Fur,	  chose	  to	  form	  alliances	  (Mamdani,	  2009).	  M.W.	  Daily	  points	  
out	  that,	  “Each	  of	  the	  several	  major	  groups	  that	  would	  eventually	  form	  the	  
nucleus	  of	  revolt,	  Fur,	  Zaghawa,	  and	  Masalit,	  was	  the	  focus	  of	  ever-­‐increasing	  
violence	  from	  Arab	  militias,	  and	  pleas	  for	  government	  protection	  fell	  on	  deaf	  ears	  
or	  were	  even	  punished”	  (Daly,	  2007,	  p.	  267).	  
Following	  the	  unrest	  and	  overall	  instability	  throughout	  the	  80’s	  and	  90’s,	  
and	  an	  instance	  in	  2001	  involving	  Arab	  raiders	  which	  left	  over	  125	  people	  in	  Abu	  
Gamra	  dead,	  tribal	  militia	  groups	  that	  were	  previously	  more	  concerned	  with	  
security	  began	  airing	  their	  grievances	  with	  the	  government	  in	  Khartoum	  for	  not	  
stopping	  the	  raider	  attacks	  (Daly,	  2007,	  p.	  268).	  These	  militia	  groups	  become	  
increasingly	  centralized	  and	  political	  as	  the	  attacks	  continued.	  The	  seeds	  of	  
insurgency	  were	  sprouting	  among	  the	  three	  main	  tribes	  of	  the	  region,	  and	  in	  
2000,	  the	  first	  rebel	  military	  bases	  were	  established	  and	  training	  began	  towards	  
a	  formal	  counter	  insurgency	  (Flint	  &	  De	  Waal,	  2005).	  
Meanwhile,	  stripped	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  and	  government	  influence,	  Al-­‐
Turabi	  created	  a	  new	  political	  party,	  the	  Popular	  Congress	  Party	  (PCP),	  and,	  in	  a	  
move	  demonstrating	  contempt	  for	  Al-­‐Bashir,	  signed	  a	  “memorandum	  of	  
understanding”	  with	  the	  SPLA	  in	  February	  of	  2001,	  strategically	  befriending	  the	  




violent	  resistance	  against	  Al-­‐Bashir’s	  government	  through	  forging	  unity	  
between	  the	  southern	  civil	  war	  forces	  of	  the	  SPLA/M	  and	  the	  Darfur	  insurgency	  
groups	  (Mamdani,	  2009,	  p.	  239).	  In	  June	  of	  2001,	  the	  SPLA/M	  attempted	  to	  push	  
their	  way	  northwest	  to	  join	  with	  nascent	  insurgency	  forces	  in	  Darfur,	  but	  were	  
cut	  off	  by	  government	  troops,	  with	  the	  resulting	  battle	  displacing	  more	  than	  
30,000	  persons	  who	  fled	  mostly	  on	  foot	  (Prunier,	  2008,	  p.	  87).	  
While	  the	  resistance	  groups	  were	  still	  largely	  nebulous	  at	  this	  point,	  the	  
largest	  of	  them	  was	  known	  as	  the	  Darfur	  Liberation	  Front	  (DLF),	  and	  launched	  its	  
first	  attack	  on	  the	  government	  in	  February	  2002	  destroying	  a	  government	  post	  
near	  Nyala	  (Daly,	  2007).	  Through	  failed	  attempts	  at	  mediation	  and	  continued	  
military	  losses	  against	  the	  growing	  insurgency,	  the	  government	  began	  searching	  
for	  new	  methods	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  attacks	  and	  the	  attempts	  of	  the	  SPLA	  to	  join	  
rebel	  groups	  in	  Darfur.	  Turning	  to	  a	  method	  that	  had	  already	  proved	  effective	  in	  
the	  South,	  the	  GoS	  increased	  their	  arming	  and	  unleashing	  of	  Arab	  raiders.	  In	  April	  
of	  2002	  in	  the	  town	  of	  Shoba,	  the	  raiders	  killed	  17	  people	  and	  burned	  600	  houses	  
to	  the	  ground;	  they	  also	  stole	  2,000	  heads	  of	  cattle,	  removing	  a	  fundamental	  part	  
of	  the	  villages’	  livelihood,	  and	  thus	  discouraging	  them	  to	  return	  (Prunier,	  2008,	  p.	  
88).	  	  
In	  early	  2002,	  Al-­‐Turabi	  delivered	  a	  flow	  of	  weapons	  to	  the	  insurgent	  
groups	  hoping	  to	  develop	  an	  influence	  over	  the	  rebels,	  and	  with	  it,	  a	  modicum	  of	  
political	  capital	  (Prunier,	  2008,	  p.	  88).	  As	  the	  raider	  attacks	  continued,	  the	  DLF	  




2003,	  through	  continued	  cooperation	  among	  rebel	  groups,	  a	  political	  
declaration	  was	  released	  and	  a	  new	  united	  resistance	  front	  emerged	  under	  the	  
name	  Sudanese	  Liberation	  Movement/Front	  (SLM/A).	  The	  manifesto	  which	  
shared	  many	  similarities	  with	  the	  declaration	  of	  the	  SPLM/A,	  denounced	  
generations	  of	  oppression	  and	  called	  upon	  a:	  	  
United	  democratic	  Sudan…predicated	  on	  full	  acknowledgment	  of	  Sudan’s	  
ethnic,	  cultural,	  social,	  and	  political	  diversity.	  [On]	  an	  economy	  and	  
political	  system	  that	  address	  the	  uneven	  development	  and	  marginalization	  
that	  have	  plagued	  the	  country	  since	  independence…religion	  and	  
politics…must	  be	  kept	  in	  their	  respective	  domains,	  with	  religion	  belonging	  
to	  the	  personal	  domain	  and	  the	  state	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  The	  SLM/A	  
firmly	  opposes	  the	  Khartoum	  Government’s	  policies	  of	  using	  some	  Arab	  
tribes	  to	  achieve	  its	  hegemonic	  devices	  that	  are	  detrimental	  both	  to	  Arabs	  
and	  non-­‐Arabs	  (Sudanese	  Liberation	  Movement,	  2003).	  
Emboldened	  with	  political	  direction,	  the	  SLM/A	  continued	  launching	  
attacks	  on	  government-­‐controlled	  positions	  in	  the	  west	  of	  Sudan	  around	  the	  
same	  time	  that	  the	  north-­‐south	  peace	  process	  was	  beginning	  to	  gain	  traction.	  On	  
the	  26th	  of	  February	  2003,	  around	  300	  rebels	  operating	  with	  30	  so-­‐called	  
‘technicals’	  (Toyota	  Land	  cruisers	  rigged	  with	  top-­‐mounted	  machine	  guns)	  
attacked	  a	  government	  garrison	  in	  the	  town	  of	  Gulu,	  killing	  nearly	  200	  
government	  soldiers	  and	  disbanding	  the	  garrison,	  causing	  the	  troops	  to	  flee	  




The	  attacks	  forced	  the	  Government	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  rapidly	  
escalating	  conflict	  in	  Darfur,	  while	  also	  maintaining	  a	  stable	  façade	  for	  the	  
international	  community	  that	  everything	  was	  under	  control	  for	  the	  continuation	  
of	  the	  peace	  talks	  in	  Naivasha.	  A	  press	  release	  was	  issued	  the	  day	  after	  the	  Guli	  
attack	  stating	  that,	  “These	  people	  are	  not	  rebels	  but	  bandits;	  [they]	  will	  not	  
jeopardize	  the	  peace	  process”	  (in	  Prunier,	  2008,	  p.	  95).	  	  
A	  second	  rebel	  group	  was	  forming	  around	  the	  same	  time	  in	  Darfur	  that	  
had	  originally	  been	  supportive	  of	  the	  NIF	  after	  it	  seized	  power,	  but	  quickly	  
became	  disillusioned	  with	  continued	  government	  neglect	  and	  its	  continued	  
policies	  of	  favoritism.	  Calling	  themselves	  the	  Justice	  and	  Equality	  Movement	  
(JEM),	  the	  group	  is	  associated	  with	  documenting	  the	  history	  of	  minority	  rule	  in	  
Sudan	  and	  the	  tactics	  of	  political	  exclusion	  through	  the	  publication	  of	  a	  volume,	  
titled	  The	  Black	  Book:	  Imbalance	  of	  Power	  and	  Wealth	  in	  the	  Sudan.	  The	  book	  was	  
published	  and	  distributed	  around	  the	  country	  in	  2000	  and	  2002,	  and	  statistically	  
documented	  the	  severe	  imbalance	  of	  political	  representation	  within	  the	  
government,	  illustrating	  how	  a	  certain	  northern	  Arab	  tribal	  group	  had	  been	  able	  
to	  dominate	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  through	  coercion	  and	  political	  subterfuge	  
(Seekers	  of	  Truth	  and	  Justice,	  2004).	  	  
Even	  while	  the	  majority	  of	  educated	  Sudanese	  were	  already	  well	  aware	  of	  
such	  government	  discrimination	  and	  policies	  of	  selective	  representation,	  The	  
Black	  Book	  brought	  together	  different	  elements	  of	  the	  Darfur	  resistance	  both	  




cause,	  while	  also	  managing	  to	  further	  provoke	  an	  already	  frantic	  government,	  
which	  hastened	  its	  arming	  and	  cooperation	  with	  Arab	  raider	  groups	  (Daly,	  2007,	  
p.276).	  	  
While	  the	  two	  resistance	  movements	  both	  shared	  anti-­‐government	  
sentiments	  and	  recognized	  the	  need	  for	  better	  representation	  and	  equality	  in	  
Darfur,	  they	  differed	  in	  their	  approach	  and	  ideology.	  The	  SLM/A	  was	  composed	  
largely	  of	  secular,	  multiethnic	  groups	  advocating	  for	  the	  reorganization	  of	  the	  
Sudanese	  government	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  fairer	  distribution	  of	  power	  and	  economic	  
opportunity,	  while	  the	  JEM	  was	  formed	  as	  a	  neo-­‐Islamist	  revival	  movement	  
calling	  for	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  Darfur’s	  position	  in	  a	  unified	  Sudan	  under	  shari’a	  
law	  (Iyob	  &	  Khadiagala,	  2006).	  It	  was	  also	  the	  JEM	  that	  Al-­‐Turabi	  was	  drawn	  
towards	  in	  his	  efforts	  to	  push	  back	  against	  the	  Al-­‐Bashir	  government.	  	  
The	  SLM/A	  and	  JEM	  continued	  making	  demands	  of	  the	  government	  for	  
economic	  equality,	  development	  projects,	  political	  recognition,	  and	  to	  stop	  being	  
called	  “armed	  bandits”	  (Mamdani,	  2009).	  Continuing	  with	  their	  early	  military	  
successes,	  the	  rebels	  launched	  an	  attack	  on	  April	  25th	  2003	  targeting	  both	  Nyala	  
and	  al-­‐Fashir,	  and	  resulted	  in	  their	  occupying	  the	  airport,	  destroying	  airplanes	  
and	  gunships,	  and	  capturing	  the	  commander	  of	  an	  air	  force	  base	  (Flint,	  2007).	  
The	  insurgency	  attacks	  continued	  into	  late	  May,	  where	  rebels	  seized	  the	  city	  of	  
Kutum	  and	  killed	  around	  500	  Sudanese	  soldiers	  in	  and	  around	  the	  garrison,	  
followed	  by	  an	  attack	  on	  Tinay	  resulting	  in	  around	  250	  government	  troop	  




Having	  won	  thirty-­‐four	  of	  their	  thirty-­‐eight	  skirmishes	  during	  the	  
middle	  of	  2003	  (O'Fahey,	  2008),	  the	  insurgency	  had	  created	  disarray	  within	  the	  
GoS.	  Recognizing	  their	  need	  to	  appear	  in	  control	  of	  their	  country	  during	  the	  
north-­‐south	  peace	  process,	  the	  NIF	  government	  “became	  instantly	  determined	  to	  
avenge	  the	  insults”	  (Flint,	  2007,	  p.	  152).	  Not	  long	  after	  the	  attacks	  on	  Kutum,	  a	  
group	  of	  150	  Darfur	  notables	  in	  Khartoum	  drafted	  a	  plea	  to	  the	  government,	  
which	  called	  for	  the	  opening	  of	  political	  dialogue	  with	  the	  rebellion,	  a	  ceasefire,	  
the	  freeing	  of	  Darfur	  political	  prisoners,	  and	  the	  organization	  of	  humanitarian	  aid	  
delivery	  before	  the	  start	  of	  the	  rainy	  season.	  Indignant,	  the	  government	  
responded	  by	  stepping	  up	  arrests	  of	  suspected	  rebel	  supporters	  in	  Khartoum,	  
declared	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  in	  Darfur,	  and	  threw	  its	  full	  weight	  behind	  the	  Arab	  
raider	  solution,	  or	  what	  Flint	  &	  de	  Waal	  have	  termed	  “counterinsurgency	  on	  the	  
cheap”	  (Flint	  &	  De	  Waal,	  2005).	  
The	  Government	  Response	  and	  Escalation	  of	  Violence	  
“Janjaweed”	  is	  a	  term	  used	  to	  describe	  an	  armed	  bandit	  group	  who	  were	  
recruited	  heavily,	  but	  not	  exclusively	  from	  nomadic	  Arab	  camel	  herders	  from	  the	  
north	  of	  Darfur	  and	  Chad	  (Haggar,	  2007).	  
These	  nomadic	  groups	  have	  been	  particularly	  susceptible	  in	  reverting	  to	  
banditry	  as	  they	  have	  been	  largely	  excluded	  from	  land	  ownership	  rights	  in	  
Darfur,	  and,	  as	  such,	  were	  largely	  marginalized	  in	  the	  region.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  
can	  be	  seen	  when	  the	  group	  calling	  itself	  the	  Committee	  of	  the	  Arab	  Gathering	  




consequences	  of	  Arab	  discrimination	  in	  Darfur.	  The	  group	  claimed	  that	  Arab	  
tribes	  of	  Darfur	  lacked	  fair	  representation	  and	  felt	  like	  they	  were	  subjects,	  rather	  
than	  citizens.	  The	  group	  claimed	  that	  Arabs	  were	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  
Darfur	  civilization,	  and	  requested	  more	  involvement	  in	  regional	  and	  central	  
government,	  warning	  that	  failing	  this,	  “things	  may	  get	  out	  of	  the	  hands	  of	  wise	  
people	  and…	  a	  catastrophe	  with	  dire	  consequence,	  may	  take	  place”	  (Arab	  
Gathering	  Letter,	  1987).	  	  
The	  tensions	  were	  compounded	  with	  the	  process	  of	  desertification	  that	  
has	  been	  taking	  place	  in	  Darfur	  since	  the	  80’s.	  The	  drought,	  brought	  on	  by	  both	  
rapid	  population	  increases,	  as	  well	  as	  natural	  environmental	  changes,	  has	  created	  
water	  shortages	  and	  constricted	  grazing	  areas	  for	  nomadic	  groups,	  disrupting	  
their	  traditional	  migration	  patterns	  and	  interfering	  with	  the	  region’s	  specific	  and	  
time	  honored	  strategies	  for	  survival.	  As	  this	  pushed	  the	  nomads	  closer	  to	  
sedentary	  farmland,	  tensions	  over	  the	  limited	  grazing	  areas,	  fresh	  water,	  and	  
fertile	  soil	  have	  made	  “land,	  and	  who	  owns	  it…a	  deadly	  issue	  in	  Darfur”	  (O'Fahey,	  
2008,	  p.	  301).	  
It	  was	  in	  this	  context	  of	  desperation,	  combined	  with	  a	  steady	  flow	  of	  
weapons	  and	  the	  ideology	  of	  Arab	  supremacy	  rooted	  in	  propaganda	  from	  
Gaddafi’s	  Libya,	  that	  nomad	  groups	  so	  readily	  resorted	  to	  banditry,	  while	  genuine	  
grievances	  made	  the	  Janjaweed	  an	  ideal	  tool	  for	  government	  counterinsurgency	  
efforts	  (Haggar,	  2007).	  The	  tensions	  were	  illustrated	  in	  one	  tape-­‐recorded	  




in	  Chad,	  thanking	  them	  for	  “providing	  his	  tribe	  in	  Sudan	  with	  the	  necessary	  
weapons	  and	  ammunition	  to	  exterminate	  the	  African	  tribes	  in	  Darfur”	  (Kiernan,	  
2007,	  p.	  595).	  
With	  a	  poorly	  trained	  and	  thinly	  spread	  military,	  the	  government	  was	  
finding	  itself	  outmaneuvered	  and	  on	  the	  losing	  end	  of	  what	  was	  quickly	  becoming	  
a	  second	  civil	  war.	  Flint	  &	  de	  Waal	  point	  out	  that	  at	  the	  beginning,	  the	  
government’s	  usage	  of	  tribal	  militias	  as	  being:	  
	  Purely	  opportunistic:	  there	  they	  were,	  they	  had	  fighting	  skills	  and	  they	  
allowed	  the	  government	  to	  conserve	  its	  own,	  overstretched	  
resources…but	  as	  time	  went	  on	  the	  militias…gave	  the	  government	  the	  
cover	  of	  ‘age-­‐old	  tribal	  conflict’,	  enabling	  it	  to	  deny	  there	  was	  a	  civil	  war	  at	  
all	  (Flint	  &	  De	  Waal,	  2005,	  p.	  57).	  	  
The	  U.S.	  special	  envoy	  to	  Sudan	  Andrew	  Natsios	  described	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
Janjaweed	  to	  the	  Senate	  Foreign	  Relations	  Committee:	  
The	  Government	  of	  Sudan	  is	  using	  strategies	  against	  Darfur	  that	  were	  first	  
used	  against	  the	  south	  for	  many	  years.	  By	  manipulating	  pre-­‐existing	  tribal	  
divisions,	  the	  Government	  has	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  splintering	  the	  
opposition	  movements	  into	  factions	  and	  has	  attempted	  to	  buy	  off	  one	  
small	  group	  at	  a	  time	  rather	  than	  pursuing	  a	  broader	  peace	  through	  
transparent	  negotiation	  with	  all	  parties	  (Natsios,	  2007).	  
On	  the	  25th	  of	  July	  2003	  the	  Sudanese	  newspaper	  Al-­‐Adwaa	  reported	  that	  




in	  Darfur,	  and	  that	  the	  conflict	  must	  now	  be	  resolved	  by	  military	  means	  (in	  
Prunier,	  2008).	  Because	  the	  military	  had	  already	  proven	  itself	  inept,	  the	  
government	  was	  really	  referring	  here	  to	  the	  Janjaweed.	  In	  the	  process	  of	  building	  
up	  the	  raiders	  to	  an	  effective	  counterinsurgent	  group,	  criminals	  who	  could	  be	  
counted	  on	  for	  their	  ruthlessness	  were	  released	  from	  prison	  to	  join	  and	  lead	  the	  
militia	  operations	  (Daly,	  2007,	  p.	  282).	  Through	  an	  active	  recruitment	  process,	  
the	  government	  sought	  to	  add	  members	  by	  arming	  and	  remunerating	  the	  
Janjaweed,	  paying	  a	  salary	  which	  varied	  depending	  on	  whether	  they	  could	  read	  
or	  write,	  and	  if	  they	  owned	  a	  horse	  or	  camel	  (Prunier,	  2008).	  	  
The	  Janjaweed	  increasingly	  came	  to	  resemble	  a	  group	  of	  pirates,	  giving	  
themselves	  names	  such	  as	  the	  “angel	  of	  death,”	  and	  were	  often	  less	  interested	  in	  
fighting	  the	  rebels	  than	  they	  were	  in	  making	  “surprise	  attacks	  on	  civilians	  in	  their	  
towns	  and	  villages”	  in	  order	  to	  rape,	  pillage,	  and	  collect	  loot	  (Daly,	  2007,	  p.	  283).	  
This	  could	  hardly	  have	  been	  unexpected,	  as	  the	  Janjaweed	  were	  encouraged	  and	  
motivated	  by	  the	  government	  with	  promises	  of	  free	  reign	  over	  villages	  once	  they	  
were	  destroyed.	  In	  interviews,	  Janjaweed	  members	  confessed	  that	  they	  had	  been	  
instructed	  to	  “enter	  the	  village	  first	  and	  burn	  everything,	  and	  afterwards	  take	  
‘what	  you	  like’”	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  2005,	  p.	  20).	  
Despite	  the	  governments’	  early	  attempts	  to	  do	  so,	  its	  connections	  to	  the	  
Janaweed	  cannot	  be	  denied.	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  reported	  that	  	  “the	  record	  of	  
the	  Sudanese	  military	  in	  Darfur	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  crimes	  against	  civilians	  




and	  military	  leadership	  in	  Khartoum”	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  2005,	  p.	  34).	  The	  
report	  goes	  on	  to	  cite	  an	  AU	  observer	  on	  the	  ground	  who	  observed	  that	  in	  nearly	  
every	  attack,	  helicopter	  gunships	  were	  present,	  along	  with	  transports	  which	  
performed	  reconnaissance,	  dropped	  metal	  drums	  full	  of	  explosives,	  and	  directed	  
fire	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  2005).	  As	  noted	  by	  one	  villager,	  “We	  know	  the	  Arabs.	  
They	  don’t	  have	  planes;	  they	  have	  cows!	  Only	  the	  government	  has	  planes!”	  (Flint	  
&	  De	  Waal,	  2005,	  p.	  107).	  
Throughout	  2003,	  the	  violence	  in	  western	  Sudan	  from	  both	  sides	  
continued	  to	  escalate.	  Prunier	  (2008)	  describes	  some	  of	  the	  initial	  bombing	  
attacks	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  government	  and	  Janjaweed	  against	  villages	  in	  Darfur:	  
First	  aircraft	  would	  come	  over	  a	  village,	  as	  if	  smelling	  the	  target,	  and	  then	  
return	  to	  release	  their	  bombs.	  The	  raids	  were	  carried	  out	  by	  Russian-­‐built	  
four-­‐engine	  Antonov	  An-­‐12s,	  which	  are	  not	  bombers	  but	  transports.	  They	  
have	  no	  bomb	  bays	  or	  aiming	  mechanisms,	  and	  the	  “bombs”	  they	  dropped	  
were	  old	  oil	  drums	  stuffed	  with	  a	  mixture	  of	  explosives	  and	  metallic	  
debris.	  These	  were	  rolled	  on	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  transport	  and	  dropped	  out	  of	  
the	  rear	  ramp,	  which	  was	  kept	  open	  during	  the	  flight.	  The	  result	  was	  
primitive	  free	  falling	  cluster	  bombs,	  which	  were	  completely	  useless	  from	  a	  
military	  point	  of	  view,	  since	  they	  could	  not	  be	  aimed,	  but	  had	  a	  deadly	  
efficiency	  against	  fixed	  civilian	  targets.	  As	  any	  combatant	  with	  a	  minimum	  
of	  training	  could	  easily	  duck	  them,	  they	  were	  terror	  weapons,	  aimed	  solely	  




helicopters	  and/or	  MiG	  fighter-­‐bombers	  would	  come,	  machine-­‐
gunning	  and	  firing	  rockets	  at	  any	  large	  targets	  such	  as	  a	  school	  or	  a	  
warehouse	  which	  might	  still	  be	  standing.	  Utter	  destruction	  was	  clearly	  
programmed.	  When	  the	  air	  attacks	  were	  over	  the	  Janjaweed	  would	  arrive,	  
either	  by	  themselves	  or	  in	  the	  company	  or	  regular	  Army	  units.	  The	  
militiamen	  would	  be	  mounted	  on	  horses	  and	  camels	  and	  often	  be	  
accompanied	  by	  others	  riding	  in	  “technicals”.	  They	  would	  surround	  the	  
village	  and	  what	  followed	  would	  vary.	  In	  the	  “hard”	  pattern	  they	  would	  
cordon	  off	  the	  place,	  loot	  personal	  belongings,	  rape	  the	  girls	  and	  women,	  
steal	  the	  cattle	  and	  kill	  the	  donkeys.	  Then	  they	  would	  burn	  the	  houses	  and	  
shoot	  all	  those	  who	  could	  not	  run	  away.	  Small	  children,	  being	  light,	  were	  
often	  tossed	  back	  in	  the	  burning	  houses	  (p.100).	  	  	  
Flint	  &	  De	  Waal	  (2005)	  through	  extensive	  interviews	  have	  further	  
documented	  bombings,	  as	  well	  as	  summary	  executions	  of	  suspected	  SLA	  leaders,	  
who	  were	  dragged	  from	  their	  villages	  and	  killed	  in	  the	  hundreds.	  The	  majority	  of	  
the	  violence	  coming	  from	  the	  Janjaweed	  and	  Government	  counterinsurgency	  was	  
directed	  towards	  the	  Fur,	  Masalit,	  and	  Zaghawa	  tribal	  groups.	  The	  patterns	  of	  
violence	  were	  remarkably	  uniform.	  They	  included	  the	  burning	  of	  huts,	  food,	  and	  
mosques,	  the	  stealing	  of	  cattle,	  mass	  killings,	  rape,	  and	  the	  poisoning	  of	  water	  
wells	  with	  corpses	  to	  render	  villages	  beyond	  the	  possibility	  of	  return,	  depopulate	  
the	  land,	  and	  humiliate	  the	  population	  (Flint	  &	  De	  Waal,	  2005).	  Attacks	  were	  




claiming	  Arab	  ownership	  of	  the	  land	  (Daly,	  2007).	  When	  pushed	  to	  disarm	  the	  
Janjaweed,	  the	  GoS	  would	  either	  invite	  the	  AU	  to	  watch	  a	  public	  disarmament	  
ceremony	  on	  one	  day,	  and	  hand	  them	  back	  the	  next,	  or	  simply	  merge	  the	  militia	  
members	  into	  the	  government	  security	  and	  defense	  forces	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  
2005;	  Flint	  &	  De	  Waal,	  2005).	  	  
The	  period	  between	  2003	  and	  2005	  evidenced	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  violent	  
deaths	  in	  Darfur.	  Attacks	  on	  villages	  were	  described	  in	  2004	  by	  the	  United	  
Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  of	  Human	  Rights	  as	  constituting	  a	  “reign	  of	  terror”	  
through	  the	  use	  of	  a	  “scorched	  earth	  policy”	  which	  had	  resulted	  in	  repeated	  war	  
crimes	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  being	  committed	  (U.N.	  News	  Centre,	  2004).	  
In	  2005,	  the	  UN	  released	  the	  Report	  of	  the	  International	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  on	  
Darfur	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Secretary-­General	  which	  found	  that	  crimes	  against	  
humanity	  had	  been	  committed	  by	  all	  actors:	  GOS,	  Janjaweed,	  and	  armed	  
guerrillas	  of	  Darfur	  (International	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  on	  Darfur,	  2005).	  
Rape	  was	  also	  systematically	  used	  as	  a	  weapon	  in	  Darfur,	  and	  was	  
combined	  with	  racial	  insults	  to	  humiliate,	  demoralize,	  and	  disrupt	  tribal	  society	  
(Amnesty	  Internatinal,	  2004).	  If	  the	  underlying	  formula	  for	  a	  successful	  guerrilla	  
insurgency	  is	  to	  be	  “among	  the	  people	  as	  fish	  are	  in	  water,”	  Pruiner	  (2008)	  
describes	  the	  government	  of	  Sudan’s	  counterinsurgency	  policy	  as	  aiming	  to	  
simply	  “drain	  the	  pond”	  (p.103).	  The	  complete	  destruction	  of	  villages	  and	  
measures	  taken	  to	  discourage	  their	  reestablishment	  and	  targeting	  of	  peoples’	  





The	  AU	  and	  the	  Ndjamena	  Peace	  Agreement	  
Five	  months	  after	  being	  called	  “the	  world’s	  greatest	  humanitarian	  
disaster,”	  the	  issue	  of	  Darfur	  was	  raised	  at	  the	  Security	  Council	  for	  the	  first	  time	  
(Flint	  &	  De	  Waal,	  2005,	  p.	  126).	  This	  was	  in	  July	  of	  2004,	  nearly	  a	  year	  and	  a	  half	  
after	  the	  first	  attacks	  went	  widespread	  in	  2003.	  Resolution	  1556	  condemned	  the	  
counter	  insurgency	  and	  called	  upon	  the	  government	  to	  recognize	  its	  own	  primary	  
responsibility	  to	  protect,	  but	  contained	  incoherent	  and	  unenforceable	  
recommendations	  for	  following	  up.	  It	  was	  careful	  not	  to	  encroach	  upon	  the	  
sovereignty	  of	  the	  Sudanese	  government,	  who	  continued	  to	  remind	  the	  UN	  that	  
Darfur	  was	  an	  internal	  matter,	  while	  adamantly	  refusing	  external	  interference	  
(Badescu	  &	  Bergholm,	  The	  Responsibility	  To	  Protect	  and	  the	  Conflict	  in	  Darfur:	  
The	  Big	  Let-­‐Down,	  2009).	  One	  Amnesty	  International	  spokesperson	  described	  
the	  resolution	  as	  “the	  abandonment	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Darfur	  and	  an	  abdication	  of	  
the	  Security	  Council’s	  role	  as	  a	  human	  rights	  enforcing	  agent”	  (Hoge,	  2004).	  
With	  peace	  negotiations	  having	  begun	  in	  2000	  in	  Naivasha,	  Kenya	  towards	  
a	  resolution	  in	  the	  drawn	  out	  civil	  war,	  oil	  beginning	  to	  flow	  a	  year	  earlier	  with	  
China	  obtaining	  the	  largest	  supply	  contract,	  and	  the	  cooperation	  of	  the	  GoS	  on	  
counter	  terror	  initiatives	  following	  September	  11th,	  Sudan	  had	  found	  itself	  with	  
unexpected	  leverage	  in	  the	  international	  community.	  Despite	  having	  the	  GoS	  at	  
the	  bargaining	  table	  in	  Naivasha,	  “neither	  the	  SPLA/M	  under	  John	  Garang	  nor	  




pressure	  the	  GOS	  to	  rein	  in	  the	  violence	  in	  the	  Darfur	  region”	  (Apsel,	  2009,	  p.	  
243).	  
In	  2003,	  as	  violence	  increased	  but	  enforcement	  mechanisms	  appeared	  
unlikely,	  a	  number	  of	  diplomatic	  visits	  were	  dispatched	  to	  the	  region	  including	  
the	  UN	  Secretary	  General,	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  and	  the	  
Special	  Advisor	  on	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Genocide.	  They	  all	  returned	  with	  the	  same	  
conclusion:	  that	  the	  Government	  of	  Sudan	  must	  take	  immediate	  action	  to	  protect	  
their	  citizens	  from	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  and	  war	  crimes.	  Despite	  these	  visits,	  
all	  of	  2003	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  2004	  were	  essentially	  lost,	  as	  all	  eyes	  stayed	  
focused	  on	  Naivasha	  (United	  Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  
2004).	  
On	  April	  8th	  2004,	  a	  ceasefire	  agreement	  was	  signed	  in	  Ndjamena,	  Chad,	  
with	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  AU	  leading	  the	  way	  for	  an	  observer	  force.	  The	  
document	  has	  been	  described	  as	  fundamentally	  flawed,	  agreeing	  “to	  the	  
neutralization	  of	  armed	  militia	  without	  defining	  what	  either	  the	  term	  ‘militia’	  
referred	  to	  or	  what	  ‘neutralization’	  might	  mean”	  (De	  Waal,	  2007).	  Either	  way,	  it	  
was	  violated	  by	  all	  of	  the	  involved	  parties	  according	  to	  some	  sources	  within	  
hours	  of	  being	  signed	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  2005).	  Shortly	  after	  the	  signing	  of	  
the	  agreement,	  and	  with	  the	  UN’s	  blessing	  through	  resolution	  1564,	  the	  AU	  
deployed	  an	  observer	  mission	  in	  Sudan	  (AMIS)	  to	  monitor	  and	  document,	  if	  not	  




The	  AU	  mission	  grew	  to	  2,341	  soldiers,	  814	  police	  officers,	  and	  450	  
observers	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2004	  (Mamdani,	  2009).	  The	  soldiers	  were	  initially	  tasked	  
with	  protecting	  the	  observation	  team	  and	  documenting	  attacks	  and	  ceasefire	  
violations,	  but	  lacked	  a	  protection	  mandate	  to	  intervene	  on	  behalf	  of	  villages	  or	  
civilians	  in	  imminent	  danger.	  Flint	  &	  De	  Waal	  (2005)	  described	  the	  mission	  as	  
having	  been	  “thrown	  in	  the	  deep	  end…[with]	  fewer	  staff	  working	  on	  Sudan	  than	  
the	  Darfur	  unit	  of	  a	  medium-­‐sized	  international	  NGO”	  (p.120).	  In	  2005,	  the	  AU’s	  
mandate	  was	  expanded	  to	  include	  the	  protection	  of	  civilians	  when	  possible	  and	  
when	  they	  were	  experiencing	  an	  imminent	  threat.	  
Despite	  being	  underfunded	  and	  understaffed,	  the	  AU	  deployment	  did	  
eventually	  coincide	  with	  a	  reduction	  in	  deaths	  starting	  around	  the	  beginning	  of	  
2005,	  and	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  a	  second	  peace	  agreement.	  According	  to	  
Mamdani	  (2009),	  the	  AU	  was	  “able	  to	  radically	  reduce	  deaths	  from	  political	  
violence”	  (p.	  38),	  while	  an	  increased	  NGO	  presence	  in	  Darfur	  worked	  to	  provide	  
water	  in	  the	  prevailing	  drought	  conditions,	  further	  reducing	  overall	  death	  tolls.	  A	  
report	  issued	  by	  Refugees	  International	  found	  that	  the	  AU	  had	  been	  able	  to	  bring	  
“a	  modicum	  of	  additional	  security	  in	  certain	  locations,”	  including	  in	  IDP	  camps,	  
but	  had	  been	  ultimately	  restricted	  in	  its	  ability	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  funding	  and	  logistical	  
support	  (Refugees	  International,	  2005).	  Another	  report	  issued	  by	  the	  Feinstein	  
center	  also	  found	  that	  security	  had	  improved	  in	  the	  Kebkabiya	  province	  in	  
northern	  Darfur,	  where	  the	  AU	  had	  established	  a	  presence	  (Feinstein	  




twelve	  months	  after	  its	  initial	  deployment	  in	  July-­‐August	  2004,	  AMIS	  helped	  
bring	  increased	  stability	  to	  most	  areas	  of	  Darfur”	  (p.377).	  
Even	  if	  the	  AU	  had	  had	  the	  bureaucratic	  capacity	  to	  absorb	  further	  
support	  from	  the	  developed	  world	  for	  its	  observer	  mission,	  it	  did	  not	  receive	  it.	  
Even	  from	  its	  own	  member	  states,	  AMIS	  ran	  into	  difficulty	  amassing	  funds	  for	  its	  
first	  peacekeeping	  mission,	  as	  around	  75%	  of	  the	  AU	  budget	  is	  contributed	  by	  
only	  five	  countries	  consisting	  of	  South	  Africa,	  Egypt,	  Libya,	  Nigeria,	  and	  Algeria	  
(Badescu	  &	  Bergholm,	  The	  Responsibility	  To	  Protect	  and	  the	  Conflict	  in	  Darfur:	  
The	  Big	  Let-­‐Down,	  2009).	  AMIS	  was	  further	  restricted	  in	  their	  movement	  by	  a	  
6pm	  –	  6am	  curfew	  imposed	  by	  the	  government,	  was	  often	  subject	  to	  “temporary	  
fuel	  shortages”	  and	  had	  no	  aerial	  defensive	  capabilities	  (Steidle,	  2007).	  With	  a	  
200	  million	  dollar	  deficit	  in	  July	  of	  2005,	  and	  faced	  with	  difficulties	  collecting	  
upon	  pledged	  support,	  soldiers	  would	  regularly	  go	  many	  months	  without	  being	  
paid,	  and	  many	  had	  been	  forced	  to	  take	  loans	  (Williams,	  2006).	  
Given	  the	  amount	  that	  AMIS	  achieved	  in	  the	  areas	  that	  it	  established	  a	  
presence,	  on	  the	  budget	  it	  was	  given,	  one	  can	  deduce	  that	  adequate	  support	  of	  
the	  AU	  mission	  would	  have	  increased	  its	  effectiveness.	  As	  the	  push	  for	  a	  UN	  
takeover	  grew,	  the	  already	  insufficient	  support	  for	  the	  AU	  mission	  continued	  to	  
decline	  until	  in	  January	  of	  2006,	  recognizing	  its	  own	  limitations,	  the	  AU	  itself	  






Darfur	  Peace	  Agreement	  
The	  Darfur	  Peace	  Agreement	  (DPA),	  signed	  on	  the	  5th	  of	  May,	  2006	  in	  
Abuja,	  Nigeria	  was	  a	  significant	  improvement	  upon	  the	  N’Djamena	  document.	  
Despite	  these	  improvements,	  is	  has	  been	  widely	  criticized	  for	  being	  
unenforceable,	  insufficient,	  and	  entirely	  contingent	  upon	  the	  cooperation	  of	  
Khartoum	  (Wadlow,	  2006).	  The	  DPA	  was	  also	  signed	  under	  immense	  pressure	  by	  
the	  international	  community,	  particularly	  the	  United	  States,	  who	  “strong	  armed”	  
it	  to	  completion	  	  (Fadul	  &	  Tanner,	  2007).	  
Lacking	  the	  economic	  strength	  to	  survive	  independently,	  the	  DPA	  did	  not	  
entertain	  the	  hope	  of	  independence	  for	  Darfur,	  unlike	  with	  the	  CPA	  in	  the	  south.	  
The	  DPA	  also	  severely	  underfunded	  compensation	  for	  war	  affected	  victims	  and	  
their	  families,	  (what	  amounted	  to	  around	  $10	  per	  person)	  and	  relied	  on	  the	  
government	  to	  abide	  by	  peace	  agreements	  for	  the	  very	  violence	  they	  were	  
responsible	  for	  starting	  (Prunier,	  2008,	  p.	  164).	  As	  Reeves	  (2007)	  argues,	  the	  
biggest	  problem	  with	  the	  agreement	  was	  its	  “failure	  to	  provide	  meaningful	  
international	  guarantors	  for	  the	  exceedingly	  complex	  security	  arrangements—
arrangements	  that	  Khartoum	  has	  consistently	  and	  comprehensively	  flouted	  from	  
the	  moment	  the	  document	  was	  signed”	  (p.10).	  It	  was,	  on	  paper	  and	  in	  practice,	  
the	  second	  non-­‐starter	  in	  the	  Darfur	  peace	  process.	  	  
International	  pressure	  to	  produce	  something	  tangible	  through	  the	  
imposition	  of	  external	  deadlines,	  and	  inflexibility	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  negotiating	  




and	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  agreement	  (Nathan,	  2007).	  Stall	  tactics	  by	  the	  GoS	  
slowed	  the	  mediation	  process,	  while	  its	  suggestions,	  such	  as	  placing	  the	  AU	  in	  
charge	  of	  disarming	  the	  rebels,	  while	  it	  would	  take	  responsibility	  for	  disarming	  
the	  Janjaweed,	  lead	  one	  to	  question	  the	  seriousness	  with	  which	  it	  approached	  the	  
negotiations	  (Prunier,	  2008).	  	  
The	  utter	  lack	  of	  mutual	  trust	  between	  parties	  during	  the	  negotiations,	  
along	  with	  the	  external	  pressure	  to	  produce	  a	  tangible	  document	  as	  soon	  as	  
possible,	  led	  to	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  agreement	  by	  only	  one	  of	  the	  leaders	  within	  the	  
SLM/A,	  Minni	  Minnawi.	  Others	  within	  the	  SLM	  who	  were	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  
agreement	  immediately	  split	  from	  the	  Minnawi	  faction,	  vowing	  not	  to	  honor	  the	  
DPA	  ceasefire.	  The	  splintering	  continued	  under	  a	  variety	  of	  underlying	  
motivations,	  resulting	  eventually	  in	  around	  15	  separate	  guerrilla	  movements	  
fighting	  in	  Darfur	  (Prunier,	  2008).	  The	  JEM	  also	  refused	  to	  sign	  the	  agreement.	  	  
With	  the	  underlying	  rift	  in	  the	  SLM/A	  blown	  apart	  by	  the	  DPA,	  open	  
warfare	  emerged	  between	  the	  groups	  for	  superiority,	  while	  “rouge”	  factions	  shed	  
much	  of	  their	  political	  motivation	  and	  frequently	  resorted	  to	  attacking	  and	  
looting	  villages	  in	  their	  vicinity	  (Mamdani,	  2009).	  As	  Natsios	  (2007)	  pointed	  out	  
during	  his	  testimony	  to	  the	  Senate	  foreign	  relations	  committee,	  “Rebel	  leaders	  
frequently	  appear	  more	  focused	  on	  their	  own	  ambitions	  than	  on	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  
the	  people	  of	  Darfur.”	  	  
In	  August	  of	  2006,	  the	  Security	  Council	  again	  tried	  their	  hands	  at	  a	  




of	  the	  AU	  mission	  (U.N.	  Security	  Council,	  2006).	  Citing	  the	  inviolability	  of	  his	  
state’s	  sovereignty,	  Al-­‐Bashir	  politely	  declined.	  The	  International	  Crisis	  Group	  
reported,	  in	  November	  of	  2007,	  that	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  year,	  there	  had	  
been	  over	  240,000	  newly	  displaced	  or	  re-­displaced	  persons,	  and	  that	  attacks	  
against	  Darfurians	  had	  risen	  150	  per	  cent	  over	  the	  previous	  year	  (International	  
Crisis	  Group,	  2007).	  In	  September	  2007,	  splinter	  groups	  from	  the	  SLA	  attacked	  an	  
AU	  base	  killing	  at	  least	  10	  peacekeepers	  and	  wounding	  many	  more	  (Polgreen,	  
2007).	  With	  attackers	  following	  no	  clear	  allegiances,	  and	  the	  2005	  cessation	  of	  
violence	  now	  reversing	  against	  the	  efforts	  of	  an	  under-­‐funded	  AU	  team,	  the	  
situation	  following	  the	  DPA	  had	  become	  worse	  than	  before.	  	  
UNAMID	  
Four	  years	  after	  the	  outbreak	  of	  violence	  in	  Darfur,	  the	  approval	  of	  UN	  
Security	  Council	  resolution	  1769	  in	  July	  of	  2007,	  with	  all	  15	  members	  in	  favor,	  
cleared	  the	  way	  for	  UN	  peacekeepers.	  The	  mission	  would	  be	  merged	  together	  
with	  the	  AU	  AMIS	  troops	  in	  a	  first	  of	  its	  kind	  “hybrid	  force,”	  and	  was	  aimed	  at	  
implementing	  the	  Darfur	  Peace	  Agreement	  and	  upholding	  the	  ceasefire	  (U.N.	  
Security	  Council,	  2007).	  It	  got	  off	  to	  a	  slow	  start.	  Prunier	  (2008)	  has	  described	  its	  
activation	  in	  December	  of	  2007	  as	  a	  ceremonious	  “re-­‐hatting”	  from	  green	  
helmets	  to	  blue,	  yet	  remaining	  “as	  unmotivated,	  as	  inefficient	  and	  as	  under-­‐
equipped	  as	  they	  had	  been	  under	  their	  previous	  name”	  (p.	  178).	  	  
Despite	  paragraph	  15	  (2)	  of	  the	  resolution	  clearly	  stating	  that,	  acting	  




responsibility	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Sudan”	  (U.N.	  Security	  Council,	  2007).	  The	  
GoS	  has	  done	  its	  best	  to	  make	  this	  task	  as	  difficult	  as	  possible	  for	  the	  UN,	  with	  an	  
official	  from	  the	  defense	  ministry	  even	  claiming	  that	  they	  only	  had	  the	  right	  to	  
defend	  themselves	  (Abass,	  2007).	  UNAMID	  also	  suffers	  from	  similar	  limitations	  in	  
its	  operational	  capacity	  as	  AMIS	  did,	  including	  requiring	  permission	  for	  night	  
flights,	  mounting	  rescue	  or	  reinforcement	  missions	  for	  their	  own	  troops	  who	  
come	  under	  fire,	  and	  being	  relegated	  only	  to	  an	  “observe	  and	  encourage”	  position	  
in	  the	  disarming	  of	  the	  Janjaweed	  (Badescu	  &	  Bergholm,	  The	  Responsibility	  To	  
Protect	  and	  the	  Conflict	  in	  Darfur:	  The	  Big	  Let-­‐Down,	  2009;	  Report	  of	  the	  
Secretary-­‐General	  and	  the	  Chairperson	  of	  the	  African	  Union	  Commission,	  2007).	  
Attacks	  on	  UNAMID	  have	  been	  frequent	  and	  57	  UN	  personnel	  have	  been	  killed	  so	  
far	  (UNAMID	  Facts	  and	  Figures,	  2010).	  
As	  of	  2009,	  the	  deployment	  reached	  its	  full	  capacity,	  consisting	  of	  21,800	  
total	  uniformed	  personnel,	  including	  16,852	  troops,	  273	  military	  observers,	  and	  
4,675	  police	  officers	  (UNAMID	  Facts	  and	  Figures,	  2010). While	  Darfur	  has	  seen	  
dramatic	  improvements	  since	  the	  full	  deployment	  of	  UNAMID,	  the	  situation	  
remains	  extremely	  volatile.	  	  In	  its	  Aug	  9,	  2009	  extension	  of	  the	  hybrid	  mission	  
two	  years	  after	  its	  inception,	  the	  UN	  expressed	  concern	  over	  the	  “continued	  
seriousness	  of	  the	  security	  situation	  and	  deterioration	  of	  the	  humanitarian	  
situation	  in	  Darfur,	  and	  at	  the	  recurring	  attacks	  on	  the	  civilian	  population”	  (U.N.	  
Security	  Council,	  2009).	  On	  25	  February	  of	  2010,	  a	  day	  after	  Omar	  al-­‐Bashir	  




Medicines	  du	  Monde	  was	  forced	  to	  halt	  their	  operations	  in	  Jabel	  Marra	  due	  to	  
fighting	  between	  rebel	  and	  government	  forces,	  while	  an	  estimated	  100,000	  were	  
forced	  to	  flee	  from	  the	  region	  (Reuters,	  2010).	  
ICC	  Indictment	  	  
In	  2009,	  the	  ICC	  issued	  an	  arrest	  warrant	  for	  the	  president	  of	  Sudan.	  In	  the	  
warrant	  it	  wrote	  that	  it	  	  “was	  satisfied	  that	  there	  are	  reasonable	  grounds	  to	  
believe	  that	  Omar	  Al-­‐Bashir	  is	  criminally	  responsible	  under	  article	  25(3)(a)	  of	  the	  
Statute	  as	  an	  indirect	  perpetrator,	  or	  as	  an	  indirect	  co-­‐perpetrator,	  for	  war	  
crimes	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  and	  that	  his	  arrest	  appears	  to	  be	  necessary	  
under	  article	  58(l)(b)	  of	  the	  Rome	  Statute”	  (International	  Criminal	  Court,	  2009).	  
The	  action	  is	  open	  to	  the	  criticism	  that,	  as	  it’s	  essentially	  unenforceable,	  
only	  serves	  to	  complicate	  the	  process	  of	  reconciliation	  in	  Darfur,	  and	  meanwhile	  
has	  provoked	  the	  GoS	  which	  kicked	  out	  a	  number	  of	  humanitarian	  aid	  groups.	  By	  
setting	  such	  precedence	  however,	  the	  warrant	  has	  also	  established	  that	  even	  
acting	  heads	  of	  state	  will	  not	  be	  immune	  from	  persecution	  against	  such	  crimes.	  
As	  a	  result,	  Al-­‐Bashir	  has	  been	  severely	  de-­‐legitimized	  and	  will	  likely	  suffer	  
politically,	  as	  Slobodan	  Milošević	  did	  after	  being	  indicted	  by	  the	  International	  
Criminal	  Tribunal.	  Whether	  or	  not	  this	  will	  ultimately	  serve	  to	  moderate	  the	  GoS	  
or	  contribute	  to	  the	  de-­‐escalation	  of	  conflict	  however,	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  
Death	  Toll	  
Establishing	  the	  number	  of	  casualties	  starting	  from	  the	  rebel	  attacks	  in	  




extremely	  contested,	  and	  at	  times	  political	  exercise.	  The	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  
State	  estimated,	  between	  March	  2004	  and	  January	  2005,	  a	  total	  of	  between	  
98,000	  and	  181,000	  deaths,	  while	  other	  reports	  between	  February	  and	  August	  of	  
the	  same	  years	  have	  reached	  as	  high	  as	  400,000	  (U.S.	  Government	  Accountablity	  
Office,	  2006).	  The	  difficulty	  in	  establishing	  accurate	  findings	  is	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  
obstacles	  in	  collecting	  the	  data	  on	  the	  ground,	  as	  well	  as	  differing	  opinions	  on	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  the	  tactics	  of	  privation,	  as	  a	  counterinsurgency	  tool,	  should	  be	  
included	  in	  the	  estimates.	  Daly	  poses	  the	  dilemma	  in	  counting	  the	  dead	  when	  he	  
writes,	  “are	  malnourished	  children	  dying	  from	  dysentery	  in	  squalid	  camps	  
surrounded	  by	  Janjaweed	  to	  be	  counted	  as	  victims…?”	  (Daly,	  2007).	  	  
A	  study	  conducted	  by	  Centre	  for	  Research	  on	  the	  Epidemiology	  of	  
Disasters,	  working	  primarily	  from	  statistical	  analysis	  of	  around	  30	  mortality	  
surveys	  and	  receiving	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  confidence	  from	  the	  United	  States	  
Government	  Accountability	  Office,	  which	  stepped	  in	  to	  mediate	  the	  numbers	  
debate,	  reported	  170,237	  deaths	  over	  a	  22	  month	  period	  between	  2003	  and	  2005	  
(U.S.	  Government	  Accountablity	  Office,	  2006). 180,000	  later	  became	  the	  official	  
UN	  figure	  in	  March	  of	  2005	  (New	  York	  Times,	  2005).	  A	  more	  recent	  study	  
financed	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State	  extended	  
the	  time	  frame	  to	  the	  end	  of	  2008	  and	  concluded	  with	  298,271	  deaths	  (Degomme	  
&	  Guha-­‐Sapir,	  2010).	  Even	  though,	  as	  Tubiana	  (2007)	  notes,	  “there	  are	  no	  reliable	  
figures”	  (p.68),	  the	  lowest	  of	  the	  death	  toll	  ranges,	  widely	  acknowledged	  to	  be	  in	  




The	  totals	  of	  war-­‐affected	  persons	  in	  Darfur	  have,	  for	  some	  time,	  been	  
in	  the	  millions,	  while	  the	  number	  of	  internally	  displaced	  persons,	  as	  reported	  by	  
the	  Office	  for	  the	  Coordination	  of	  Humanitarian	  Affairs	  in	  January	  of	  2009	  
reached	  2,667,682;	  more	  than	  double	  its	  April	  2004	  figures	  of	  around	  1	  million	  
(United	  Nations	  Office	  for	  the	  Coordination	  of	  Humanitarian	  Affairs,	  2009).	  
Genocide	  
The	  declaration	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Congress	  and	  President	  Bush	  that	  the	  
situation	  in	  Darfur	  as	  a	  genocide	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  similar,	  but	  much	  less	  
committed,	  finding	  by	  the	  EU	  that	  the	  events	  in	  Darfur	  were	  “tantamount	  to	  
genocide”	  (Bock	  &	  Miller,	  2004).	  These	  declarations	  presented	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
observe	  the	  mechanics	  of	  the	  invocation	  of	  the	  Genocide	  convention	  and	  its	  
requirements	  for	  action.	  
Contrary	  to	  the	  American	  declaration	  and	  the	  European	  quasi-­‐declaration,	  
in	  2005,	  the	  UN	  commission	  of	  inquiry	  conducted	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  
Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  found	  that	  the	  “Government	  of	  Sudan	  has	  not	  
pursued	  a	  policy	  of	  genocide”	  (BBC,	  2010).	  It	  cited	  that	  forced	  displacement	  was	  
more	  common	  than	  the	  killing	  of	  entire	  villages	  and	  suggested	  that	  the	  violence	  
more	  resembled	  a	  terribly	  brutal	  counter-­‐insurgency	  with	  potentially	  
“individual”	  acts	  of	  genocide,	  rather	  than	  a	  mechanized	  government	  attempt	  to	  
eliminate,	  in	  whole	  or	  part,	  one	  particular	  group	  (International	  Commission	  of	  




soldiers,	  following	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  DPA,	  added	  to	  the	  non-­‐genocidal	  
elements	  in	  characterizing	  the	  overall	  nature	  of	  violence.	  
Contention	  over	  the	  genocide	  question	  was	  illustrated	  through	  the	  
testimony	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Special	  Envoy	  to	  Sudan,	  Andrew	  Natsios	  to	  the	  Senate	  
Foreign	  Relations	  Committee.	  Towards	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  report	  in	  April,	  he	  
described	  the	  events	  in	  2003	  to	  2004	  as	  having	  “led	  to	  genocide,”	  but	  was	  
exceedingly	  cautious	  during	  his	  testimony	  to	  describe	  the	  present	  situation	  in	  
Darfur	  as	  genocide,	  illustrating	  instead	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  situation	  (United	  
States	  Senate,	  2007).	  Mamdani	  (2009)	  quotes	  the	  follow-­‐up	  questioning	  after	  
Natsios’s	  testimony,	  where	  he	  takes	  great	  pains	  in	  illustrating	  the	  evolving	  nature	  
of	  the	  violence	  in	  Darfur,	  which	  by	  2007,	  included	  intra-­‐tribe	  rape,	  rebel	  
atrocities	  and	  attacks,	  loss	  of	  Government	  control,	  and	  the	  shifting	  of	  some	  of	  the	  
worst	  violence	  into	  neighboring	  Chad.	  All	  of	  these	  factors	  contradicted	  a	  simple	  
categorical	  designation	  of	  genocide.	  	  
Contrastingly,	  interviews	  of	  eyewitnesses	  to	  attacks	  in	  2003	  and	  2004	  
have	  recorded	  widespread	  use	  of	  racial	  insults	  directly	  accompanying	  fatal	  
violence	  (Hagan	  &	  Rymond-­‐Richmond,	  2009).	  Once	  the	  UN	  referred	  the	  issue	  to	  
the	  ICC,	  the	  chief	  prosecutor,	  Luis	  Moreno	  Ocampo	  pushed	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  
genocide	  in	  the	  indictment	  of	  president	  Al-­‐Bashir	  in	  2009,	  but	  the	  court	  decided	  
not	  to	  include	  it	  in	  the	  final	  arrest	  warrant	  that	  was	  issued	  (Hagan	  &	  Rymond-­‐
Richmond,	  2009).	  Prunier	  (2008)	  illustrates	  the	  complexity	  of	  violence	  in	  Darfur	  




been	  a	  deliberate	  well-­‐though	  out	  policy,	  but	  rather	  a	  spontaneous	  tool	  used	  
for	  keeping	  together	  a	  ‘country’	  which	  is	  under	  minority	  Arab	  domination”	  
(p.105).	  Darfur	  thus	  cannot	  serve	  as	  a	  case	  study	  for	  the	  invocation	  of	  an	  
international	  response	  as	  required	  by	  an	  enactment	  of	  the	  genocide	  convention.	  	  
While	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term,	  “genocide,”	  remains	  a	  disputed	  issue,	  the	  
severity	  and	  nature	  of	  violence	  meeting	  the	  conditions	  for	  crimes	  against	  
humanity	  and	  war	  crimes	  is	  not.	  The	  UN	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  found	  
widespread	  evidence	  of	  both	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  and	  war	  crimes,	  and	  also	  
recognized	  the	  role	  that	  ethnicity	  played	  in	  the	  violence	  and	  forced	  displacement	  
by	  describing	  it	  as	  “ethnic	  cleansing”	  (International	  Commission	  of	  Inquiry	  on	  
Darfur,	  2005).	  
The	  Government	  of	  Sudan	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  arming	  and	  inciting	  
of	  militant	  groups	  to	  purposefully	  target	  civilians	  within	  three	  dominant	  tribal	  
groups	  as	  a	  counter-­‐insurgency	  tactic.	  It	  also	  masterfully	  enacted	  diplomatic	  
subterfuge	  to	  delay	  or	  prevent	  the	  spread	  of	  information	  and	  the	  progress	  of	  
conflict	  resolution.	  Still,	  the	  problem	  of	  co-­‐opting	  the	  language	  of	  genocide,	  as	  a	  
tool	  for	  fast-­‐track	  military	  action,	  illustrates	  the	  importance	  of	  both	  early-­‐
warning	  and	  thorough	  information	  gathering	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  areas	  of	  conflict,	  
for	  the	  enactment	  of	  existing	  treaties	  and	  best	  practices	  by	  the	  international	  
community.	  	  
The	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  was	  upheld	  in	  the	  Darfur	  crisis,	  while	  legal	  




convention	  were	  not	  applied.	  Despite	  cries	  in	  the	  west	  for	  protection	  in	  
Darfur,	  nearly	  reaching	  the	  level	  of	  populist	  rage	  around	  2005,	  little	  changed	  in	  
the	  international	  response.	  The	  conflict	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  and	  protection	  was	  at	  
the	  center	  of	  the	  response	  to	  Darfur.	  
As	  previously	  mentioned,	  an	  international	  conflict	  response	  framework	  
for	  situations	  involving	  both	  an	  immediate	  need	  for	  protection,	  and	  a	  belligerent,	  
recalcitrant	  government	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  achieve.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  simple	  act	  
of	  identifying	  needs	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  debate	  and	  subjecting	  them	  to	  careful	  
reflection	  will	  inform	  and	  direct	  the	  first	  tentative	  steps.	  These	  steps	  must	  be	  
cautious	  in	  respecting	  international	  law	  and	  state	  sovereignty,	  while	  also	  taking	  
conclusive	  measures	  to	  protect	  victims	  of	  genocide,	  crimes	  against	  humanity,	  war	  
crimes,	  and	  ethnic	  cleansing.	  The	  following	  report	  credits	  itself	  as	  attempting	  to	  











The	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  
Formation	  and	  Content	  
One	  attempt	  at	  reconciling	  the	  non-­‐intervention/protection	  debate	  has	  
made	  surprising	  gains	  in	  a	  relatively	  short	  amount	  of	  time.	  It	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  
section.	  	  
During	  a	  speech	  in	  2000,	  Kofi	  Annan	  sought	  to	  improve	  responses	  to	  
humanitarian	  catastrophe	  by	  illustrating	  the	  importance	  of	  finding	  a	  way	  to	  
navigate	  the	  conflict	  between	  sovereign	  inviolability	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  
individuals.	  He	  asked,	  “…if	  humanitarian	  intervention	  is,	  indeed,	  an	  unacceptable	  
assault	  on	  sovereignty,	  how	  should	  we	  respond	  to	  a	  Rwanda,	  to	  a	  Srebrenica	  –	  to	  
gross	  and	  systematic	  violations	  of	  human	  rights	  that	  affect	  every	  precept	  of	  our	  
common	  humanity?”	  (Report	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  on	  the	  work	  of	  the	  
Organization,	  2000).	  
In	   October	   of	   2001,	   the	   International	   Commission	   on	   Intervention	   and	  
State	   Sovereignty	   (ICISS)	   was	   formed	   with	   sponsorship	   from	   the	   Canadian	  
government	  to	   find	  an	  answer	  to	  Annan’s	  question.	  Co-­‐chaired	  by	  Gareth	  Evans	  
of	   Australia,	   and	  Mohamed	   Sahnoun	   of	   Algeria,	   the	   ICISS	  was	   composed	   of	   12	  
diplomats,	   foreign	   ministers,	   and	   a	   former	   president,	   from	   an	   even	  
representation	  of	   countries	   consisting	  of	  both	  northern	  and	  southern	  economic	  
and	  security	  interests.	  Its	  task	  was	  to	  build	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  and	  guidelines	  for	  




life	  as	  a	   result	  of	   government	   involvement,	   complacency,	  or	   inability	   to	  halt	  
such	  violence.	  	  
The	  formation	  of	  the	  commission	  followed	  the	  tragic	  failures	  to	  prevent	  or	  
halt	  mass	  killings,	  repeatedly	  witnessed	  during	  the	  1990’s,	  including	  in	  Rwanda,	  
Srebrenica,	  and	  East	  Timor	  (Thakur,	  Crisis	  and	  Response,	  2008).	  The	  commission	  
recognized	  that	  the	  tension	  between	  non-­‐intervention	  and	  protection	  was	  at	  the	  
crux	  of	  the	  failures	  of	  initiating	  timely	  and	  effective	  conflict	  resolution	  measures	  
for	   saving	   lives	   during	   the	   outbreak	   of	   humanitarian	   disasters.	   As	   the	   ICISS	  
recognized;	   [i]n	   the	   interest	   of	   all	   those	   victims	   who	   suffer	   and	   die	   when	  
leadership	   and	   institutions	   fail,	   it	   is	   crucial	   that	   these	   differences	   be	   resolved”	  
(ICISS,	  2001,	  p.	  2).	  
These	  differences,	  partially	  brought	  on	  by	  the	  so-­‐called	  “right	  to	  
humanitarian	  intervention”	  had	  stifled	  progress	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  force,	  as	  it	  
relates	  to	  protection	  and	  sovereignty.	  Among	  the	  main	  goals	  of	  the	  ICISS	  was	  to	  
restart	  and	  reframe	  the	  debate	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  positions	  of	  entrenched	  parties	  
through	  the	  perspective	  of	  interests.	  The	  ICISS	  drafted	  its	  report,	  “The	  
Responsibility	  to	  Protect”	  (commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  R2P),	  which	  attempts	  to	  both	  
improve	  the	  legal	  (UN	  sanctioned)	  framework	  for	  the	  prevention	  and	  response	  to	  
mass	  scale	  humanitarian	  disasters,	  as	  well	  as	  seek	  out	  common	  ground	  towards	  
developing	  consensus.	  	  
In	  essence,	  the	  report	  is	  a	  list	  of	  recommendations	  for	  UN	  reform,	  




prevent.	  The	  R2P	  also	  references	  and	  endorses	  a	  number	  of	  different	  UN	  
special	  reports	  over	  the	  past	  20	  years,	  consolidating	  and	  combining	  them	  with	  its	  
own	  recommendations.	  Lending	  further	  creditability	  to	  the	  R2P,	  many	  of	  its	  
findings	  were	  also	  echoed	  by	  the	  2004	  UN	  High-­level	  Panel	  on	  Threats,	  Challenges	  
and	  Change,	  particularly	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  UN	  reform,	  prevention,	  peace	  building,	  
and	  timely	  response	  (High-­‐Level	  Panel	  on	  Threats,	  Challenges	  and	  Change,	  2004).	  
The	  ability	  of	  ICISS	  committee,	  despite	  its	  diverse	  composition,	  to	  reach	  a	  general	  
consensus	  in	  their	  recommendations	  on	  such	  a	  potentially	  explosive	  issue	  
provided	  a	  glimmer	  of	  hope	  that	  a	  similar	  agreement	  might	  be	  possible	  within	  the	  
international	  community	  (Weiss,	  2007).	  
This	  hope	  appeared	  briefly	  justified	  in	  2005	  when	  the	  UN	  World	  Summit	  
produced	  an	  outcome	  document	  agreeing	  upon	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  R2P.	  
Resulting	  from	  a	  unanimous	  vote	  in	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  gatherings	  of	  world	  leaders	  
in	  history,	  it	  has	  perhaps	  been	  the	  largest	  step	  to	  date	  in	  recognizing	  the	  
existence	  of	  an	  emerging	  protection	  norm.	  The	  outcome	  document	  established	  
and	  clarified	  the	  four	  crimes	  to	  be	  considered	  applicable	  for	  the	  responsibility	  to	  
protect	  as	  genocide,	  war	  crimes,	  ethnic	  cleansing,	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity.	  
These	  will	  be	  subsequently	  referred	  to	  as	  “R2P	  type	  crimes.”	  
The	  outcome	  document	  reads;	  “Each	  individual	  State	  has	  the	  
responsibility	  to	  protect	  its	  populations	  from	  genocide,	  war	  crimes,	  ethnic	  
cleansing	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity.	  This	  responsibility	  entails	  the	  prevention	  




means”	  (U.N.	  General	  Assembly	  Res/60/1,	  2005).	  This	  clearly	  implies	  that	  
sovereignty	  has	  acquired	  the	  feature	  of	  responsibility,	  and	  shed	  the	  feature	  of	  
impunity.	  The	  heads	  of	  state	  then	  went	  on	  to	  agree	  that,	  “we	  accept	  that	  
responsibility	  and	  will	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  it”	  (para	  138).	  
The	  next	  paragraph	  recognizes	  that:	  
The	  international	  community,	  through	  the	  United	  Nations,	  also	  has	  the	  
responsibility	  to	  use	  appropriate	  diplomatic,	  humanitarian,	  and	  other	  
peaceful	  means,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Chapters	  VI	  and	  VIII	  of	  the	  Charter,	  to	  
help	  to	  protect	  populations	  from	  genocide,	  war	  crimes,	  ethnic	  cleansing	  
and	  crimes	  against	  humanity.	  In	  this	  context,	  we	  are	  prepared	  to	  take	  
collective	  action,	  in	  a	  timely	  and	  decisive	  manner,	  through	  the	  Security	  
Council,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Charter,	  including	  Chapter	  VII,	  on	  a	  case-­‐
by-­‐case	  basis	  and	  in	  cooperation	  with	  relevant	  regional	  organizations	  as	  
appropriate,	  should	  peaceful	  means	  be	  inadequate	  and	  national	  
authorities	  are	  manifestly	  failing	  to	  protect	  their	  populations	  from	  
genocide,	  war	  crimes,	  ethnic	  cleansing	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  (U.N.	  
General	  Assembly,	  60th	  Sess.,	  2005	  para.139)	  
Thus,	  the	  outcome	  document	  does	  not	  endorse	  the	  exercise	  of	  military	  
intervention	  outside	  of	  the	  Security	  Council,	  but	  does	  call	  upon	  the	  international	  
community	  to	  help	  states	  exercise	  their	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  within	  the	  laws	  
of	  the	  UN	  charter.	  	  




UN	  organizations	  and	  NGOs,	  including	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  International	  
Crisis	  Group,	  Oxfam	  International,	  Refugees	  International,	  the	  High	  
Commissioner	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  and	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Refugees.	  Its	  
terminology	  has	  also	  been	  used	  in	  the	  General	  Assembly	  and	  the	  Security	  Council.	  	  
Most	  of	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  ICISS	  were	  also	  echoed	  in	  2004	  by	  the	  
UN	  Panel	  on	  Threats	  Challenges	  and	  Change,	  which	  found	  that	  if	  the	  Security	  
Council	  were	  to	  adopt	  a	  new	  set	  of	  guidelines	  closely	  resembling	  the	  ones	  
established	  by	  the	  R2P	  orchestrating	  the	  use	  of	  force	  in	  situations	  of	  genocide,	  
ethnic	  cleansing,	  and	  other	  large	  scale	  killing,	  that	  it	  would	  contribute	  to	  
achieving	  consensus	  on	  the	  use	  of	  coercive	  action,	  including	  armed	  force	  (U.N.	  
General	  Assembly	  Res/59/565,	  2004).	  Such	  a	  consensus	  would	  serve	  to	  clarify	  
the	  rules	  surrounding	  the	  use	  of	  force	  when	  the	  Security	  Council	  decides	  it	  
necessary,	  and	  minimize	  the	  chances	  of	  illegal	  unilateral	  or	  multilateral	  action.	  
To	  better	  understand	  the	  content	  of	  the	  R2P,	  we	  will	  look	  at	  the	  three	  
stages	  of	  responsibility	  with	  which	  the	  ICISS	  structured	  their	  recommendations.	  
These	  include	  the	  prevention	  of	  conflict,	  timely	  and	  authorized	  response	  to	  
conflict	  through	  protection,	  and	  the	  rebuilding	  phase	  following	  conflict.	  	  
Prevention	  
The	  first	  tier	  of	  responsibility,	  and	  the	  “single	  most	  important	  dimension	  
of	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect”	  is	  that	  of	  prevention	  (ICISS,	  2001,	  p.	  xi).	  The	  
responsibility	  to	  prevent	  consists	  of	  recommendations	  spanning	  a	  range	  from	  




NGOs,	  and	  development	  organizations	  to	  more	  coercive	  ones	  that	  would	  
require	  Security	  Council	  approval.	  	  
Prevention	  measures	  addressing	  “root	  cause”	  issues	  include	  strengthening	  
development	  and	  poverty	  reduction	  programs,	  political	  and	  legal	  capacity	  
building,	  as	  well	  as	  minority	  and	  human	  rights	  programs.	  NGOs	  are	  positioned	  
uniquely	  here,	  as	  they	  can	  often	  establish	  a	  direct	  working	  relationship	  with	  
those	  they	  are	  helping,	  while	  UN	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Office	  for	  the	  High	  
Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  can	  dispatch	  fact-­‐finding	  missions,	  and	  receive	  
and	  examine	  complaint	  petitions	  against	  states	  that	  are	  party	  to	  relevant	  human	  
rights	  treaties.	  	  
More	  coercive	  preventative	  measures	  include	  “the	  threat	  or	  application	  of	  
political	  sanctions,	  diplomatic	  isolation,	  suspension	  of	  organizations	  
membership,	  travel	  and	  asset	  restrictions	  on	  targeted	  persons,	  ‘naming	  and	  
shaming’,	  and	  other	  such	  actions”	  (ICISS,	  2001,	  p.	  24).	  These	  measures	  would	  
include	  the	  use	  of	  “smart	  sanctions”	  which	  target	  specific	  groups	  or	  individuals	  
within	  the	  government,	  rather	  than	  imposing	  general	  blockades,	  and	  which	  
demonstrated	  moderate	  successes	  in	  Iraq,	  Libya,	  Cambodia	  and	  Angola	  (Cortright	  
&	  Lopez,	  2002).	  	  
Prevention	  is	  tied	  together	  and	  relies	  upon	  the	  improvement	  of	  early	  
warning	  systems.	  The	  ICISS	  recognizes	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  both	  gather	  and	  process	  
information	  on	  imminent	  or	  recently	  emerged	  conflict,	  and	  distributing	  such	  




prevention.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  commission	  recommended	  establishing	  an	  
exclusive	  office	  under	  supervision	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  
“receive	  and	  analyze	  sensitive	  information	  from	  member	  states	  and	  others”	  
which	  would	  be	  staffed	  by	  persons	  specialized	  in	  conflict	  prevention	  (ICISS,	  2001,	  
p.	  22).	  Early	  warning	  was	  also	  among	  the	  specific	  recommendations	  made	  in	  the	  
2005	  outcome	  document,	  where	  world	  leaders	  called	  upon	  the	  international	  
community	  to	  assist	  the	  UN	  in	  establishing	  a	  central	  early	  warning	  capacity.	  	  
The	  ICISS	  also	  highlighted	  and	  fully	  endorsed	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  UN	  Report	  
on	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Armed	  Conflict.	  The	  report	  recommended,	  inter	  alia,	  that	  the	  
General	  Assembly	  make	  greater	  use	  of	  its	  powers	  for	  conflict	  prevention,	  and	  that	  
the	  Security	  Council	  take	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  preventative,	  rather	  than	  reactive	  
measures.	  One	  specific	  recommendation	  by	  the	  report	  was	  to	  build	  a	  permanent	  
committee	  “to	  discuss	  prevention	  cases	  on	  a	  continuing	  basis…[based	  on]	  cases	  
brought	  to	  its	  attention	  by	  Members	  States”	  (U.N.	  General	  Assembly	  Res/55/281,	  
2001).	  
Preventative	  military	  deployments	  are	  also	  briefly	  mentioned	  as	  an	  
element	  of	  the	  responsibility	  to	  prevent	  through	  the	  example	  of	  the	  UN	  
Preventive	  Deployment	  Force	  in	  the	  Republic	  of	  Macedonia	  with	  the	  
government’s	  approval	  (UNPREDEP).	  The	  mission	  which,	  at	  its	  height	  employed	  
1,050	  troops,	  has	  widely	  been	  considered	  successful	  in	  preventing	  a	  spillover	  of	  
violence	  from	  the	  region	  into	  Macedonia	  by	  monitoring	  smuggling	  activities	  and	  




provide	  security(United	  Nations	  Department	  of	  Public	  Information,	  1999).	  
The	  peacekeeping	  mission	  was	  ended	  by	  a	  Chinese	  veto	  following	  the	  official	  
recognition	  of	  Taiwan	  by	  the	  Republic	  of	  Macedonia.	  	  
Even	  with	  sufficiently	  funded	  and	  supported	  prevention	  programs	  that	  
are	  fully	  “exhausted	  before	  intervention	  is	  contemplated”	  (ICISS,	  2001	  p.xi),	  
contingencies	  must	  be	  prepared	  for.	  Societies	  developed	  under	  normative	  
structures	  of	  opportunity	  and	  equality	  are	  still	  susceptible	  to	  unforeseen	  sources	  
of	  violence	  and	  instability,	  and	  even	  the	  best	  prevention	  cannot	  be	  expected	  to	  
eliminate	  all	  emerging	  situations	  of	  violence.	  
Protection,	  Just	  Cause	  &	  Right	  Authority	  
When	  prevention	  measures	  fail	  to	  avert	  cases	  of	  R2P	  type	  crimes,	  the	  
ICISS	  issued	  recommendations	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  individuals	  that	  build	  upon	  
the	  concept	  of	  sovereignty	  as	  responsibility	  established	  by	  Cohen	  &	  Deng.	  The	  
R2P	  states	  that	  “[w]here	  a	  population	  is	  suffering	  serious	  harm,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
internal	  war,	  insurgency,	  repression,	  or	  state	  failure,	  and	  the	  state	  in	  question	  is	  
unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  halt	  or	  avert	  it,	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  yields	  to	  
the	  international	  responsibility	  to	  protect”	  (ICISS,	  2001,	  p.	  xi)	  
Protection	  does	  not	  automatically	  translate	  into	  military	  force,	  and	  there	  
are	  potentially	  many	  ways	  of	  fulfilling	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect.	  Many	  of	  these	  
follow	  the	  continuum	  of	  measures	  started	  in	  the	  prevention	  stage.	  Strengthening	  
or	  widening	  smart	  sanctions,	  imposing	  and	  enforcing	  no-­‐fly	  zones,	  or	  




measures	  in	  the	  protection	  stage,	  that	  could	  have	  also	  been	  started	  in	  the	  
stages	  of	  prevention.	  
The	  ICISS	  recognized	  that	  the	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  must	  be	  the	  very	  
foundation,	  from	  which	  all	  further	  actions	  are	  justified.	  The	  norm	  of	  non-­‐
intervention	  and	  the	  role	  of	  sovereignty	  act	  as	  the	  protectorate	  of	  “not	  
only…states	  and	  governments…[but	  also]…peoples	  and	  cultures,	  enabling	  
societies	  to	  maintain	  the	  religious,	  ethnic,	  and	  civilization	  differences	  that	  they	  
cherish”	  (ICISS,	  2001,	  p.	  31).	  
In	  accordance	  with	  the	  UN	  Charter	  however,	  the	  ICISS	  recognizes	  that	  the	  
norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  is	  not	  unlimited.	  There	  exist	  certain	  criteria,	  
particularly	  where	  threats	  to	  the	  peace	  are	  concerned,	  or	  in	  situations	  where	  the	  
norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  must	  be	  reconsidered	  for	  threats	  to	  the	  international	  
peace	  and	  security.	  The	  question	  then	  becomes,	  what	  constitutes	  an	  emergency,	  
and	  who	  decides	  when	  the	  criteria	  are	  reached?	  The	  former	  is	  the	  question	  of	  just	  
cause,	  and	  the	  later	  of	  right	  authority.	  	  
In	  determining	  just	  cause	  the	  ICISS	  proposed	  the	  criteria	  of:	  	  
Large	  scale	  loss	  of	  life,	  actual	  or	  apprehended,	  with	  genocidal	  intent	  or	  
not,	  which	  is	  the	  product	  either	  of	  deliberate	  state	  action,	  or	  state	  neglect	  
or	  inability	  to	  act,	  or	  a	  failed	  state	  situation;	  or…large	  scale	  ‘ethnic	  
cleansing’,	  actual	  or	  apprehended,	  whether	  carried	  out	  by	  killing,	  forced	  
expulsion,	  acts	  of	  terror	  or	  rape	  (ICISS,	  2001,	  p.	  xii).	  




mentioned	  R2P	  type	  crimes	  in	  the	  2005	  World	  Summit.	  In	  determining	  the	  
question	  of	  right	  authority,	  the	  Commission	  placed	  no	  body,	  or	  source	  of	  
authority,	  above	  that	  of	  the	  Security	  Council.	  	  
By	  limiting	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect,	  the	  ICISS	  focuses	  its	  
efforts	  on	  the	  types	  of	  international	  conflict	  where	  the	  worst	  atrocities	  occur	  and	  
large-­‐scale	  loss	  of	  life	  is	  involved.	  Thus,	  international	  occurrences	  which	  do	  not	  
amount	  to	  jus	  cogens	  violations,	  and	  which	  would	  be	  excluded	  from	  invoking	  an	  
international	  responsibility	  to	  react,	  are	  many.	  Some	  examples	  include	  
widespread	  discrimination	  (assuming	  it	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  apartheid),	  
restriction	  of	  individual	  liberties	  such	  as	  freedom	  of	  expression	  or	  movement,	  the	  
overthrow	  of	  democratically	  elected	  governments,	  natural	  disasters,	  and	  the	  
harboring	  of	  terrorists.	  
Such	  examples	  could	  certainly	  be	  subject	  to	  prevention	  initiatives	  under	  
the	  auspices	  of	  the	  UN	  or	  international	  organizations,	  and	  they	  could	  also	  
potentially	  lead	  to	  R2P	  type	  crimes,	  but	  they	  are	  not,	  per	  se,	  addressed	  by	  the	  
responsibility	  to	  protect.	  Setting	  the	  just	  cause	  threshold	  high	  was	  a	  deliberate	  
attempt	  by	  the	  ICISS	  to	  focus	  consensus-­‐building	  efforts	  on	  the	  most	  dire	  of	  
circumstances.	  The	  R2P	  was	  both	  designed	  to	  make	  as	  much	  impact	  as	  possible	  in	  
a	  narrow	  field,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  avoid	  being	  used	  as	  a	  justification	  tool	  for	  the	  
imposition	  of	  national	  interests.	  Consequently,	  the	  ICISS	  does	  not	  advocate	  
alternate	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Charter	  that	  argue	  humanitarian	  intervention	  is	  




Because	  the	  ICISS	  places	  nothing	  before	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  in	  
authorizing	  military	  action	  against	  R2P	  type	  crimes,	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  
recommendations	  are	  directed	  towards	  the	  world	  body.	  Most	  recommendations	  
are	  aimed	  at	  managing	  the	  usage	  of	  the	  veto	  power	  vested	  in	  the	  permanent	  five	  
members	  (P5)	  of	  the	  Security	  Council.	  The	  first	  recommendation	  is	  that	  the	  P5	  
agree	  to	  adhere	  to	  a	  “code	  of	  conduct”	  which	  limits	  the	  usage	  of	  a	  state’s	  veto	  
power	  in	  R2P	  type	  crimes.	  According	  to	  the	  code	  of	  conduct,	  a	  State	  would	  not,	  
“…where	  its	  vital	  national	  interests	  were	  not	  claimed	  to	  be	  involved…use	  its	  veto	  
to	  obstruct	  the	  passage	  of	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  a	  majority	  resolution”	  (ICISS,	  
2001,	  p.	  51).	  
	  The	  skeleton	  in	  the	  closet	  here	  clearly	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  “vital	  national	  
interest,”	  not	  to	  mention	  that	  the	  impetus	  for	  using	  the	  veto	  rarely	  comes	  from	  
anything	  perceived	  to	  be	  less.	  This	  is	  however,	  barring	  a	  discussion	  on	  UN	  reform	  
and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  current	  Security	  Council	  makeup,	  an	  obvious	  limitation	  of	  
the	  body	  to	  act	  as	  impartial	  on	  behalf	  of	  humanity.	  Realists	  might	  argue	  that	  to	  
conceive	  of	  such	  a	  body	  is	  impossible,	  others	  that	  this	  is	  the	  very	  point	  of	  the	  
veto.	  If	  we	  focus	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  saving	  lives	  however,	  the	  very	  act	  of	  forging	  a	  
formal	  agreement,	  such	  an	  agreement	  would	  arguably	  be	  a	  significant	  first	  step	  in	  
improving	  P5	  cooperation	  for	  R2P	  type	  crimes,	  without	  entering	  into	  the	  debate	  




In	  the	  case	  that	  the	  “code	  of	  conduct”	  provision	  does	  not	  prevent	  
Security	  Council	  paralysis,	  the	  ICISS	  recommended	  two	  other	  methods	  for	  
fulfilling	  the	  international	  responsibility	  to	  protect.	  	  
The	  first	  alternative	  is	  known	  as	  	  “uniting	  for	  peace”	  and	  takes	  place	  
within	  the	  General	  Assembly.	  The	  procedure	  was	  created	  by	  resolution	  377	  in	  
1950	  as	  a	  contingency	  for	  overcoming	  Security	  Council	  deadlock	  while	  meeting	  
the	  Charter	  obligation	  of	  maintaining	  international	  peace	  and	  security.	  In	  the	  
resolution,	  the	  General	  Assembly:	  
Resolves	  that	  if	  the	  Security	  Council,	  because	  of	  lack	  of	  unanimity	  of	  the	  
permanent	  members,	  fails	  to	  exercise	  its	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  
maintenance	  of	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  in	  any	  case	  where	  there	  
appears	  to	  be	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  peace,	  breach	  of	  the	  peace,	  or	  act	  of	  
aggression,	  the	  General	  Assembly	  shall	  consider	  the	  matter	  immediately	  
with	  a	  view	  to	  making	  appropriate	  recommendations	  to	  Members	  for	  
collective	  measures,	  including	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  peace	  or	  act	  of	  
aggression,	  the	  use	  of	  armed	  force	  when	  necessary,	  to	  maintain	  or	  restore	  
international	  peace	  and	  security.	  If	  not	  in	  session	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  General	  
Assembly	  may	  meet	  in	  emergency	  special	  session	  within	  twenty-­‐four	  
hours	  of	  the	  request	  there	  for.	  Such	  emergency	  special	  session	  shall	  be	  
called	  if	  requested	  by	  the	  Security	  Council	  on	  the	  vote	  of	  any	  seven	  
members,	  or	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  Members	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  (U.N.	  




It	  was	  during	  such	  a	  “uniting	  for	  peace”	  session	  that	  one	  of	  the	  first	  
peacekeeping	  missions,	  UNEF,	  was	  established	  in	  1956	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  Suez	  
Crisis,	  achieving	  a	  moderate	  de-­‐escalation	  of	  tensions	  along	  the	  Israeli-­‐Egyptian	  
border(Thakur,	  2006).	  The	  “uniting	  for	  peace”	  option	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  invoked	  in	  
practice	  for	  conflicts	  meeting	  the	  conditions	  of	  R2P	  type	  crimes.	  	  
The	  second	  recommendation	  by	  the	  ICISS	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Security	  Council	  
deadlock	  is	  for	  a	  larger	  role	  to	  be	  played	  by	  regional	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  AU,	  
ASEAN,	  or	  NATO,	  in	  bringing	  an	  end	  to	  R2P	  type	  crimes.	  In	  meeting	  the	  
responsibility	  to	  protect	  through	  the	  use	  of	  military	  force,	  these	  regional	  
organizations	  would	  require	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  for	  their	  
operations,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  AU	  in	  Darfur.	  This	  suggestion	  has	  
precedence	  under	  chapter	  VIII	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  which	  allows	  for	  “regional	  
arrangements	  or	  agencies	  for	  dealing	  with	  such	  matters	  relating	  to	  the	  
maintenance	  of	  international	  peace	  and	  security…”	  (Charter	  of	  the	  United	  
Nations,	  2006),	  provided	  that	  the	  Security	  Council	  allows	  it.	  
Resolutions	  authorizing	  regional	  organizations	  to	  address	  crises	  within	  
their	  own	  member	  states,	  rather	  than	  the	  UN	  itself,	  may	  be	  less	  politically	  divisive	  
for	  reaching	  Security	  Council	  agreement,	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  obtain	  consent	  by	  the	  
state	  in	  question.	  The	  AU,	  for	  example,	  was	  able	  to	  get	  a	  toe	  in	  the	  door	  with	  the	  
government	  of	  Sudan	  through	  the	  philosophy	  of	  “African	  solutions	  for	  African	  
problems.”	  Of	  course,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  mission	  was	  still	  well	  below	  the	  




perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  they	  ultimately	  consented	  to	  it.	  With	  the	  
continued	  improvement	  of	  regional	  organizations	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  improve.	  The	  
NATO	  involvement	  in	  Bosnia	  in	  the	  early	  90’s,	  which	  was	  approved	  and	  
sanctioned	  by	  the	  UN,	  is	  another	  example	  of	  the	  involvement	  of	  regional	  
organizations,	  however	  its	  1999	  Kosovo	  campaign,	  having	  been	  waged	  without	  
Security	  Council	  approval,	  would	  not	  be.	  Finally,	  the	  ICISS	  also	  floated	  the	  
suggestion	  that	  action	  taken	  to	  fulfill	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  by	  regional	  
organizations	  might	  still	  be	  found	  legitimate,	  even	  if	  authorization	  were	  sought	  
ex	  post	  facto.	  
While	  addressing	  the	  question	  of	  unauthorized	  military	  intervention,	  the	  
ICISS	  was	  content	  to	  point	  out	  the	  dangers	  of	  a	  world	  where	  humanitarian	  
intervention	  is	  conducted	  outside	  UN	  authorization	  for	  the	  wrong	  reasons,	  and	  
the	  dangers	  for	  the	  UN,	  if	  it	  is	  successfully	  done	  for	  the	  right	  ones.	  It’s	  worth	  
restating	  this	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity;	  neither	  the	  R2P	  report,	  nor	  the	  2005	  
outcome	  document,	  have	  authorized	  or	  argued	  for	  military	  force	  outside	  UN	  
authority.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  gives	  the	  impression	  of	  being	  
genuinely	  concerned	  over	  the	  fate	  of	  international	  peace	  and	  security,	  should	  the	  
UN	  happen	  to	  veto	  itself	  into	  irrelevancy.	  In	  a	  word,	  the	  ICISS	  answer	  to	  Annan’s	  
earlier	  question	  seems	  to	  be,	  “fix	  your	  organization.”	  	  
Rebuilding	  
Finally,	  should	  the	  exercise	  of	  peacekeeping	  or	  intervention	  be	  necessary,	  




structural	  peace	  building.	  The	  commission	  viewed	  rebuilding	  as	  belonging	  to	  
the	  process	  of	  reconciliation	  and	  central	  in	  preventing	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  
conflict.	  Peace	  building	  follows	  the	  patterns	  recommended	  by	  Secretary	  General	  
Boutros	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  as	  actions	  “to	  identify	  and	  support	  structures	  which	  will	  
tend	  to	  strengthen	  and	  solidify	  peace	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  a	  relapse	  into	  conflict”	  
(Report	  of	  the	  Secretary	  General,	  1992,	  p.	  11).	  Conforming	  to	  peace	  psychologist	  
Johan	  Galtung’s	  description	  of	  peace	  building	  as	  an	  “associative”	  approach,	  the	  
R2P	  combines	  many	  elements	  for	  the	  development	  of	  peaceful	  societies	  
(Langholtz,	  1998,	  p.	  10).	  Included	  in	  the	  rebuilding	  process	  is	  the	  assurance	  of	  
security,	  development	  of	  a	  functional	  court	  system,	  and	  the	  encouragement	  of	  
local	  ownership	  through	  “creating	  patterns	  of	  cooperation	  between	  antagonistic	  
groups”	  (ICISS,	  2001,	  p.	  45).	  
As	  the	  ICISS	  points	  out,	  “true	  reconciliation	  is	  best	  generated	  by	  ground	  
level	  reconstruction	  efforts,	  when	  former	  armed	  adversaries	  join	  hands	  in	  
rebuilding	  their	  community	  or	  creating	  reasonable	  living	  and	  job	  conditions	  at	  
new	  settlements”	  (ICISS,	  2001,	  p.	  47).	  
Like	  elsewhere,	  the	  R2P	  draws	  from	  previous	  UN	  findings	  and	  endorses	  
the	  1998	  report	  on	  The	  causes	  of	  Conflict	  and	  the	  Promotion	  of	  Durable	  Peace	  and	  
Sustainable	  Development	  in	  Africa.	  In	  it,	  the	  report	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  
coordinating	  the	  efforts	  of	  promoting	  local	  economic	  growth,	  infrastructure	  
development,	  strengthening	  democratic	  governance,	  and	  maintaining	  security	  




Liberia	  which	  served	  to	  coordinate	  and	  improve	  the	  responses	  of	  the	  many	  
different	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	  post	  conflict	  peace	  building	  process	  (Report	  of	  the	  
Secretary-­‐General,	  1998,	  p.	  69).	  	  
R2P	  and	  the	  tension	  
The	  R2P	  navigates	  the	  tension	  between	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  and	  
protection	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  success.	  While	  the	  threat	  posed	  to	  sovereignty	  
by	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  appears	  minimal,	  other	  concerns	  such	  as	  empire	  
on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  insufficiency	  of	  response	  on	  the	  other,	  make	  the	  R2P	  no	  
more	  than	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  consensus	  building	  that	  must	  precede	  a	  new	  
response	  framework	  for	  humanitarian	  crises.	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  R2P	  works	  
towards	  a	  win/win	  outcome	  for	  the	  conflict.	  By	  issuing	  recommendations	  that	  
build	  on	  already	  established	  UN	  reports,	  recognizing	  the	  concerns	  on	  both	  sides	  
of	  the	  debate,	  and	  supporting	  the	  prohibition	  on	  the	  use	  of	  force	  without	  Security	  
Council	  authorization,	  the	  ICISS	  has	  drawn	  its	  report	  carefully	  down	  the	  middle.	  	  
While	  this	  is	  a	  strength,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  weakness,	  and	  opens	  the	  R2P	  up	  to	  the	  
criticism	  that	  it	  takes	  not	  enough	  concrete	  steps	  in	  either	  direction.	  Bullish	  
humanitarians	  will	  argue	  that	  it	  does	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  in	  endorsing	  the	  use	  of	  
force,	  while	  strict	  non-­‐interventionists	  will	  claim	  that	  its	  recommendations	  aim	  
to	  weaken	  the	  current	  restrictions	  already	  in	  place.	  	  	  
The	  narrow	  applicability	  of	  the	  intervention	  clauses	  in	  the	  R2P,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  recommendations	  made	  by	  the	  ICISS	  do	  not	  violate	  the	  UN	  




as	  it	  relates	  force,	  does	  not	  immediately	  change	  or	  alter	  the	  present	  
landscape.	  If,	  through	  its	  recommendations,	  it	  is	  able	  to	  alter	  the	  reaction	  
behavior	  in	  the	  UN	  towards	  emerging	  R2P	  type	  crimes,	  it	  certainly	  has	  the	  
potential	  for	  inciting	  the	  development	  of	  a	  new	  norm,	  and	  might	  safely	  be	  called	  
“emerging.”	  	  
Prevention	  in	  the	  R2P	  has	  the	  potential	  for	  meeting	  concerns	  on	  both	  
sides	  of	  the	  non-­‐intervention/protection	  debate.	  As	  recommended	  by	  the	  ICISS,	  it	  
can	  be	  performed	  in	  accordance	  with	  international	  law,	  and	  by	  respecting	  the	  
inviolability	  of	  state	  sovereignty.	  At	  present,	  the	  recommendations	  for	  improved	  
prevention	  measures,	  as	  made	  by	  the	  ICISS,	  remain	  unrealized	  and	  lacking	  in	  
momentum,	  while	  the	  2005	  world	  summit	  largely	  overlooked	  prevention,	  other	  
than	  mentioning	  the	  need	  for	  improved	  early	  warning	  (Bellamy,	  Conflict	  
Prevention	  and	  the	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect,	  2008).	  
With	  protection,	  the	  concept	  of	  “sovereignty	  as	  responsibility”	  does	  not	  
appear	  to	  fundamentally	  alter,	  threaten,	  or	  undermine	  the	  current	  nature	  of	  state	  
sovereignty,	  much	  less	  the	  role	  that	  it	  plays	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  international	  
relations.	  Sovereignty	  has	  long	  made	  accommodations	  for	  changing	  views	  and	  
practice	  in	  minority	  rights,	  human	  rights,	  globalization	  and	  even	  international	  
lending.	  As	  Krasner	  rightly	  points	  out,	  the	  flexibility	  that	  sovereignty	  has	  shown	  
throughout	  its	  history	  illustrates	  that	  it	  lacks	  features	  of	  “embeddedness	  or	  
taken-­‐for-­‐grantedness,”	  exhibiting	  features	  more	  aptly	  resembling	  an	  “organized	  




and	  the	  outcome	  document	  that	  the	  primary	  responsibility	  remains	  with	  the	  
state	  itself.	  Sovereignty	  as	  responsibility	  is	  a	  rhetorical	  tool	  for	  reminding	  states	  
of	  their	  standing	  obligations	  under	  existing	  law.	  
UN	  member	  states	  have	  always	  been	  subject	  to	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  Security	  
Council	  should	  they	  be	  found	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  peace,	  and	  although	  rare,	  even	  
when	  such	  rulings	  may	  violate	  a	  state’s	  Westphalian	  sovereignty.	  As	  the	  ICISS	  
made	  clear,	  in	  becoming	  a	  signatory	  to	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  sovereignty	  undergoes	  no	  
“transfer	  or	  dilution…but	  there	  is	  a	  necessary	  re-­‐characterization	  involved:	  from	  
sovereignty	  as	  control	  to	  sovereignty	  as	  responsibility	  both	  in	  internal	  functions	  
and	  external	  duties”	  (ICISS,	  2001,	  p.	  13).	  Thus,	  in	  the	  R2P,	  sovereignty	  as	  
responsibility	  reiterates	  the	  conditions	  of	  becoming	  a	  member	  of	  the	  UN	  that	  
have	  existed	  since	  its	  inception.	  	  
A	  persistent	  misconception	  that	  the	  R2P	  would	  erode	  legal	  state	  
sovereignty,	  and	  make	  unauthorized	  military	  intervention	  easier,	  has	  led	  to	  a	  
pushback	  worth	  exploring	  in	  more	  detail.	  In	  2008,	  following	  the	  recognition	  of	  
the	  R2P	  in	  the	  World	  Summit,	  again	  in	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  and	  later	  in	  the	  
Security	  Council,	  the	  UN	  began	  the	  process	  of	  implementing	  a	  special	  advisor	  for	  
the	  responsibility	  to	  protect.	  During	  a	  budget	  committee	  meeting,	  delegates	  from	  
the	  Middle	  East,	  Africa,	  and	  Latin	  America	  decided	  that	  “‘the	  World	  Summit	  
rejected	  R2P	  in	  2005’,	  ‘the	  concept	  of	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  has	  not	  been	  




was	  not	  accepted	  or	  approved	  as	  a	  principle	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly’”	  
(Evans,	  2008).	  
This	  resistance	  was	  encountered	  during	  the	  appointment	  of	  Edward	  Luck	  
as	  a	  special	  advisor	  on	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  by	  the	  Secretary	  General.	  
Ultimately,	  Mr.	  Luck	  was	  appointed,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  being	  blocked	  in	  the	  
budgetary	  approval	  process,	  would	  be	  paid	  one	  dollar	  per	  year	  under	  a	  
temporary	  status,	  and	  was	  left	  with	  a	  vague	  mandate	  other	  than	  to	  explore	  how	  
to	  “further”	  the	  ideas	  contained	  in	  the	  outcome	  document	  (U.N.	  General	  Assembly	  
62nd	  Sess.,	  2008).	  
General	  misunderstanding	  over	  the	  scope	  and	  implications	  of	  the	  R2P	  may	  
be	  partially	  at	  fault.	  One	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  R2P	  was	  derived	  from	  humanitarian	  
intervention,	  and	  was	  “intended	  to	  enlarge	  the	  basis	  of	  support	  for	  it”	  (Newman,	  
2009,	  p.	  98).	  Unfortunately,	  this	  interpretation	  of	  the	  R2P	  seems	  to	  brush	  aside	  
the	  deliberately	  cautious	  approach	  it	  takes,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  legal	  restrictions	  it	  
accepts.	  If	  the	  R2P	  does	  derive	  from	  humanitarian	  intervention,	  it	  does	  so	  only	  
from	  the	  fallout	  left	  by	  the	  zero-­‐sum	  approach	  of	  those	  arguing	  for	  the	  right	  to	  
humanitarian	  intervention.	  As	  the	  R2P	  clearly	  indicates,	  the	  ICISS	  did	  not	  intend	  
to	  expand	  support	  for	  the	  illegal	  use	  of	  force,	  but	  rather	  to	  stimulate	  and	  reframe	  
the	  deadlocked	  debate.	  By	  calling	  attention	  to	  the	  insufficiency	  of	  the	  response	  
framework	  for	  R2P	  type	  crimes,	  and	  placing	  it	  squarely	  on	  the	  international	  




In	  the	  direct	  aftermath	  of	  the	  R2P’s	  rise	  to	  popularity,	  there	  were	  a	  
number	  of	  conflicts	  that	  attempted	  to	  claim	  its	  vocabulary	  for	  themselves.	  These	  
included	  the	  American	  invasion	  of	  Iraq,	  the	  conflict	  in	  South	  Osetia,	  and	  the	  
French	  attempt	  to	  invoke	  the	  R2P	  to	  open-­‐up	  the	  restrictive	  government	  of	  
Burma	  to	  provide	  humanitarian	  aid	  following	  cyclone	  Nargis.	  None	  of	  these	  were	  
successful	  in	  convincing	  the	  international	  community	  that	  the	  R2P	  was	  interested	  
only	  in	  serving	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  powerful.	  
Some	  states	  have	  even	  sought	  to	  clarify	  these	  misconceptions.	  As	  Chile	  
pointed	  out	  during	  the	  Plenary	  Meeting	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly	  on	  the	  R2P,	  
“misuse	  of	  a	  concept	  does	  not	  invalidate	  it”	  (Badescu	  &	  Weiss,	  2010).	  Even	  the	  
case	  of	  Iraq,	  as	  Thakur	  (2005)	  has	  argued,	  demonstrates	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
R2P	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  bring	  legal	  clarification	  and	  consensus	  in	  the	  non-­‐
intervention/protection	  conflict.	  Indeed	  this	  may	  already	  be	  happening,	  as	  each	  
case	  where	  the	  R2P	  was	  appropriated,	  the	  resulting	  discussion	  seems	  to	  have	  
served	  to	  establish	  clearer	  boundaries	  on	  what	  the	  emerging	  norm	  is	  not,	  rather	  
than	  convince	  anybody	  that	  it	  is	  a	  Trojan	  horse	  for	  empire-­‐building	  (Badescu	  &	  
Weiss,	  2010).	  
This	  interpretation	  has	  also	  been	  confirmed	  by	  the	  2009	  report	  of	  the	  
Secretary	  General	  on	  implementing	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect.	  In	  it,	  Ban	  Ki-­‐
Moon	  made	  a	  plea	  for	  unity	  around	  the	  summit	  outcome	  document,	  while	  also	  
attempting	  to	  clarify	  common	  misconceptions.	  He	  argues	  that	  quick	  action	  




development	  of	  a	  rapid	  response	  agency	  consisting	  of	  both	  civilian	  and	  
police	  actors,	  which	  can	  be	  deployed	  in	  situations	  of	  rapidly	  escalating	  R2P	  type	  
crimes	  (U.N.	  General	  Assembly	  Res/63/677,	  2009).	  	  
Conflict	  prevention	  or	  rebuilding,	  that	  include	  the	  opening	  and	  developing	  
of	  economies	  to	  a	  global-­‐rather	  than	  local-­‐market,	  is	  a	  weakness	  of	  the	  R2P.	  The	  
construction	  of	  industry,	  economic	  opportunity,	  and	  functioning	  social	  services	  
are	  necessary	  for	  the	  development	  of	  peaceful	  societies.	  However,	  the	  dangers	  of	  
imperial	  influence,	  whether	  through	  NGOs,	  economic	  organizations,	  or	  corporate	  
exploit	  are	  significant.	  Particularly	  as	  cheap	  labor	  increasingly	  fuels	  the	  global	  
economy,	  and	  satisfies	  its	  raison	  d’être	  of	  increasing	  demand	  and	  expanding	  the	  
market,	  identifying	  and	  working	  against	  imperial	  dispersion	  will	  be	  crucial.	  	  
Of	  course,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  prevention,	  protection,	  and	  rebuilding	  
activities	  do	  result	  in	  the	  spread	  of	  empire	  will	  depend	  on	  our	  working	  definition	  
of	  the	  concept.	  If	  empire	  is	  centralized	  in	  a	  hegemonic	  power,	  certain	  diplomatic	  
and	  legal	  measures	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  shun,	  or	  clearly	  label	  such	  behavior.	  
Instead,	  if	  the	  danger	  is	  in	  the	  spread	  of	  networks	  of	  power	  and	  control	  through	  
the	  devices	  of	  global	  capitalism—whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  stitched	  as	  appendages	  
to	  a	  modicum	  of	  democracy—the	  task	  of	  isolating,	  much	  less	  controlling	  empire,	  
is	  tricky	  indeed.	  Slavoj	  Žižeck	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  despite	  the	  tendency	  to	  
dismiss	  Fukuyama’s	  claim	  of	  the	  “end	  of	  history”	  as	  characterizing	  the	  rise	  of	  
liberal	  democracy	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  collapse,	  we	  have	  come	  to	  




capitalism	  stay?	  Will	  States	  stay?’	  We	  basically	  accept	  the	  frame”	  
(Democracy	  Now,	  2008).	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  R2P	  passes	  on	  this	  question.	  Whether	  or	  
not	  this	  is	  prudent	  for	  the	  long-­‐term	  reduction	  of	  violent	  conflict	  should	  be	  
considered	  as	  a	  suggestion	  for	  further	  research.	  	  
	   Finally,	  a	  last	  objection	  to	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  regards	  the	  
imbalance	  of	  international	  power	  when	  applying	  protection	  elements	  to	  R2P	  type	  
crimes.	  The	  challenge	  or	  impossibility	  in	  holding	  powerful	  nations	  accountable,	  
who	  do	  not	  consent	  to	  a	  peacekeeping	  force,	  seems	  to	  be	  at	  first	  glance,	  an	  
obstacle	  in	  meeting	  the	  international	  responsibility	  to	  protect.	  In	  other	  words,	  it’s	  
hypocritical	  to	  expect	  some	  countries	  to	  submit	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Security	  
Council	  and	  the	  UN,	  while	  others	  may	  pick	  and	  choose	  what	  to	  follow,	  as	  the	  U.S.	  
did	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Nicaragua.	  	  
There	  are	  two	  responses	  to	  this	  argument,	  both	  of	  which	  recognize	  the	  
value	  of	  finding	  the	  best-­‐case	  scenario	  in	  less	  than	  ideal	  realities.	  The	  first	  is	  
straightforward:	  the	  reality	  of	  international	  power	  difference	  does	  not	  and	  
should	  not	  prevent	  the	  development	  and	  improvement	  of	  life-­‐saving	  response	  
criteria	  to	  humanitarian	  crises.	  The	  reality	  of	  power	  difference	  does	  not	  condemn	  
us	  to	  international	  nihilism.	  Just	  because	  the	  international	  community	  is	  unable	  
to	  intervene	  everywhere	  in	  the	  world,	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  cannot	  or	  should	  not,	  
intervene	  anywhere	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  second	  response	  recognizes	  that,	  limited	  
though	  they	  might	  be,	  there	  are	  exist	  actions	  recommended	  by	  the	  R2P	  that	  can	  




the	  ICISS	  points	  out,	  	  “[n]o	  major	  country	  in	  the	  world,	  however	  big	  and	  
powerful,	  is	  today	  wholly	  immune	  from	  peer	  group	  pressure”	  (Evans,	  2008,	  p.	  
293).	  	  
The	  future	  role	  of	  the	  R2P,	  as	  an	  impetus	  for	  consensus	  building	  between	  
the	  non-­‐intervention/protection	  conflict,	  appears	  to	  be	  continuing	  in	  the	  
immediate	  future.	  During	  a	  2009	  debate	  over	  future	  of	  the	  R2P	  in	  the	  General	  
Assembly,	  the	  melt-­‐down	  that	  was	  perceived	  imminent	  following	  the	  objections	  
during	  the	  appointment	  of	  the	  special	  advisor,	  failed	  to	  materialize.	  The	  result	  
was	  that	  the	  body	  endorsed	  the	  continued	  exploration	  of	  the	  R2P	  concept.	  
Likening	  the	  R2P	  to	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  as	  a	  focus	  for	  the	  
organization	  of	  efforts	  around	  a	  particular	  theme,	  Noam	  Chomsky	  pointed	  out	  
that	  the	  contributions	  of	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect,	  “with	  sufficient	  
commitment…	  could	  be	  significant	  indeed”	  (Chomsky,	  2009).	  
Darfur	  and	  the	  R2P	  
While	  there	  were	  many	  mistakes	  made	  in	  the	  response	  to	  Darfur	  there	  
were	  positive	  signs	  as	  well.	  Failures	  from	  May	  2003	  onwards	  stemmed	  from	  a	  
lack	  of	  political	  will	  and	  cohesion,	  particularly	  in	  the	  Security	  Council,	  and	  the	  
near	  absence	  of	  prevention	  efforts	  preceding	  the	  outbreak	  of	  violence.	  They	  
included	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  North-­‐South	  peace	  process	  over	  Darfur	  and	  its	  exclusion	  
from	  the	  CPA	  agreements,	  the	  lack	  of	  multilateral	  pressure,	  insufficient	  support	  




commitments	  to	  the	  international	  community,	  as	  it	  cited	  sovereignty	  in	  
order	  to	  prevent	  the	  deployment	  of	  UN	  peacekeepers	  (Srinivasan,	  2006).	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  AU	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  UN	  
peacekeepers,	  and	  the	  (albeit	  limited)	  positive	  impact	  it	  achieved	  during	  its	  first	  
observer	  mission,	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  its	  continued	  involvement	  in	  future	  conflicts	  in	  
Africa,	  and	  did	  take	  the	  first	  steps	  towards	  establishing	  security	  in	  the	  region	  
leading	  the	  way	  for	  UN	  involvement.	  	  
The	  deadlock	  that	  the	  AU	  was	  able	  to	  penetrate	  stemmed	  from	  objections	  
by	  Khartoum	  against	  UN	  peacekeepers,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  findings	  of	  a	  2004	  “mini	  
summit”	  in	  Tripoli,	  led	  by	  Libya	  and	  Egypt,	  that	  rejected	  “any	  foreign	  intervention	  
by	  any	  country	  whatsoever	  in	  this	  pure	  African	  issue”	  (Libyan	  Jamahiriya	  
Broadcasting	  Corporation,	  2004).	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  unity	  from	  China	  and	  Russia	  in	  the	  Security	  Council	  for	  the	  
application	  of	  pressure	  towards	  greater	  UN	  involvement	  contributed	  to	  the	  slow	  
and	  indecisive	  response.	  Resolution	  1556	  in	  2004,	  which	  demanded	  
(unsuccessfully)	  that	  the	  Sudan	  disarm	  the	  Janjaweed	  and	  endorsed	  the	  AU	  
deployment	  of	  monitors,	  passed	  only	  from	  China’s	  abstention.	  Later,	  under	  the	  
threat	  of	  a	  veto,	  China	  joined	  with	  Russia	  in	  abstaining	  from	  resolution	  1706	  
which,	  under	  China’s	  insistence	  of	  wording,	  “invited	  the	  consent”	  of	  Khartoum	  to	  
allow	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  southern	  UN	  presence	  into	  Darfur	  (Reeves,	  2007).	  
China’s	  motivation	  for	  doing	  so,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  close	  relationship	  with	  




2009;	  Straus,	  2005;	  Bellamy	  &	  Williams,	  2006).	  As	  a	  signal	  of	  support	  to	  
Khartoum,	  it	  also	  sent	  a	  government	  delegate	  in	  2007	  to	  survey	  a	  number	  of	  IDP	  
camps	  in	  Darfur,	  returning	  with	  findings	  that	  “humanitarian	  conditions	  were	  
generally	  fine	  and	  that	  security	  was	  improving,	  especially	  since	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  
Darfur	  Peace	  Agreement”	  (Reeves,	  2007).	  
The	  lack	  of	  unity	  in	  pressuring	  Sudan,	  the	  watering-­‐down	  of	  resolutions	  in	  
order	  to	  prevent	  them	  from	  being	  vetoed,	  and	  the	  underfunding	  of	  the	  AU,	  
demonstrated	  clearly	  to	  the	  government	  that	  the	  threats	  of	  the	  international	  
community	  were	  empty,	  and	  gave	  Khartoum	  the	  correct	  impression	  that	  it	  could	  
continue	  to	  as	  it	  wished.	  As	  Nathan	  (2007)	  points	  out,	  “the	  approach	  adopted	  in	  
relation	  to	  Darfur	  where	  the	  international	  community	  issued	  threats	  and	  then	  
failed	  to	  consistently	  act	  on	  them,	  emboldened	  the	  belligerents”	  (p.265).	  
Eventually,	  after	  international	  pressure	  focused	  on	  China	  as	  being	  
partially	  responsible	  for	  allowing	  the	  situation	  to	  continue,	  including	  the	  
cancellation	  of	  an	  appearance	  by	  Stephen	  Spielberg	  during	  the	  opening	  ceremony	  
of	  the	  Olympics,	  it	  joined	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  in	  authorizing	  the	  
hybrid	  AU/UN	  mission	  with	  resolution	  1769.	  In	  so	  doing,	  Sudan	  acquiesced	  to	  the	  
deployment	  of	  UN	  peacekeepers.	  
The	  lapse	  of	  nearly	  a	  year	  and	  a	  half	  between	  the	  outbreak	  of	  violence	  and	  
the	  first	  AU	  observers	  in	  Darfur,	  which	  also	  corresponded	  with	  the	  highest	  
number	  of	  deaths	  during	  the	  conflict,	  was	  likely	  the	  most	  egregious	  failure	  in	  the	  




unanimous	  international	  pressure,	  the	  UN	  would	  have	  become	  involved	  
much	  earlier	  as	  evidenced	  by	  their	  actions	  once	  resolution	  1769	  passed.	  If	  not,	  
unanimous	  international	  pressure	  may	  have	  secured	  a	  broader	  mandate	  or	  
adequate	  support	  for	  the	  AU	  towards	  stopping	  imminent	  attacks	  during	  the	  
counter-­‐insurgency.	  	  	  
Given	  the	  lack	  of	  cooperation	  from	  Russia	  and	  China,	  the	  authorization	  of	  
the	  initial	  AU	  mission	  demonstrates	  the	  value	  of	  increased	  participation	  of	  
international	  organizations,	  as	  recognized	  by	  the	  R2P.	  The	  fact	  that	  a	  poorly	  
designed,	  ill-­‐equipped,	  and	  underfunded	  observation	  force	  was	  able	  to	  reduce	  
violent	  deaths	  in	  Darfur	  suggests	  that	  a	  properly	  conducted	  one	  could	  have	  saved	  
that	  many	  more	  lives.	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  within	  the	  Security	  Council	  to	  enact	  early	  and	  
enforceable	  resolutions	  against	  the	  Al-­‐Bashir	  government	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  
Darfurians	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  “code	  of	  conduct”	  against	  the	  threat	  or	  
use	  of	  veto.	  The	  call	  for	  a	  “uniting	  for	  peace”	  procedure	  in	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  
even	  if	  it	  failed	  to	  pass,	  might	  have	  also	  rallied	  support	  for	  greater	  UN	  
involvement	  and	  put	  pressure	  on	  countries	  abstaining	  from	  Security	  Council	  
resolutions.	  	  
Accompanying	  the	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  was	  a	  widespread	  failure	  of	  early	  
warning	  and	  prevention	  systems	  preceding	  the	  outbreak	  of	  violence	  in	  Darfur.	  
Despite	  reports	  from	  NGOs	  throughout	  the	  90’s	  that	  the	  tensions	  between	  ethnic	  




region	  between	  1992	  and	  2001	  (Srinivasan,	  2006).	  Paradoxically,	  in	  2003	  
following	  a	  report	  from	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  
expressing	  concern	  for	  the	  worsening	  situation,	  Sudan	  was	  removed	  from	  the	  
watch	  list	  of	  the	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  special	  rappertours	  were	  
pulled	  out	  (Srinivasan,	  2006).	  Combined	  with	  international	  unwillingness	  to	  view	  
Darfur	  and	  the	  north/south	  peace	  process	  as	  connected,	  or	  address	  them	  in	  
unison,	  the	  few	  warning	  signs	  that	  did	  exist	  were	  muted	  or	  ignored,	  ultimately	  
preventing	  a	  timely	  reaction	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  violence.	  
While	  there	  are	  many	  difficulties	  in	  establishing	  conflict	  prevention	  
mechanisms,	  including	  predicting	  which	  tensions	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  escalate	  into	  
open	  conflict	  in	  allocating	  resources,	  and	  determining	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  
measures	  taken,	  (Wallensteen,	  2007)	  Darfur	  lacked	  even	  moderate	  prevention	  
measures.	  	  
It’s	  worth	  noting	  that	  while	  native	  tribal	  conflict	  resolution	  does	  exist,	  and	  
is	  often	  used	  in	  the	  native	  administrations	  of	  rural	  Darfur,	  it	  has	  traditionally	  
been	  used	  to	  address	  local	  land	  disputes	  and	  small-­‐scale	  conflicts	  within	  the	  
community.	  As	  Abdul-­‐Jalil,	  Mohammed,	  &	  Yousuf	  (2007)	  point	  out,	  these	  native	  
administrators	  were	  often	  exploited	  by	  younger,	  educated	  politicans	  who	  sought	  
to	  polorize	  ethnic	  tensions	  for	  their	  political	  gain	  (p.66).	  
The	  importance	  of	  early	  warning	  is	  repeatedly	  emphasized	  in	  the	  R2P,	  and	  
was	  also	  among	  the	  specific	  recommendations	  in	  the	  2005	  outcome	  document.	  If	  




then	  early	  warning	  is	  among	  the	  most	  important	  elements	  of	  the	  
responsibility	  to	  prevent.	  These	  failures	  in	  Darfur	  seem	  to	  echo	  the	  need	  for	  the	  
ICISS	  recommendations	  of	  a	  centralized	  agency	  to	  collect	  and	  aggregate	  early	  
warning	  information	  for	  emerging	  conflicts,	  and	  sound	  the	  alarm	  when	  situations	  
begin	  to	  turn	  violent.	  	  
Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  the	  unwillingness	  of	  the	  international	  
community	  to	  challenge	  Sudan’s	  sovereignty	  following	  its	  loud	  and	  frequent	  
objections	  to	  a	  UN	  peacekeeping	  mission,	  combined	  with	  the	  numbers	  of	  dead,	  
wounded,	  and	  displaced	  shows	  that	  Darfur	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	  manifest	  
example	  of	  the	  basic	  conflict	  between	  non-­‐intervention	  and	  protection.	  
Failure	  of	  the	  R2P?	  
The	  case	  of	  Darfur	  illustrates	  that	  the	  present	  response	  framework	  for	  
R2P	  type	  crimes	  remains	  insufficient.	  It	  further	  demonstrates	  the	  importance	  of	  
consensus	  building	  in	  the	  conflict	  between	  sovereignty	  and	  protection.	  Finally,	  it	  
shows	  that	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  ICISS	  were	  not	  invoked	  against	  Sudan	  
during	  the	  height	  of	  the	  killings.	  If	  the	  number	  of	  dead,	  displaced,	  and	  abused	  is	  
any	  indication,	  the	  international	  response	  to	  Darfur	  was	  a	  failure.	  	  
That	  the	  international	  community	  did	  not	  violate	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  Darfur	  
upheld	  the	  norm	  of	  non-­‐intervention.	  That	  so	  many	  people	  died	  preventable	  
deaths	  early	  in	  the	  conflict	  was	  a	  failure	  of	  protection.	  This	  may	  lead	  one	  to	  view	  
Darfur	  as	  illustrating	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  R2P,	  yet	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  premature	  for	  a	  




First,	  the	  R2P	  achieved	  affirmation	  and	  adoption	  in	  the	  2005	  world	  
summit	  around	  the	  same	  time	  that	  the	  AU	  had	  been	  able	  to	  marginally	  improve	  
death	  rates	  in	  Sudan.	  Considering	  that	  the	  R2P	  is	  essentially	  a	  collection	  of	  
recommendations	  for	  the	  UN	  that	  attempt	  to	  improve	  its	  overall	  response	  for	  
large-­‐scale	  violent	  conflict,	  and	  not	  a	  legal	  treaty	  or	  convention,	  its	  
implementation	  cannot	  be	  expected	  to	  happen	  in	  such	  a	  short	  amount	  of	  time.	  
Immediately	  following	  the	  world	  summit	  vote,	  the	  R2P	  had	  hardly	  been	  given	  a	  
chance	  to	  work	  its	  way	  into	  the	  procedures	  of	  the	  world	  body,	  not	  to	  mention	  
survive	  the	  subsequent	  pushback	  following	  the	  world	  summit	  adoption.	  	  
Second,	  Darfur	  would	  illustrate	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  R2P	  if	  its	  conditions	  for	  
success	  were	  based	  on	  deploying	  troops	  into	  conflict	  zones	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  R2P	  works	  on	  a	  much	  deeper	  level,	  and	  represents	  an	  
attempt	  to	  reconcile	  protection	  with	  the	  existing	  norms	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  and	  
international	  law.	  
Third,	  one	  case	  is	  an	  insufficient	  indicator	  of	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  the	  
responsibility	  to	  protect.	  As	  the	  R2P	  is	  largely	  about	  reframing	  the	  debate	  and	  
working	  towards	  consensus	  building,	  its	  impact	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  seen	  through	  
a	  number	  of	  cases,	  should	  it	  manifest	  at	  all.	  	  
Darfur	  was	  certainly	  not	  an	  example	  of	  the	  R2P	  principles	  in	  action.	  Sudan	  
not	  only	  failed	  in	  its	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  its	  population,	  but	  actively	  
contributed	  in	  their	  suffering.	  Sudan	  exploited	  the	  concept	  of	  sovereignty	  with	  




misdirect	  the	  international	  community	  to	  continue	  their	  disastrous	  policies	  
relatively	  unabated.	  Darfur	  was	  a	  perfect	  example	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  further	  
consensus	  and	  was	  a	  prime	  candidate	  for	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	  ICISS,	  but	  
unfortunately	  saw	  very	  few	  of	  them	  applied.	  	  
Even	  so,	  a	  forceful	  unilateral	  or	  multilateral	  military	  intervention	  in	  
Darfur	  without	  Security	  Council	  approval,	  in	  the	  largest	  country	  in	  Africa,	  lacking	  
an	  underlying	  peace	  process,	  at	  the	  closing	  end	  of	  a	  civil	  war,	  and	  in	  spite	  of	  
efforts	  by	  the	  AU,	  would	  very	  likely	  have	  been	  equally	  disastrous.	  The	  function	  of	  
peacekeepers	  is	  to	  support	  a	  peace	  agreement	  or	  ceasefire,	  and	  as	  De	  Waal	  
(2007)	  points	  out,	  the	  “efforts	  to	  obtain	  a	  peace	  agreement	  and	  efforts	  to	  bring	  
UN	  troops	  to	  Darfur	  cancelled	  each	  other	  out”	  (p.381).	  	  
Cohesion	  in	  the	  international	  community,	  particularly	  in	  the	  Security	  
Council,	  would	  have	  been	  a	  start.	  If	  it	  had	  existed,	  the	  forceful	  imposition	  of	  a	  no-­‐
fly	  zone	  in	  the	  areas	  where	  the	  government	  employed	  the	  use	  of	  helicopters	  and	  
airplanes	  to	  bomb	  villages,	  or	  at	  least	  providing	  the	  AU	  with	  aerial	  defense	  
capabilities	  would	  have	  disrupted	  the	  aerial	  coordination	  of	  attacks	  between	  the	  
government	  and	  the	  Janjaweed,	  and	  halted	  bombing	  campaigns.	  Improved	  early	  
warning	  systems	  to	  identify	  the	  emerging	  violence	  would	  have	  allowed	  
mediators	  to	  work	  towards	  easing	  tensions,	  while	  greater	  support	  for	  economic	  
development	  programs	  and	  peace-­‐building	  initiatives	  would	  have	  opened	  further	  
channels	  for	  dialogue	  between	  Arab	  and	  African	  groups.	  More	  concerted	  




the	  calling	  for	  a	  “uniting	  for	  peace”	  procedure	  or	  a	  greater	  use	  of	  existing	  
rapid	  response	  teams	  to	  augment	  the	  AU	  team,	  could	  have	  improved	  ceasefire	  
monitoring	  efforts.	  	  
Examples	  of	  such	  measures	  in	  action	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  2008	  post	  election	  
unrest	  in	  Kenya,	  which	  has	  been	  cited	  as	  one	  example	  where	  swift	  prevention	  
measures	  were	  taken	  to	  deescalate	  tensions	  and	  save	  lives	  (Brown,	  2009).	  Talks	  
mediated	  by	  Kofi	  Annan,	  the	  involvement	  of	  a	  unified	  Security	  Council	  which	  
voted	  for	  a	  swift	  resolution	  to	  the	  conflict	  mere	  weeks	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  
violence,	  along	  with	  swift	  criminal	  charges	  for	  police	  brutality	  and	  a	  targeted	  
travel	  ban	  imposed	  by	  the	  United	  States	  helped	  in	  reducing	  violence,	  and	  led	  to	  a	  
power	  sharing	  agreement	  between	  the	  opposing	  parties	  (BBC,	  2008).	  When	  
international	  political	  will	  comes	  together	  in	  agreement	  towards	  a	  common	  goal,	  
the	  effect	  can	  be	  dramatic.	  
Consensus	  building	  in	  a	  conflict	  between	  the	  nature	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  
may	  not	  entirely	  satisfy	  the	  understandable	  impulse	  of	  taking	  action	  when	  people	  
are	  dying	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  violent	  conflict.	  However	  in	  conflict	  resolution,	  
consensus	  building	  is	  a	  necessary	  first	  step,	  and	  just	  as	  important	  in	  determining	  
what	  outcomes	  can	  ultimately	  be	  agreed	  upon.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  I	  believe	  
the	  underlying	  objectives	  of	  the	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  become	  the	  most	  





In	  brief,	  the	  non-­‐intervention/protection	  conflict	  has	  not	  been	  solved	  by	  
the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect.	  The	  importance	  of	  working	  
towards	  consensus	  however	  to	  give	  meaning	  to	  the	  phrase	  “never	  again,”	  could	  
not	  be	  clearer.	  
Fisher	  &	  Ury	  (1981)	  point	  out	  “as	  more	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  positions,	  less	  
attention	  is	  devoted	  to	  meeting	  the	  underlying	  concerns	  of	  the	  parties.	  
Agreement	  becomes	  less	  likely”	  (p.5).	  Arguments	  for	  a	  right	  to	  humanitarian	  
intervention	  assume	  positions,	  rather	  than	  interests.	  “We	  demand	  the	  right	  to	  
protect	  suffering	  peoples,”	  says	  one	  side,	  “We	  demand	  the	  right	  to	  autonomy	  and	  
non-­‐interference,”	  says	  the	  other.	  Meanwhile,	  intervention	  either	  goes	  forward	  
breaking	  laws	  and	  destroying	  any	  existing	  channels	  of	  dialogue,	  or	  individuals	  
suffer	  and	  die	  while	  no	  action	  is	  taken.	  
The	  R2P	  tore	  a	  page	  directly	  from	  Fisher	  &	  Ury’s	  playbook.	  Protection	  is	  an	  
interest,	  not	  a	  position.	  It	  can	  be	  filled	  many	  different	  ways,	  and	  stands	  for	  
something	  much	  larger	  than	  the	  narrow	  concept	  of	  the	  right	  to	  humanitarian	  
intervention.	  Most	  importantly,	  it	  serves	  to	  foster	  dialogue	  and	  real	  negotiation	  
among	  the	  international	  community,	  a	  dialogue	  that	  continues	  to	  find	  willing	  
participants	  in	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  states.	  
Among	  the	  largest	  outstanding	  issues	  to	  be	  discussed	  are	  the	  very	  
practical	  questions	  of	  improving	  the	  rules	  of	  force	  within	  the	  Security	  Council.	  




what	  criteria	  should	  force,	  or	  the	  threat	  of	  it,	  be	  allowed	  when	  the	  P5	  are	  in	  
agreement?	  
One	  suggestion	  for	  further	  research	  might	  be	  the	  use	  of	  tit	  for	  tat	  as	  the	  
strategy	  activated	  when	  R2P	  crimes	  are	  identified	  and	  action	  deemed	  necessary.	  
Tit	  for	  tat	  is	  a	  negotiation	  strategy	  and	  the	  most	  successful	  approach	  to	  solving	  
the	  prisoner’s	  dilemma	  that	  emphasizes	  cooperation	  with	  the	  other	  party	  at	  first,	  
matches	  uncooperative	  behavior	  in	  kind,	  and	  reverts	  again	  to	  cooperation	  when	  
the	  other	  party	  shows	  willingness	  (Axelrod,	  1984).	  
Once	  the	  Security	  Council	  deems	  that	  a	  R2P	  type	  situation	  exists,	  tit	  for	  tat	  
could	  then	  be	  used	  to	  include	  the	  full	  range	  of	  diplomatic	  measures	  from	  both	  
cooperative,	  and	  punitive	  standpoints.	  Sanctions	  or	  development	  aid,	  travel	  
restrictions	  or	  greater	  political	  recognition	  could	  all	  be	  included	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
negotiation,	  and	  tit	  for	  tat	  strategy	  could	  potentially	  mitigate	  stall	  tactics	  and	  
subterfuge,	  while	  also	  leaving	  the	  door	  for	  cooperation	  always	  open.	  
Additionally,	  a	  focus	  on	  meeting	  basic	  human	  needs,	  combined	  with	  the	  
structural	  peace	  building	  concepts	  found	  in	  the	  R2P	  could	  serve	  to	  guide	  
prevention	  and	  rebuilding	  efforts.	  The	  drive	  to	  meet	  basic	  psychological	  and	  
physiological	  needs,	  and	  the	  resulting	  frustration	  when	  such	  needs	  remain	  
unmet,	  often	  leads	  to	  certain	  response	  processes	  which	  make	  violence	  much	  
more	  likely.	  	  
The	  need	  for	  identity,	  for	  example,	  has	  lead	  to	  the	  “increased	  identification	  




conflicts	  and	  genocides”	  (Staub,	  2003,	  p.	  54).	  Recognizing	  the	  lack	  of	  these	  
underlying	  needs,	  especially	  with	  perpetrators	  of	  egregious	  instances	  of	  violence,	  
will	  lead	  to	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  root	  causes	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  such	  
violence	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  and	  inform	  and	  guide	  prevention	  efforts	  as	  
recommended	  by	  the	  R2P.	  Developing	  societies	  around	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  basic	  
human	  needs	  should	  be	  the	  normative	  goal	  in	  rebuilding	  and	  development	  
efforts,	  and	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  early	  warning	  systems,	  could	  ultimately	  
diminish	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  that	  eventually	  meet	  the	  designation	  of	  R2P	  type	  
crimes.	  Due	  to	  the	  intractable	  nature	  of	  the	  basic	  conflict	  between	  protection	  and	  
non-­‐intervention,	  maximizing	  such	  prevention	  efforts	  would	  effectively	  bypass	  
many	  of	  contentious	  obstacles	  in	  the	  debate.	  	  
Still,	  the	  process	  of	  implementing	  the	  R2P,	  and	  determining	  when	  
sufficient	  consensus	  exists,	  are	  important	  questions	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  
Accomplishing	  such	  tasks	  cannot	  guarantee	  the	  prevention	  or	  swift	  cessation	  of	  
future	  atrocities.	  However,	  given	  the	  momentum	  the	  R2P	  has	  already	  achieved,	  
and	  the	  potential	  it	  contains	  for	  achieving	  consensus,	  continuing	  the	  dialogue	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